

# **Deleuze and Guattari's Geophilosophy: The Fabulation of a People-to-come and Becoming-Revolutionary**

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**Abstract:** In this paper, I develop Deleuze and Guattari's Geophilosophy as an expression of the philosophy of becoming-revolutionary. Firstly, I provide a general background on the concept of geophilosophy, in relation to the concepts such as contingency and becoming-Greek. It will be followed by a discussion on the art of fabulation and the people-to-come, in conjunction with the theory of refrain and politics. The said discussions accentuate the close affinity between arts and politics in the Deleuzo-Guattarian canon. Lastly, I elucidate geophilosophy in relation to revolutionary becoming and utopia. In this vein, geophilosophy transforms into a philosophy of becoming-revolutionary whose underlying principle is the creation of a world and people-to-come.

**Keywords:** Geophilosophy, becoming-revolutionary, fabulation, virtual people, deterritorialization

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## What is Geophilosophy?

**W***hat is Philosophy?* is the last work written by Deleuze and Guattari where they explicitly explain geophilosophy.<sup>1</sup> In the book, they deal with their definition of philosophy as the ability to create concepts that critically engage the present, paving way for a world and people-to-come.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, they elucidate the role of geography and spatiality in the configurations of our answers or ways to engage with the present. In this regard, part of the discussion is philosophy's relationship with arts and science, and more importantly, its intrinsic relation to the Earth. These efforts presuppose their goal of reorienting philosophy as a materialist, earthy, and spatial endeavor.<sup>3</sup> Such philosophical initiative, I suppose, is one of the most concrete ways to articulate the philosophy of immanence that undergirds their entire project. In this sense, geography and spatiality transfigure as groundwork principles of a new philosophy—geophilosophy.

In geophilosophy, thinking no longer harbors on the principle of historicity and temporality. It is “neither a line drawn between subject and object nor a revolving of one around the other. Rather, thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth.”<sup>4</sup> If thinking is inextricably related to territory, then humanity must realize that the earth itself observes its own self-organizing material systems and complexity beyond our rational or philosophical intervention. Similarly, thinking “constantly carries out a movement of deterritorialization on the spot, by which it goes beyond its own territory.”<sup>5</sup> One may also look at the third chapter in *A Thousand Plateaus* entitled, “10,000 B.C.: The Geology of Morals (Who Does the Earth Think It Is?),” that contains discussions about the earth's self-organizing capacity.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The project was originally written by Deleuze alone. But it undergoes comprehensive revisions during his collaborative years, especially after *A Thousand Plateaus*' publication. As described by their biographer Francois Dosse, *What is Philosophy?* is “both a very personal project and something of a crowning moment in a philosopher's life” [(Francois Dosse, *Deleuze and Guattari: Intersecting Lives*, trans. by D. Glassman (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 456]; Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).

<sup>2</sup> This very definition of philosophy indispensably serves as the guiding principle of *Anti-Oedipus*' schizoanalysis, *Kafka's* micropolitics of literature, and *A Thousand Plateaus*' becoming-minoritarian.

<sup>3</sup> Mark Bonta and John Protevi, *Deleuze and Geophilosophy: A Guide and Glossary* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2004), 92.

<sup>4</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 84.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1987), v.

Further, Deleuze and Guattari opine that “philosophy is a geophilosophy in precisely the same way that history is a geohistory from Braudel’s point of view.”<sup>7</sup> Deleuze’s formulation of the principle of difference as philosophy’s new image of thought is derived from the ruins of the old image of thought—the philosophy of identity or representation. In the context of geophilosophy, the new Deleuzo-Guattarian materialism or philosophy of immanence is represented by ‘contingency’ as the new image of thought against the backdrop of western philosophy’s proclivity towards the rational. A philosophy based on contingency assumes that the birth of philosophy in Greece was not an organized phenomenon. Using Braudel’s line of reasoning, Deleuze and Guattari ponder that philosophy’s natality is an off-spring of various contingent, socio-economic, political, and geographic tensions or relations.

Greece’s freedom from Persian invasion prompts a creative and vigorous ‘milieu of immanence’ in Greek society.<sup>8</sup> Numerous kinds of developments in the Greek society, especially in relation to cultural and socio-political aspects of communal living, occurred. However, notwithstanding this golden era in the Greek society, it generated a kind of paradox, which really challenged philosophers like Plato. While the Greek milieu of immanence provided a very congenial and meaningful place for philosophical thinking, it was nevertheless unfriendly towards great philosophers. Accordingly, the pre-Socratic thinkers who are nurtured by Egyptian education returned to Greece and imparted their knowledge to the people. On one hand, the Greek society’s deterritorialization of political autonomy and cooperation fashions novel socio-political values and ideals, like ‘immanence, friendship, and opinion’<sup>9</sup> that were embraced by philosophy eventually. On the other, Keith Woodward explains, “it was the arrival of minor outsiders (Egyptian philosophers) into that milieu that gave rise to the Western philosophical system.”<sup>10</sup> Obviously, the principle of contingency (contingent geographical proximities and historical accidents) plays a very indispensable contribution to the advent of Western philosophy in the Greek milieu. In a nutshell, geophilosophy theorizes that philosophy needs the contingent connection between absolute deterritorialization (of a thought of radical immanence) and a relative social deterritorialization (that constitutes a milieu of social immanence).<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., 95; See also Ferdinand Braudel, *Civilization and Capitalism 15<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> Century* (London: HarperCollins, 1985).

<sup>8</sup> See Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 87.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 88.

<sup>10</sup> Keith Woodward, “Geophilosophy,” in [https://www.academia.edu/27206983/Geophilosophy\\_The\\_International\\_Encyclopedia\\_of\\_Geography\\_2017](https://www.academia.edu/27206983/Geophilosophy_The_International_Encyclopedia_of_Geography_2017) (accessed April 28, 2018).

<sup>11</sup> See Bonta and Protevi, *Deleuze and Geophilosophy*, 92-93.

The trajectory of the discussion of contingency leads to Deleuze and Guattari claim that philosophy is undeniably a Greek authorship. Similarly, they claim that one must become a Greek to profoundly understand its merits. In other words, becoming-Greek entails the creative and critical process by which one becomes a nomad to Greek philosophy, in a time when becoming Greek is already an impossibility. Meaning to say, becoming-Greek implies becoming a nomad, that is, becoming neither Greek nor non-Greek. Rodolphe Gasché further elaborates this phenomenon of becoming in *Geophilosophy: On Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's What is Philosophy?*:

[A]s philosophers, how are they to become Greek in a way that is not to be confounded with what the Greeks were, so as to be able to do something different from the Greeks, something radically new, which however, is not therefore something necessarily un-Greek, something beyond philosophy, but on the contrary, a form of philosophy that adequately responds to the modern and contemporary world?<sup>12</sup>

The aforementioned problematic of becoming-Greek posited above challenges us to conceptualize a philosophy or to create philosophical concepts that would satisfy the contemporary democratic and capitalist territories, and would allow us to critically engage with them in order to produce new connections, values, and subjectivities. As Deleuze and Guattari radically explicates in *What is Philosophy?*:

The object of philosophy is not to contemplate the eternal or to reflect history but to diagnose our actual becomings: a becoming-revolutionary that... is not the same thing as the past, present, or future of revolutions. A becoming-democratic that is not the same as what States of law are, or even a becoming-Greek that is not the same as what the Greeks were. The diagnosis of becomings in every passing present is what Nietzsche assigned to the philosopher as physician, “physician of civilization,” or inventor of new immanent modes of existence.<sup>13</sup>

Indeed, there is a very important link between the philosopher and the concept in Deleuze and Guattari's philosophy. In fact, they opine in the same book that philosopher is the concept's friend in the Greek sense of the word: “He is potentiality of the concept. That is, philosophy is not a simple art of forming, inventing, or fabricating concepts, because concepts are not necessarily forms, discoveries, or products.”<sup>14</sup> Philosophy involves the creation of new concepts. Even though the act of creation appears to be arts' entitlement, and that science is also

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<sup>12</sup> Rodolphe Gasché, *Geophilosophy: On Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's What is Philosophy?* (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2014), xi.

<sup>13</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 112-113.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

creative, it is “only philosophy [that] creates concepts in the strict sense. Concepts are not waiting for us ready-made, like heavenly bodies.”<sup>15</sup> ‘Democracy,’ that is, democracy already subsumed by advance capitalism, cannot be considered as a philosophical concept because initially it lacks creativity necessary for the creation of new concepts or states of living. Albeit capitalist axioms bear an intrinsic creativity in commodifying all subjectivities, objects, and experiences into commodified entities, as well as inaugurates the potentiality for a universal history, its version of deterritorialization merely strengthens the capitalist system, instead of diagramming world and people-to-come.

Since philosophy is the concept’s friend and essentially characterized by creativity, then one must treat it critically and politically. I deem it necessary to distinguish the word ‘critically’ from ‘politically’ because in my view one may be critical only for self-gratification. Capitalism likewise is incessantly critical of itself that is why it indefatigably and immanently overcomes its own limits. But, of course, the political vocation of philosophy requires more than that. One’s observance of criticality must always be informed by the noble impetus to transfigure the present towards a world and people-to-come. As Nietzsche radically argues in *The Will to Power*, “[Philosophers] must no longer accept concepts as a gift, nor merely purify and polish them, but first make and create them, present them and make them convincing. Hitherto one has generally trusted one’s concepts as if they were a wonderful dowry from some sort of wonderland.”<sup>16</sup>

## **The Creative Fabulation of a People-to-come**

### *The Art of Fabulation*

The idea of a ‘people’ is one of the most bastardized or banalized concepts in the history of mankind. It was used by some great thinkers to unify a deteriorating nation, or to give hope to a colonized society. Concepts such as ‘unity,’ ‘freedom,’ ‘nation,’ etc., are frequently attached to it in order to gain a politico-historical force—the unity of the people, the freedom of the people of Abraham, and the rehabilitation of the Philippine nation, are some of its examples. But as time evolves, this very concept also opens the possibility for deception, colonization, and imperialism. In the first place, the ‘people’ is an abstract and universal term. Given these attributes, it can serve as a transcendental concept or a majoritarian standard to all individuals

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, trans. by Walter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968), 409.

regardless of socio-economic, political, and cultural differences and contingencies. However, its metaphysical configuration is undeniably formulated at a particular time, and by a particular circumstance and subjectivities. The problem lies when, to use the language of Adorno, the concept becomes more real than the object it represents.<sup>17</sup> As the term people is transcendentalized, the contingencies surrounding it are disregarded, thus losing its material value. Consequently, it transforms into a device of totalization that disheartens manifold kinds of divergence and becoming.

Another problem occurs when the concept 'people' is used as means to an end, and not as an end in itself. In a democratic society, such concept is oftentimes used and abused by political leaders and would-be politicians. During election time, for example, different techno-media networks and channels would bombard us with political utterances, trivialized advertisements, and whimsical promises in order to dignify aspiring leaders. All of them would deceptively utilize the mantra 'for the people,' 'genuine service to the people,' and the perennial triumphalist adage that 'he/she is the leader the people are waiting for' etc. An individual whose basis for living is only the social media would of course be easily deceived by these rhetorics. In this vein, albeit it superficially appears that this political practice prudently treats the concept people as an end in itself, history would say otherwise—that it is merely used as a ploy in pursuit of political, economic, and narcissistic gains.

In the field of philosophy, the 'people' also occupies an important place, especially in the philosophies of Heidegger and Nietzsche.<sup>18</sup> In particular, the said concept informs their quest for the myth and philosopher of the future. As the great poet Hölderlin claims, myths bear the capacity to invent a people or a Nation.<sup>19</sup> Such creative aptitude prompts the whole right-wing German Romanticist including Heidegger, to use this creative concept as a regulative principle for all their principles and aspirations. Nonetheless history teaches us that these myths are also used as devices of trickery and domination. Like the instrumentalization of the people in democratic societies, we are all aware that the Nazis likewise use the said concept as propaganda for the massive and overbearing promotion of the National Socialist ideology.

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<sup>17</sup> See Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, trans. by E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973).

<sup>18</sup> In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and *Beyond Good and Evil*, for example, it can be observed how Nietzsche explains how modern nihilism or Christian morality engenders the degeneration of modern humanity or 'people,' and how it can be overcome. See Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961); Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book For Everyone and No One*, trans. with an introduction by R.J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin Books, 1969).

<sup>19</sup> See Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister,"* trans. by William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indiana Press, 1996).

As history turns into a fable under different ideological manipulations across time, Nietzsche believes that a glimmer of hope can still be uncovered from its ruins. History as fable “mythifies” or reifies particular historical personalities and occurrences (like revolutionary leaders, political statesmen, and influential classes) relevant to the present time. In this regard, there exist unsung and forgotten heroes of historical events. However, what lies behind their marginalization in the pages of history is the possibility of being protected from internal and external appropriations, and more importantly, of opening the possibility of uplifting the people’s lives. Nietzsche formulates the notion of monumental history in order for history to be in the service of life, and not of particular ideology or dominant class. It optimizes past greatness in conjunction with the unexplored spaces and unheard voices of the past to creatively inspire a new generation of incredible achievements.<sup>20</sup> Despite the brilliance of humanity across time, we must not forget that in history, such positive attribute can anytime be manipulated to benefit a select few, and converted into life-denying values. In “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for life,” in *Untimely Meditations*, Nietzsche writes:

...that the great moments in the struggle of the human individual constitute a chain, that this chain unites mankind across the millennia like a range of human mountain peaks, that the summit of such a long-ago moment shall be for me still living, bright and great – that this is the fundamental idea of the faith in humanity which finds expression in the demand for a monumental history.<sup>21</sup>

In Deleuzo-Guattarian perspective, myths and monumental history always carry the potentiality of being transformed into majoritarian standards or what Lyotard calls as grand narratives. The peril is that even the marginalized or minorities bear the danger of becoming the next dominant or majoritarian authorities. Rather than succumbing to the principles offered by myth and monumental history, Deleuze and Guattari pursue a micropolitics of history whose goal is “to unpack this work of myth, legend, fabulation, and to reveal beneath the large ensembles (of the majorities) the infinite dispersal of causes and small beginnings, the ‘shameful origins, as Nietzsche used to say, believing this to be the object of the historical knowledge of academic historians.”<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of History for life,” in *Untimely Meditations*, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 62.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 68.

<sup>22</sup> Philip Mengue, “People and Fabulation,” in *Deleuze and Politics* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008), 222.

The concept ‘people’ cannot be discussed comprehensively without discussing first the concept of ‘fabulation’—a concept originally borrowed from Bergson.<sup>23</sup> In *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, Bergson defines fabulation as myth-making activity in closed societies. It refers to the natural propensity of human beings to anthropomorphize and attribute intentionality to natural phenomena.<sup>24</sup> Social institutions, standards, and religion are some of the anthropomorphic by-products of this instinctual ability. In turn, they operate instinctually and regulate the closed societies, which are fundamentally static ones.

Despite the fact that this widespread anthromorphism among people of traditional societies generates societal investments and principles, Bergson ponders fabulation as something negative. On the contrary, Deleuze detaches the said concept from the anthropomorphism of these societies, and perceive it positively by eradicating the idea of utopia that is perennially attached to it, and eventually unearthing its political spectrums. Perhaps one of the reasons that justifies Bergson’s abhorrence towards fabulation is that it serves as one of the basic pillars of religion. Fabulation produces illusory fictions that numb individuals’ critical acuity. Humans are then creatively persuaded to pattern their behaviour after religious doctrines or principles. As a result, it actualizes as an instrument of religion to police deviant behaviors and guarantee harmonious and unified actions. In other words, Bergson thinks that religion and fabulation maintain a reciprocal relation in such a manner that both serve as a means of fortifying cohesion in closed societies.<sup>25</sup> The inextricable relation between fabulation and religion still persists today. However, advanced capitalism has already ascended as the new religion of our times, characterized by new configurations, language, and vigour. As Deleuze and Guattari articulate in *Anti Oedipus*, the capitalist machinery appoints technicians of desire who ‘would subjugate the multiplicity of desire to the twofold law of structure and lack.’<sup>26</sup> After capitalism subjects individuals into various types of oppression, it would instantaneously seek the help of its public strategists to fabricate narratives to people via various channels and media. A romanticized portrayal and actualization of a happy life or a

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<sup>23</sup> Although Deleuze’s usage of the term fabulation is Bergsonian in origin, such term only appeared in *Cinema 2*, wherein it is understood as a kind of narration or story-telling that is closely associated to the powers of the false (Cf. Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 2, 150-155.

<sup>24</sup> Henri Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, trans. by R.A. Audra and C. Brereton (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1954); Bogue, “Fabulation,” in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, 99.

<sup>25</sup> Ronald Bogue, “Fabulation, Narration, and the People to Come,” in *Deleuze and Philosophy*, ed. by Constantin Boundas (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006), 2014; Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, 109-109.

<sup>26</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983), xii-xiii.



perfect relationship through endless consumption of capitalist-laden products, for example, is one of the most potent ways to commodify everything that is human. The more people are convinced that they lack something, the more capitalist potency amplifies, and the more the people's critical faculty is numbed and bastardized in a systematically manipulated control society.

Fabulation is also an activity of the intellect that paradoxically empowers us to antagonize the instinctive propensity intrinsic in our intelligence.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, it is also an act that opens human beings to the finitude of existence. The consequent despair people feel after apprehending this fact is neutralized by religion via its benevolent recognition of the finitude and feebleness of humans.<sup>28</sup> Evidently, because religion and fabulation support each other in several instances, Bergson infers that the former is simply a "defensive reaction of Nature against that which might be depressing for the individual and dissolvent for society, in the exercise of intelligence."<sup>29</sup>

At this juncture, it is interesting to know why Deleuze sees fabulation as a positive faculty, despite Bergson's negative portrayal of it. Answering this important query directs us to its opposite—*creative emotion*. Bergson argues that fabulation and creative emotion are products of two divergent qualitative processes. This is the reason why for him, it is misleading to comprehend them in the same plane. Genuine creativity for him is only possible when we free ourselves from the default concepts and meanings provided to us by society. Further, fabulation can be likened to the concept of the 'possible,' while creative emotion can be paralleled to the 'virtual.' The former pertains to an activity of uncovering what already exists, that is, it is already assured of what will happen in the future.<sup>30</sup> Meanwhile, the latter is a state of existence actualized through self-differentiation by conceptualizing its respective lines of differentiation as an essential condition of its actualization. In other words, the virtual involves a process that prompts the existence of events irreducible to any kind of appropriation—to those circumstances that might never have occurred.

The above explanations claim that it is only in the realms of creative emotion and the virtual that genuine creativity exists. Artists who embody genuine creativity audaciously fashion new ideas, intentionally misinterpret grand interpretations,

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<sup>27</sup> Similarly, even if much of the arts are already commodified nowadays, the fact remains that it can still expose societal ills and contradictions, and in doing so, create spaces for radical interventions and transformation.

<sup>28</sup> See Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, 205.

<sup>29</sup> See *ibid.*, 205.

<sup>30</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988), 14.

and push the limits of language. More importantly, the exceptional proficiency of these versions of becoming-minoritarian of language, can likewise invent ‘a thought capable of taking on a new aspect for each new generation.’<sup>31</sup> This prompts Bergson to associate the realm of creative emotion with the principle of the *elan vital*. Not only is creativity the point of convergence between them because the latter is not merely a principle fueled by creativity. Rather, *elan vital* is likewise a principle espousing the “inventive becoming of the new, and through mystics that principle finds expression in the vision of a creative self-formation of human society.”<sup>32</sup> The revolutionary characteristics of the *elan vital* entails that the transition from closed to open societies can only occur as a radical ‘leap forward’ towards the impossible or virtual which engenders its own possibility in its very dynamicity.<sup>33</sup>

The becoming-minoritarian of language uncovered from Bergson’s principle of genuine creativity leads to an open-ended, emancipatory, and dynamic society and future multitude. However, such affirmative consequence is achieved from a Bergsonian philosophy where fabulation and genuine creation are separated. For Deleuze, meanwhile, such outcome can be achieved through a reconfigured notion of fabulation which includes the principle of genuine creation. And since they find a harmony in the Deleuzian canon, then the leap forward initiated by the *elan vital* actualizes as the shock of the event. In this revolutionary moment, fabulation is already deemed as indispensably contributory to the process of genuine creation and the invention of the people-to-come.

Moreover, the close relationship between philosophy and art presupposes the principle of fabulation. Rimbaud and Mallarmé represent the group of kindred spirits whom Deleuze refers to every time he talks about the ethico-revolutionary necessity of the people—still waiting to be fabulated. As mentioned earlier, although creativity is the prerogative of art, it is dissimilar to philosophy because it is philosophy that can invent new concepts or collectivity. The people in the artists’ struggles cannot involve themselves directly with art, but when a people start to emerge, an interactive process is made visible which connects art and the people.<sup>34</sup> Deleuze further claims that even though artists appear to create their genuine artworks in solitary state, their crafts are already constitutive of social relevance because of their pursuit to fabulate a collectivity or community that does not yet exist. As Deleuze argues:

When a people’s created, it’s through its own resources, but in a way that links up with something in art ... or links up art to what it lacked. Utopia isn’t the right concept: it’s more a question of a “fabulation” in which a

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<sup>31</sup> Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, 254.

<sup>32</sup> Bogue, “Fabulation, Narration, and the People to Come,” 208.

<sup>33</sup> Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, 74.

<sup>34</sup> Bogue, “Fabulation, Narration, and the People to Come,” 202.

people and art both share. We ought to take up Bergson's notion of fabulation and give it a political meaning.<sup>35</sup>

Although the discussion of fabulation immensely revolves around the Bergsonian distinction between fabulation and genuine creation, Deleuze's contemporary Foucault, also includes it in his political philosophy. According to Deleuze, "Foucault draws from this a very intriguing conception of 'infamous men,' a conception imbued with a quiet gaiety. ... It's a man confronting Power, summoned to appear and speak. ... The infamous man's a particle caught in a shaft of light and a wave of sound."<sup>36</sup> Foucault's man of anonymity makes appear what does not, cannot, and should not appear. His notion of anonymous man embodies the principle of becoming-minoritarian and occupies a holey space, "the place that makes it possible for him to survey the entire tribe and to fill himself with the affects necessary for the 'creation of concept'—the political seer discerns that the people to whom the concept strives to reach is not yet there."<sup>37</sup> This man doubtlessly epitomizes the act of fabulation—the art of summoning forth and creating the people who are not yet there.

Lastly, fabulation includes, Deleuze and Guattari claim, the 'fabrication of giants.'<sup>38</sup> At this point, it appears that they are referring here to Nietzsche's notion of monumental history. However, even though such kind of history gives utmost value to the resuscitation of past greatness, the domain of art is not memory, and "creative fabulation has nothing to do with memory, however exaggerated, or 'with a fantasy. In fact, the artist, including the novelist, goes beyond the perceptual states and affective transitions of the lived. The artist is a seer, a becoming."<sup>39</sup> In fact, as early as the year 1975, Deleuze and Guattari claim in *Kafka* that "the literary machine thus becomes the relay for a revolutionary machine-to-come."<sup>40</sup> The art of fabulation, as a concept embodying the principle of becoming, fashions gigantic images capable of radicalizing majoritarian representation and configuration of collectivities toward a new community of radical solidarity and virtuality.

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<sup>35</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Negotiations*, trans. by Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 174.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 108.

<sup>37</sup> Jérémi Valentin, "Deleuze's Political Posture," in Constantine Boundas, ed., *Deleuze and Philosophy*, 196.

<sup>38</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 171.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature*, trans. by Dana Polan (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 17-18.

### *The Virtual People*

A micropolitics of literature, desire, or history maintains a critical relation with the universal concept of ‘people.’ The universal or majoritarian configuration of a people is based on the principles of unity, stability, and identity. It denies the dynamicity, multiplicity, and creativity, of the concept people—the very characteristics revered by minoritarian becoming.

“The people are what is missing,”<sup>41</sup> Deleuze boldly asserts in *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*. Such absence is inextricably linked with the notion of a creative minority that he talks about in *Negotiations*. As such, the people’s existence is premised on the principle of minority or minoritarian, that is why they are absent. Although I have some reservations with Mengue’s parallelism between Heidegger’s German Romanticism<sup>42</sup> and Deleuzian fabulation, I agree with his argument that Deleuze’s project of politicizing fabulation grants politics a reformulated meaning and relevance, and more importantly, it assigns a new function to the people—resistance (art is resistance), which is an off-spring of fabulation and art.<sup>43</sup>

The relationship between the people and the artist-minority results in an alliance. If art is resistance and the artist-minority are capable of launching resistance (a creative aptitude the people lacks), then the former must inspire the latter. The people lack this power because they are always absent from creation. Creation, hence, must ‘make a people to come,’ a sense of ‘the advent of a people.’<sup>44</sup> According to Mengue, the Deleuzo-Guattarian people is a virtual collectivity, “in so far as it tends to join the creative minority and inasmuch as the creative minority tends to join what the people lacks.”<sup>45</sup> Of course, there is no direct and default relationship between the missing people and the artistic minority. Fabulation bridges the existing gap between them. The fabulation of the ‘people to come’—‘mass-people, world-people, brain-people, chaos-people’<sup>46</sup>—have certain attributes in common with philosophy and art: “their resistance to death, to servitude, to the intolerable, to shame and to the present.”<sup>47</sup> Moreover, fabulation compensates the people’s incapacity to create art.

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<sup>41</sup> Deleuze, *Cinema 2*, 215

<sup>42</sup> Despite Heidegger’s valorization of the role of art in politics and in constituting a people, the fact remains that his acceptance of a Rectorship responsibility in a Nazi-administered university, is unforgivable and contradictory to his over-all existentialist doctrine (See Mengue, “People and Fabulation,” in *Deleuze and Politics*, 225).

<sup>43</sup> Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 174.

<sup>44</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 110.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 218.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., 110.

They are able to participate in the very act of artistic fabulation, while art fabulates by addressing itself to a virtual people.<sup>48</sup> The alliance between the people and the artistic minority, and their inclusion in artistic fabulation, assumes the Deleuzo-Guattarian politicization of the Bergsonian fabulation. From its previous artistic constitution and function, political fabulation now focuses on the people. These people, of course, are not the actual or territorialized ones. Rather, this collectivity that artists are waiting for the longest time emerges as a virtuality.<sup>49</sup>

The virtual, Deleuze asserts in *Proust and Signs*, is “real without being actual, ideal, without being abstract.”<sup>50</sup> To my mind, such definition is the profoundest primer to understand what he means by the virtual. When associated with the concept ‘people,’ the concept ‘virtual people’ is then conceptualized. These people are real, but not actual. Whereas Sartre comprehends the existential individual as a being *condemned to be free*, Deleuze defines the virtual people as a collectivity condemned to be “eternally” ‘to come.’ In other words, it cannot actualize as a historical entity because it belongs to the domain of thought or absolute deterritorialization. Unlike the actual people which can assume a concrete historical existence, the virtual people cannot locate anything that would allow itself to be translated empirically or historically. Paradoxically, the only way for it to be historically concretized or connected to the actual world is by virtue of its perpetual absence.

Democracy’s theorization of people as *demos* resembles the actual people. The *demos* belongs to capitalism’s historical process of relative reterritorialization. For Deleuze and Guattari, the *demos*’(actual people) capitalist capture through democratic nation-states prohibits it from being elevated into the level of thought—the plane of absolute deterritorialization and revolution. According to them:

The immense relative deterritorialization of world capitalism needs to be reterritorialized on the modern national State, which finds an outcome in democracy ... the capitalist version of the society of friends. As Braudel shows, capitalism started out from city-towns, but these pushed deterritorialization so far that immanent modern States had to temper their madness, to recapture and invest them so as to carry out necessary reterritorializations in the form of new internal limits.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> See *ibid.*, 225-226.

<sup>49</sup> Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between the actual and the virtual people is essentially influenced by Bergson’s distinction between the actual and the virtual.

<sup>50</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, trans. by Richard Howard (New York: George Braziller, 1972), 58.

<sup>51</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 98.

The monstrosity and malevolence of the capitalism lead the *demos* (actual people) to the repressive vacuum of the state apparatus or nation-state. The world and people-to-come in other words cannot be “found in our democracies. Democracies are majorities, but a becoming is by its nature that which always eludes the majority”<sup>52</sup> In fact, anything situated in history is converted into capitalist axioms that exclusively reinforce the oppressive machinery, thereby subjugating the *demos*. As Deleuze and Guattari sarcastically opine:

We are no longer Greeks, and friendship is no longer the same. ... We do not feel ourselves outside of our time but continue to undergo shameful compromises with it. This feeling of shame is one of philosophy’s most powerful motifs. We are not responsible for the victims but responsible before them. And there is no way to escape the ignoble but to play the part of the animal.<sup>53</sup>

The insular frontiers and infallible configurations of the capitalist state apparatus can only be challenged by the nomad. The nomad’s radical exteriority (in relation to the state apparatus) brings us to a future of virtual people that always suspends its arrival. If ever it arrives in the territory of history, it is always a becoming-minoritarian—of fleeting, molecularized, and creative resistances, “by a handful of minorities entrusted for a brief instant with carrying out the demands of thought—resistances that are likely to get quickly bogged down.”<sup>54</sup>

Regrettably, Heidegger’s support for Nazism is founded on the uncritical belief that the Nazis are outside of their time like the Greeks.<sup>55</sup> Another error that really upset many scholars of his time is his confusion “not only the German for a Greek but the fascist for a creator of existence and freedom.... He got the wrong people, earth, and blood. For the race summoned forth by art or philosophy is not the one that claims to be pure but rather an oppressed, bastard, lower, anarchical, nomadic, and irremediably minor race.”<sup>56</sup> Beyond his so-called blunder, he chooses concrete people for the process of reterritorialization. In short, Heidegger is incognizant of the fact that reterritorialization like deterritorialization transcend all

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 108.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 107-108.

<sup>54</sup> Mengue, “People and Fabulation,” 230. In the contemporary period, the Occupy Movement radicals and the initiatives of Edward Snowden resemble the best examples of this the principle of becoming-minoritarian.

<sup>55</sup> Deleuze and Guattari further add: “It is not always easy to be Heideggerian. It would be easier to understand a great painter or musician falling into shame in this way. ... He wanted to rejoin the Greeks through the Germans, at the worst moment in their history: is there anything worse, said Nietzsche, than to find oneself facing a German when one was expecting a Greek? (Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 109).

<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

historical or empirical configurations, including a specific ethnic people. Such hubris convinces him that the German people is the new Greek people. Pure becoming and infinite thought like I said earlier can never find its concretization in any ethnic group or nation's citizens. The same restriction applies to the idea of the 'people.' Thus, his betrayal is based on his uncritical disposition that prevents him from understanding that "the people is internal to the thinker because it is a 'becoming-people,' just as the thinker is internal to the people as no less unlimited becoming."<sup>57</sup> Furthermore, his betrayal is aggravated because he confines the absolute movement of the process of deterritorialization to the territory of Greece and Germany.<sup>58</sup>

Ironically, some traditional political theorists find Heidegger's initiative as something worthy of noble appreciation, while Deleuze and Guattari's philosophic project as something unrealistic or whimsical. For these theorists, politics is an immanent discipline that deals with concrete principles and problems, as well as actual people. Foucault, in his "Preface" of *Anti-Oedipus* calls these people as "the political ascetics, the sad militants, the terrorists of theory, those who would preserve the pure order of politics and political discourse."<sup>59</sup> Indeed, these "conservatives" sightlessly believe that their nation or ethnic class bear the redemptive responsibility and capability to salvage the entire German society, Europe, or the world from the threat of decline. More importantly, these political theorists think that deterritorialization, reterritorialization, the world-to-come, and the missing people, can be historically materialized and politically problematized.<sup>60</sup> Although Deleuze and Guattari's writings can critically engage with actual infractions or dehumanizations in the society, we must not forget that they are forerunners of micropolitics. The new question that must be addressed then is: *how can micropolitics' aesthetic resistance serve a middle principle between traditional majoritarian politics and a politics of deterritorialization? To be more specific, how can Deleuze and Guattari's micropolitics obtain determinate and concrete objectives, and at the same time engage with actual people?*

The *demos* of democracy and Heidegger's German people cannot assume the role of the virtual people. Similarly, a particular ethnic class or collectivity cannot assume face of Humanity because in the first place, such gesture would compel us to reactively invent a transcendental fiction that includes abstract Human Rights, Law, and Humanism.

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 109.

<sup>58</sup> See Mengue, "People and Fabulation," 230.

<sup>59</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, xii.

<sup>60</sup> Deleuze and Guattari's proclivity towards the virtual people in relation to politics can be seen in some of their writings both individually and in collaboration. One example is 1979 'Open Letter to Negri's Judges' [Cf. Gilles Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–1995*, trans.by Ames Hodges and Mike Taormina (New York: Semiotext(e), 2007), 167-169].

The first aforementioned question presupposes that deterritorialization is a process by which all existing links with territory are obliterated, as well as a form of utter departure from the past. The general accusation that the Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy in general espouses the principle of deterritorialization or lines of flight, is already debunked using the concept of the holey space or the principle of becoming-minoritarian. The aforementioned principle serves as a principle of prudence or moderation in Deleuze and Guattari's politics. In this paper, it is the theory of refrain (Ritournelle) that moderates or temporarily territorializes deterritorialization.

The term 'refrain' originally appears in Guattari's book, *The Machinic Unconscious: Essays in Schizoanalysis*.<sup>61</sup> Its initial appearance in his book with Deleuze, *A Thousand Plateaus*, is associated with music, which serves as the source of its origin. Although originating from music,<sup>62</sup> 'refrain' assumes a wider function posterior to its philosophical appropriation. As a philosophical concept, 'refrain' is a principle of consistency or territoriality. It fashions momentary landscapes and assemblages constitutive of heterogeneous resources, and then deterritorializes again to incessantly re-configure the relations of elements.

Understanding deterritorialization through the theory of 'refrain' mitigates the line of flight in simply becoming a pure absolute line. In this vein, deterritorialization is now perceived to be constitutive of some striated spaces and segments, as well as some milieu and codes. The fragmentary existence of these things within the principle of deterritorialization gives us a substantial assurance that something will reterritorialize itself along the way. More importantly, the inclusion of the theory of refrain not only moderates deterritorialization, but also allows this principle to be inexorably complemented by reterritorialization.

Given deterritorialization's transformation, does it mean then that Deleuzo-Guattarian politics is already hospitable to the actual people or ethnic class? The answer will only be affirmative if the 'refrain' is said to create permanent territories or configurations. 'Refrain' is an assemblage of consistency that marks a dwelling. In the words of Deleuze and Guattari:

The role of the refrain has often been emphasized: it is territorial, a territorial assemblage. Bird songs: the bird sings to mark its territory. ... The refrain may assume other functions, amorous, professional or social,

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<sup>61</sup> Felix Guattari, *The Machinic Unconscious: Essays in Schizoanalysis*, trans. by Taylor Adkins (Cambridge, MA: Semiotext(e), 2011) 107-148.

<sup>62</sup> Refrain is a musical concept: "Music is a creative, active operation that consists in deterritorializing the refrain. Whereas the refrain is essentially ... territorializing, or reterritorializing, music makes it a deterritorialized content for a deterritorializing form of expression" (Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 300).



liturgical or cosmic: it always carries earth with it; it has a land (sometimes a spiritual land) as its concomitant; it has an essential relation to a Natal, a Native.<sup>63</sup>

The territories created by refrain are temporary. More importantly, 'refrain' consecutively deterritorializes so that 'a territory is always *en route* to an at least potential deterritorialization.'<sup>64</sup> At the end of the day, the 'refrain' remains loyal to the principle of deterritorialization because the former owes its consistency to the latter, as it consolidates all heterogeneous elements without synthesizing all of them. As Deleuze and Guattari claim, "even in a territorial assemblage, it may be the most deterritorialized component, the deterritorializing vector, in other words, the refrain that assures the consistency of the territory."<sup>65</sup>

Furthermore, the 'refrain' has a power to uncork hidden potentialities within and beyond a particular dwelling or Natal. However, because of its territorial and assemblagic composition, the 'refrain' likewise promotes the status of the actual people or the ethnic class as the "germinal factor that guides the openings and reterritorializations from its inner source, its inner space."<sup>66</sup> Nonetheless, the recognition of the actual people or ethnic life is also temporary. The absolute deterritorialization of thought calls for a people-to-come or missing people. Meanwhile, while it is true that the absolute reterritorialization of thought summons a homeland, this form of dwelling (which is really inseparable from philosophy), must be capacitated in restoring "an equivalent of territory, valid as a home."<sup>67</sup> Even though this is the case, the value of infinite thought to both absolute deterritorialization and reterritorialization, presupposes a virtual territory and people.

The actual people (the proper object of traditional politics) only receives ephemeral recognition in relation to the theory of 'refrain' and the principle of reterritorialization. From a conventional political eye, their singular existence is determined and regulated by their traditions. Their identities are relatively inimical to the process of becoming-other that is why their movements are sluggish. With the help of fabulation, the actual people's limited movements lead them to societal cohesion and grant them a convergent political reality. The actual people is the subordinate of the virtual people who are condemned in eternity to be absent or missing. These indeterminate people are valuable because of their constant absence. But as a holistic

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<sup>63</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, 313.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., 327; Cf. Mengue, "People and Fabulation," 232.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Mengue, "People and Fabulation," 233.

<sup>67</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 69.

project, it is significant to know how does Deleuzo-Guattarian micropolitics perceive the actual people. Rather than just situating it at the margins, micropolitics should return the power of fabulation to the actual people.<sup>68</sup> Revolutionaries of today must educate, encourage, and inspire the actual people to become a narrating or story-telling collectivity in order for their capability to narrate stories will be re-activated. This creative capacity in fact can serve as a potent armament against regimes of power that promote historical revisionism and cultural imperialism, to name a few. Deleuzo-Guattarian fabulation must concern itself with local stories and minor fictions, “which in the actuality of the present, are the creators of the future.”<sup>69</sup>

### Revolutionary Becoming and the Possibility of Utopia

Deterritorialization presupposes the achievement of higher forms of existence posterior to its obliteration of striated spaces in the society, and Oedipalized subjectivities in the capitalist-regulated nuclear family. However, the emergence of higher kinds of existence is not guaranteed because the lines of flight can likewise metamorphose as lines of destruction. Even resistance (artistic resistance), in fact, can produce detrimental or life-denying outcomes. Deleuze and Guattari, in *Anti-Oedipus*, assert that the anti-productive spirit of disjunctive synthesis can bring forth total breakdown of connections and organizations wherein an individual enters the schizophrenic and capitalist-laden state called *catanoia*.<sup>70</sup> As such, vigilance must always be at hand because the processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization immanent in artistic resistance constantly carry its perils of producing corrupted and destructive identities and relations. The danger lies in the possibility of restoring transcendence or utopia. Deleuze and Guattari explain: “In utopia (as in philosophy) there is always the risk of a restoration, and sometimes a proud affirmation, of transcendence, so that we need to distinguish between authoritarian utopias, or utopias of transcendence, and immanent, revolutionary, libertarian utopias.”<sup>71</sup> In

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<sup>68</sup> This power is parallel to Adorno's claim that the Enlightenment project abolishes our mimetic relationship with nature. Such grand philosophical project subjects humanity into Auschwitz whose barbarism is beyond normative language. We cannot blame Adorno in saying that, “to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric. And this corrodes even the knowledge of why it has become impossible to write poetry today” [Theodor Adorno, *Prisms*, trans. by German by Samuel and Shierry Weber (MIT Press, 1997), 34].

<sup>69</sup> Mengue, “People and Fabulation,” 236.

<sup>70</sup> Catatonics are people captives of capitalist Oedipalization because “they become immobile, silent, they retreat to the body without organs... where all desiring-production is arrested... feigning stoppage: psychosis. These catatonic bodies have... entrusted all their forces to primal repression, in order to escape the system of social and psychic repression that fabricates neurotics” (Deleuze and Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, 135-136).

<sup>71</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 100.

a way, we cannot blame them for saying that utopia is not the right concept to be associated with fabulation. However, the politicization of fabulation constitutes a people with a new function—artistic resistance. In this sense, it is an imperative to re-think the concept ‘utopia.’ Taking a cue from *What is Philosophy?*, utopia does not automatically direct us to transcendence. Such clarification licenses us to talk about utopia and fabulation without the quicksand of transcendence. In my opinion, a politicized fabulation expressed through resistance posits a new kind of utopia that is immanent and revolutionary. In fact, it is philosophy’s Promethean task to “take the relative deterritorialization of capital to the absolute; it makes it pass over the plane of immanence as movement of the infinite and suppresses it as internal limit, *turns it back against itself so as to summon forth a new earth, a new people.*”<sup>72</sup> Such creative and revolutionary beckoning which emerges from philosophy’s absolute deterritorialization is also called utopia and revolution.<sup>73</sup>

Further, the plane of immanence is the milieu for absolute deterritorialization of thought. In other words, this plane (as opposed to the plane of transcendence), serves as the very soil of philosophy. Philosophy cannot just stay at the ivory tower of knowledge. As Zarathustra argues in the Preface of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*: “You great star! What would your happiness be if you had not those for whom you shine? ... Like you, I must *go down* as the human beings say, to whom I want to descend. Behold! ... This cup wants to become empty again, and Zarathustra wants to become human again.”<sup>74</sup> Although written figuratively, Zarathustra’s principle of going-under parallels with the imperative for thought (absolute deterritorialization), to be within human grasp. Similarly, thought must maintain a continuous and creative relationship with relative deterritorialization whose milieu is history and whose concern deals with material configurations and societal contingencies. However, thought’s gap with the society can only be bridged by utopia, because it is only via this concept ‘that philosophy becomes political.’<sup>75</sup>

Like I said earlier, the principle of relative reterritorialization entails a principle of territory or dwelling where the actual people live and interrelate. Since it involves actual people, it can be said that politics (traditional) is hospitable to the actual people. Given its historical and empirical characteristics, relative deterritorialization is a form of immanent politics that cannot be detached from thought’s directive—revolution. As Deleuze and Guattari claim, “Revolution is absolute deterritorialization even to

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid., 99.

<sup>73</sup> See *ibid.*, 100-101.

<sup>74</sup> Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 1.

<sup>75</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 99.

the point where this calls for a new earth, a new people.”<sup>76</sup> At the plane of thought, revolution is an event that radically engages and intervenes in the capitalist-regulated *status quo*. Specifically, it rekindles the people’s deadened critical impulse and power of resistance subtly yet forcefully deadened by capitalism. In this vein, micropolitical interventions are formulated in order to antagonize the present capitalist grain.

The virtual people is the absolute reterritorialization adequate to thought. Being distinct from relative deterritorialization (capitalism) and reterritorialization (democracy), the deterritorialization of such mode “does not preclude a reterritorialization but posits it as the creation of a future new earth.”<sup>77</sup> While reterritorialization entails a dwelling and a people, absolute deterritorialization implies a virtual earth and people. Also, absolute deterritorialization allows us to conceive revolution and utopia concurrently. For Deleuze and Guattari:

[T]o say that revolution is itself utopia of immanence is not to say that it is a dream, something that is not realized or that is only realized by betraying itself. On the contrary, it is to posit revolution as plane of immanence, infinite movement and absolute survey, but to the extent that these features connect up with what is real here and now in the struggle against capitalism, re-launching new struggles whenever the earlier one is betrayed.”<sup>78</sup>

To delve deeper in Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of revolution or becoming-revolutionary, I deem it necessary to distinguish it first from other traditional interpretations of what revolution is. But before proceeding to such task, some one important guidepost must be mentioned: their preference for the schizophrenic process of permanent revolution rather than for the schizophrenic itself; and, their theorization of the principle of becoming-minoritarian as being dynamically in-between the majoritarian and the minoritarian.

Reformers call themselves revolutionaries. Firstly, for conservative, revolution involves the noble restoration of particular values that people of a particular society cherish, like freedom, justice, and equality. It can likewise be seen as a restoration of a lost societal cohesion and communal solidarity. In other words, these men pursue to

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<sup>76</sup> Ibid., 101.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid., 88; Cf. Mengue, “People and Fabulation,” 228-229.

<sup>78</sup> Deleuze and Guattari, *What is Philosophy?*, 100. For Ernst Bloch, utopian thinking is the normative foundation for revolutionary hope. Utopian thinking is a kind of a creative anticipatory consciousness where the still-to-come is conceived differentially. In addition, he notes that the emancipatory potential is not limited to the oppressed, but located in culture. Cultural heritages, which are marginalized by dogmatic Marxists, can also render us utopian images of liberation implanted within the hopes, dreams, and historical struggles of different cultural groups (See Ernst Bloch, *The Utopian Function of Art and Literature*, trans. by Jack Zipes and Frank Mecklenburg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988).

reclaim a lost unity in the society, as well in other sub-societal or institutional spaces like the family and the school. In the Deleuzo-Guattarian canon, this brand of struggle is problematic by virtue of its presupposition that society is a generalized striated space or closed system. Initially, these reformers believe that it is possible to go back entirely to a previous mode of existence or state of affairs, as if a “renaissance” of the Renaissance Period or the EDSA I Revolution is possible. Their failure to profoundly comprehend reality as pure difference disables them to think of the ‘outside,’ that is, to become a creative and nomadic machine that can subject the closed system into a process of becoming-minoritarian/other. As Deleuze writes, “We’re in the midst of a general breakdown of all sites of confinement—prisons, hospitals, factories, schools, the family. The family is an ‘interior’ that’s breaking down like all other interiors—educational, professional, and so on. The appropriate ministers have constantly been announcing supposedly appropriate reforms.”<sup>79</sup>

Based on Deleuze and Guattari’s proclivity towards the schizophrenic process and becoming-minoritarian, the claim of the reformers that they are genuine acolytes of revolution is valid. Of course, some followers of Deleuzo-Guattarian philosophy would object to my argument on the reason that a return to a lost unity as the goal of revolution contradicts their philosophy or politics of difference. However, I deem it necessary to clarify that there exists a distinction between *revolution* and *becoming-revolutionary* in their political philosophy.

For Deleuze and Guattari, revolution pertains to those collective struggles ending in societal decline and duress like those initiated by Lenin, Stalin, and Cromwell: “They say revolutions turn out badly. But they’re constantly confusing two different things, the way revolutions turn out historically and people’s revolutionary becoming. These relate to two different sets of people. Men’s only hope lies in a revolutionary becoming: the only way of casting off their shame or responding to what is intolerable.”<sup>80</sup> Thus, conservative reformers are forerunners of revolution and not becoming-revolutionary. Since these men are incarcerated in the old tablet of societal values, they become incapacitated in thinking creatively and in fashioning the emergence of new collective assemblages that would equip them in confronting the intolerable or the ever-growing capitalist axiomatic. Consequently, what becoming revolutionary entails, “is becoming creative. It entails tapping into a line of flight, shamelessly asking the right questions, in order to transform the system or assemblage of power.”<sup>81</sup>

<sup>79</sup> Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 178.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid., 171.

<sup>81</sup> Bell, “Between Individualism and Socialism: Deleuze’s Micropolitics of Desire,” 22.

It must be noted at this juncture that there exist many kinds of reformers. While there are conventional reformers, there are also reformers whose initiatives can be described as either liberal or radical. The difference between a liberal from a conservative reformer is that the former struggles for the actualization of a higher kind of existence in the future. Rather than seeking for the resurgence of past unity or traditional ethical practices, the liberal reformer aims for the creation of a better state of affairs and more just institutions through painstaking deliberative and constitutional procedures, than that of the past. In *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, Rawls claims that one of the purposes of his philosophy of liberalism is to demonstrate the limits of democracy especially when a particular society is characterized by “profound and irreconcilable differences in citizen’s reasonable comprehensive religious and philosophical conceptions of the world.”<sup>82</sup> Rawls commendably depicts the limits of democracy as a form of societal principle. Although his version of liberalism is better than that of the conservatives, his political philosophy is devoid of a formulation of the principle of the virtual. On the contrary, Deleuze and Guattari’s political philosophy is informed by the conditions of the new and the creation of concepts. As Patton opines in *Deleuzian Concepts*, their political philosophy, “presents a conception of the political vocation of philosophy with far more radical conception than those acknowledged in Rawls’ realistic utopianism.”<sup>83</sup>

Meanwhile, there is a kind of reformer that resembles the liberal reformer’s future-oriented perspective, which is more radical. Marx calls for the realization of a communist society that would obliterate and overcome all pre-existing hierarchies, contradictions, and estrangement authored by modern capitalism. Indeed, his theorization of capitalism as an immanent system capable of fashioning its own limits, remains one of the most comprehensive characterization of capitalism for Deleuze and Guattari. However, the teleological inclinations of Marx’s notion of revolution, in conjunction with its radical engagement with the capitalist system only at the majoritarian level of class, consciousness, State, and ideology, tarnish his overall revolutionary project. Like every class-based, teleological, and macropolitical revolutions, it will just fail since it disregards the repressions, tensions, and connections that occur at the micropolitical level, where repression and fascism are the strongest and the most inimical.

Over the years, the relevance of Marx’s notion of revolution has become increasingly obsolete. Such degenerating event indicates the demise of one of the

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<sup>82</sup> John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001; Cf. Patton, *Deleuzian Concepts*, 187.

<sup>83</sup> Patton, *Deleuzian Concepts*, 187.

most relevant and powerful revolutionary philosophies in the past, but only at the majoritarian or macropolitical domains. Despite Marx's profound theorization of capitalism, one of the undeniable blunders of Marxism is its misrecognition that repression occurs at the historical milieu where the individuals themselves, as Reich puts it, desire their own repression. Consequently, the fascists within themselves are dynamically cultivated. Unless Marxism starts at the molecular segments of individuals as its object of critique, then it will always end up astray.<sup>84</sup> The same applies if we want to radically transfigure capitalism. In fact, the shattering of closed and disciplinary spaces in today's time, including the grand narratives about history, politics, literature etc., also leads to the dispersal of micro-fascism or Oedipalization at various molecular spaces. In this vein, the adversary becomes more fluid, liquid, and potent with the advent of the control society, which assumes capitalism's new appearance in the contemporary period. If our revolutionary impulse and creativity are already enfeebled by the disciplinary society brand of capitalism, these kinds of degenerations aggravate immensely in the control society era.

## Conclusion

In a very complex time where people knowingly surrender their critical impulse and creativity to the altar of capitalist oppression, what is to be done? Primarily, Deleuze and Guattari suggest distancing ourselves from the market place because, as Nietzsche argues in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, "the people little understand what is great, that is: the creator. But they have a sense for all performers and actors of great things."<sup>85</sup> However, with the advent of the control society, there exists a breakdown of all institutional spaces in such a manner that the school can become a hospital and mental hospital at the same time. The same applies with the location of the market place. The university can become a market place, when, among many things, it becomes too conscious of its public image; it gives more attention to sports and beauty competitions; and when it becomes obsessed with global/capitalist trends like journal citations and indexing, as well as university rankings. Since our capitalist adversary that deadens our critical acuity and creativity are scattered ubiquitously, then our initiatives that would re-kindle their potency and dynamicity, must be meticulously crafted and launched.

If capitalist domination seems inescapable to the point that it has already commodified the very language people use to relate and understand the world, then

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<sup>84</sup> Although Marx speaks of the emancipatory potentials of the proletariats, Deleuze and Guattari think that revolution can be launched by any one because oppression is no longer limited to the factory.

<sup>85</sup> Nietzsche, "On the Flies of the Marketplace," in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, 37.

our mode of communication (the language that we will create and utilize) must be unconventional, unpredictable, and self-reflexive. As Deleuze explains, “Maybe speech and communication have been corrupted. They’re thoroughly permeated by money-and not by accident but by their very nature. We’ve got to hijack speech. Creating has always been something different from communicating. The key thing may be to create vacuoles of non-communication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control.”<sup>86</sup> Hence, to become revolutionary is not to ceaselessly communicate, examine, and identify ourselves. The radical effort to forward the becoming-other of language requires us to critically engage and experiment with it, as well as to go against the flow of traditional communication in order to unleash the hidden potentials of revolutionary becoming. The emergence of criticality and creativity are always characterized by unpredictability. Their production is always untimely.<sup>87</sup>

On a larger perspective, becoming-revolutionary necessitates us to press the ‘pause’ button of our life tentatively, to disturb the monotony of everyday living, and to consciously isolate ourselves from the unending operations and processes of control and communication.<sup>88</sup> More importantly, Deleuze and Guattari’s revolutionary project is marked by moderation and cautiousness, as well as spearheaded by revolutionaries who lack a definite political name. They embody what Fitzgerald calls as ‘the crack’—a rhizomic line that exists and operates in-between the line of rigid segments and absolute deterritorialization. The said middle existence is being a “little alcoholic, a little crazy, a little suicidal, a little guerilla,”<sup>89</sup> just sufficient to broaden the crack. Fueled by vigilance, moderation, and patience, we should inspire the formulations of radical questions capable of engendering revolutionary impulses and movements.**PS**

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<sup>86</sup> Deleuze, *Negotiations*, 175.

<sup>87</sup> For Guattari, “Revolutions, like history, always brings surprises ... they are always unpredictable ... ‘working for revolution’ is working for the unpredictable” (Felix Guattari, *Molecular Revolution in Brazil*, trans. by K. Clapshow and B. Holmes (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008), 258.

<sup>88</sup> Bell, “Between Individualism and Socialism: Deleuze’s Micropolitics of Desire,” 30.

<sup>89</sup> Gilles Deleuze, *The Logic of Sense*, trans. by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, Constantin Boundas eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 157-158.



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