

Surprisingly, the reader will find that Tyler did not begin with Husserl's *Logical Investigations* but with his last work the *Crisis*. It is interesting to find out how Tyler weaves his arguments to fit into his overall aim.

The issue of granting to Edith Stein an ecclesiastical doctorate is gaining ground, which the CBCP this year approves unanimously. One of the questions often raised is the necessity of granting the title *Doctor of the Universal Church*, to her which, to date, only 37 saints in the Catholic Church have. Is this just one of the titles with no impact at all to the Universal Church and to the local church of Asia, particularly the Philippines? Tyler's work lets us think more broadly. The reader senses that the philosophy and spirituality of St. Edith Stein, as Tyler presents it, strikes to the reader's soul. It evokes a tone which echoes an important text in Vatican II's Pastoral Constitution *Gaudium et Spes* no. 14 and which can be considered an important argument why Edith Stein should be granted the title Doctor of the Church: "Now, man is not wrong when he regards himself as superior to bodily concerns, and as more than a speck of nature or a nameless constituent of the city of man. For by his interior qualities, he outstrips the whole sum of mere things. He plunges into the depths of reality whenever he enters into his own heart; God, who probes the heart, awaits him there; there he discerns his proper destiny beneath the eyes of God. Thus, when he recognizes in himself a spiritual and immortal soul, he is not being mocked by a fantasy born only of physical or social influences, but is rather laying hold of the proper truth of the matter." Tyler proves that human beings are not mere bodily extensions occupying spaces but someone who possesses an irreducible component, i.e. the spiritual soul. In a world where humans are treated merely on the level of the material, the *Living Philosophy of Edith Stein* provides a strong reminder and a solid teaching on who humans are and what actions should be done in relation to them. In the present age of wars, famine, oppression, and corruption, Edith Stein is a strong message and a living witness that the human soul must be taken care of and anything that oppresses it surely leads to destruction. It is in this sense that Edith Stein is a Doctor i.e. teacher and a "carer of souls". Tyler gives the readers an avenue to appreciate not only her person and teaching, but also, a glimpse of the beauty of her soul. This work may perhaps be considered as an argument, among many, why Edith Stein has to be considered a Doctor of Church, though this point may not be Tyler's main reason why he wrote the book. If so, then, this publication has exceeded what it is expected from it.

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**Wojtyla, Karol. *The Lublin Lectures and Works on Max Scheler. The English Critical Edition of the Works of Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II. Volume 2.* Edited by Antonio Lopez et al. Washington DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2023. pp. 609. ISBN: 978-0-8132-3677-3.**

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Imagine an ethics professor discussing the suitable systems of ethics in a time where the strongest voices are Kant and Max Scheler. This is what this book is all about. During

his time as a professor at the Catholic University of Lublin (KUL) in Poland, Karol Wojtyła delivered lectures on philosophy, particularly ethics, to his students. More than that, an avid reader of the works of Karol Wojtyła, who heavily relies on the English translations of his works, will always have a puzzling experience reading the pages of *Person and Act* and *Love and Responsibility*. The only best hope was to consult *Person and Community* to fill in the gaps in the claims of Karol Wojtyła in that major work. That puzzling moment comes to a conclusion, at least to English readers, since this work clarified and further deepened Wojtyła's crucial claims about the human person and morality.

This book is divided into three major parts. The first is the *Lublin Lectures*, which are compilations of Wojtyła's lectures on ethics. There is always an initial impression that Wojtyła was *influenced* by Max Scheler. In fact, the 1979 English translation of *Osoba y Czyn* that appeared as *The Acting Person*, received criticism that the translator made Wojtyła's work "too phenomenological" to the point that Aquinas has been overshadowed by phenomenological resources. However, to be *influenced* can go in two ways: either in a positive-affirmative way or in a negative-oppositional way. The *Lublin Lectures* clarified Wojtyła's position on this issue as he took the latter. For instance, Wojtyła criticizes Scheler for being guilty of *emotionalism* which resulted in the removal of *efficacy* in human action. Hence, making the person not accountable in his action and making it impossible for the person to reach perfection. He says, "what Scheler calls the ethical value does not originate efficaciously from the person, we have then no basis for claiming that his value constitutes the real perfection of this person. For as the object of an emotional feeling, it can belong only to the intentional ideal of the person, to the world of his desires, and not necessarily to his real essence itself." (p.33) In any case, does it mean that Wojtyła is endorsing the *apriorism* of Immanuel Kant found in his *Critique of Practical Reason* and *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*? The answer is no. Kant is equally guilty of removing the efficacy of the person with his *pure deontology*. Wojtyła opposes this because "duty becomes for Kant the exclusive content of the ethical act. Good—objective values—cannot influence man if his act is to have the true ethical value." (p.30) If both Scheler and Kant have problematic ethical systems, whose ethics did Wojtyła recommend? Here, it crystallizes that Wojtyła refers back to the metaphysics of St. Thomas, particularly in the angelic doctor's concept of *potency* and *act* as well as *being* and *becoming* in the context of Ethics.

The second part of the book is about the *Unfolding of the Lublin Lectures*, which contains Wojtyła's detailed engagement and justifications regarding his early lectures at Lublin. This came in the form of academic and scholarly papers whose content is based on the premises and arguments that he already made in the early lectures that the first part of the book tackled. Again, Wojtyła underscored the enduring relevance of St. Thomas Aquinas's metaphysics and ethics amidst the new concepts that contemporary philosophers have tried to teach about. For example, on the topic of value and action, between St. Thomas Aquinas and Max Scheler, Wojtyła agrees with the former saying, "We must seek in St. Thomas the lived-experience of value in the real relation to the object of the act as to a determined good. This lived-experience of value is an integral part of action. The cognitive lived-experience of value is also most closely linked to action; it occurs generally because of action. The

presuppositions of the Thomistic system convince us that value is the practical object in the essential sense of the word.” (p.379)

The third part of the book, entitled *An Assessment of the Possibility for Building a Christian Ethics Based on the Presuppositions of Max Scheler's System* is Karol Wojtyła's habilitation thesis that was presented to the Council of the Theological Faculty of the Jagiellonian University in 1953. The main question of Wojtyła's thesis is, “Does Scheler's system already contain a finished elaboration of Christian ethics or at least some of its problems?” Wojtyła answered in the *negative* since in his assessment, Max Scheler's system of ethics is inadequate and not suitable for Christian ethics on the basis that for Scheler “the person is reduced to the unity of various acts. Both these acts and the person are given to him not in the metaphysical form but precisely in the experiential form of lived-experience; the person is given as a unity of lived-experiences.” (p.491) In effect, there is no culpability since the action is not conscientious and based on the truth about the good, which one can find in St. Thomas Aquinas. More dangerous than that is the fact that for Scheler, the source of ethical values is the person and not the truth, which may lead to ethical relativism. This is indispensable for Wojtyła because *efficacious act* is exclusively tied with *conscience*. For this, he rejects Scheler's ethical system because “according to the teaching of Christian revelation, the efficacious relation of the person to ethical values is expressed in the acts of conscience. By subjecting his acts to the normative activity of conscience, the person impresses on them the mark of his efficacy.” (p.492) Conscience has been subordinated to mere feelings thus it is incompatible with Christian ethics for the reason that “according to the Gospel, we must seek the ethical content of life in the action formed within, in a sense, from the person's depth, through love. Only by accepting this principle can we properly interpret all instructions of the Gospel, which define when man does good and when he does evil, which proclaim what one must do to be saved, and which indicate the means to ethical perfection.” (p.493)

Nevertheless, Wojtyła made his position fair and clear: he contends that even if Max Scheler's ethical system is fundamentally incompatible with Christian ethics, it still has important contributions. For example, the contribution on the lived-experience of value which Scheler discussed in most of his ethical systems. Wojtyła says that the moral lived-experience can be an object of examination through the use of Scheler's ethical thoughts. He says, “examining ethical lived-experience in this way, as the lived-experience of value, the phenomenological method allows us to discover the particular regularity of lived-experience that results in lived-experience precisely from the orientation toward moral values.” (p.496) In any case, Wojtyła closed the discussion, with a stern warning: that even if Scheler's ethical system has valuable contribution to the phenomenological experience in ethical works, it must still be avoided by a theologian-ethicist. Since, “a Christian thinker, and especially a theologian, who uses phenomenological experience in his works, cannot be a phenomenologist. For consistent phenomenology will manifest ethical value to him as appearing in the lived-experience of the person ‘on the occasion’ of action, whereas the task of the theologian-ethicist will always be able to examine the value of human action itself in light of objective principles.” (p.497) This is Wojtyła's final nail in the coffin of Scheler's ethical system.

This book is *too important to be missed* by readers who wish to understand the philosophy of Wojtyła. Particularly those who are interested in his ethics and anthropology since this brings fresh insights and implications to all his other works if one is only keen enough to observe those effects. In any case, this book is not for a beginner to read, as its dense discussion demands an intermediate understanding of metaphysics and phenomenology, to say the least.

The publication of this book is timely in commemoration of the seven-hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the death of St. Thomas Aquinas. In contrast to other claims, in this newly translated work of Wojtyła, it has been clarified to whom Wojtyła went. It was not to Kant nor to Scheler. It was to Thomas. Wojtyła was clearly obedient to the call of Pope Pius XI in *Studiorum Ducem* when he said: “Go to Thomas, and ask him to give you from his ample store the food of substantial doctrine wherewith to nourish your souls unto eternal life.” (Pius XI, *Studiourm Ducem*, n.28.) With Wojtyła defending the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas, and justifying its importance in the middle of contemporary ethical debates only proves further that the angelic doctor’s teachings are *ever medieval, ever new*.

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**Galindo, David Rex. *To Sin No More: Franciscans and Conversion in the Hispanic World, 1683-1830*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017. pp. 330. ISBN: 978-1-5036-0326-4.**

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The Jesuits primarily dominated the historical study of the Catholic missionary enterprise financed by the Iberian empires and proliferated during the early modern period. Current, monotonic historiography of the Catholic missionary enterprise celebrates the Society’s mission policies and accommodating approaches, travels, and contribution to furthering Catholic and Western ideals to the New World and the introduction of the East and its cultures to Europe. However, certain aspects of the enterprise remain obscure—the activities of the mendicant orders, the complexity of the missions brought by the royal patronage systems, how the missions were financed, and the recruitment and training of missionaries. Fortunately, historians have ceased their indifference to the mendicant orders and begun to address this historiographical dearth, which includes Galindo’s work on the Franciscans.

*To Sin No More* tries to fill the lacuna on the mendicant orders—by focusing on the Franciscans—and the recruitment and training of missionaries. In this volume, Galindo analyses the Franciscan colleges of *propaganda fide* and their conversion agenda in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries within the Spanish empire. He argues that these colleges that aimed to train Franciscan missionaries are vehicles in formulating and developing “an extensive, methodical missionary program to convert Catholics and non-Catholics alike.” (p. 2) This is realized in the colleges through their daily *conferencias* that