

Thomistic Anthropology, Eschatology and the Challenge of Ecology

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Introduction

"Sustainable and Humane Cities." This twofold description seems to prevail upon the criteria in a recent *Asiaweek* survey¹ of Asian cities. If livability engenders sustainability,² the article would like us to believe that the word "sustainability" be inclusive of the following factors among others: average life expectancy, hospital beds per 1,000 people, per capita state expenditure for education, sulfur dioxide in the air (ppm), ratio of housing price to income, sq meter of parks and fields per capita, existence of a mass transit rail system, number of movie theaters per 100, 000, unemployment rate, GDP growth, and criminal cases for every 10,000 persons.

All these factors, truly promising millennial comforts, show two protagonists in the stage of ecological drama: *nature* (the environment) and *man*. But the one million dollar question is: *Where is God?* Are the cities to be humane possible in the absence of a sense of the Divine which births the moral aspect of human living? Or is this question anachronistic and, therefore, irrelevantly posed? Undeniably, even up

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¹ *Asiaweek*, (December, 1999).

² For reflections on this theme, see, for example, Rajni Kothari, "Environment, Technology, and Ethics," AA.VV. *Reflecting on Nature, Readings in Environmental Philosophy*, ed. Lori Gruen & Dale Jamieson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), particularly pp.234ff, also, Nancy G. Wright & Donald Kill, *Ecological Healing, A Christian Vision* (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1993), particularly p. 109.

to now, the bottom line problem in ecology as evidenced by the above factors is: "the relationship between the economic need to develop natural resources and the social responsibility to protect the environment."³ This neglect might have accrued from the manipulative rise of science and technology whose impetus was generated by "the dynamism of religious devotion, shaped by the Judeo-Christian dogma."⁴ And according to Lynn White, a cultural historian, in this regard, "Christianity bears a huge burden of guilt."⁵ We cannot ill afford to remain non-committed to this insightful but hurtful allegation!

Not until the publication in 1967 of White's provocative essay "The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis" did the Church or perhaps Judeo-Christian tradition realize the extent of its negligence in matters ecological. For this reason, if no other, the Church's culture of death is ecologically translated as "earth-rape," "biocide" (the killing of life-systems themselves), "geocide" (the killing of the planet), or "terricide."

One major responsibility bears on a false, unhealthy Christian asceticism wherein the world was generally viewed as evil.⁶ This tended to devalue matter and the material world. The result: the dichotomy between God and earthly things!

The culpability falls also on the theology of dominion over nature (or the "dominion mandate"). Indeed, it has been a constant doctrine of the Church that man is the center of God's creation. He is the nub around which the spokes of nature should revolve giving impetus and movement to him:

Man is the image of God partly through the mandate received from His Creator to subdue, to dominate the earth... It is clear that the term "the earth" of which the biblical text speaks is to be understood in the first place as that fragment of the visible uni-

³ Thomas McGonigle, O.P. "Ecology and Spirituality: A Twelfth-Century Perspective," AA.VV. *The Ecological Challenge, Ethical, Liturgical & Scriptural Responses* (Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1994), p. 105.

⁴ Lynn White, "The Historical Roots of the Ecological Crisis," AA.VV. *Reflecting on Nature, Readings in Environmental Philosophy*, ed. Lori Gruen & Dale Jamieson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). p.12

⁵ Ibid., p. 10.

⁶ Paulos Mar Gregorios, *The Human Presence, Ecological Spirituality and the Age of the Spirit*. (Amity, New York: Amity House, 1987), p. 10.

verse that man inhabits. By extension, however, it can be understood as the whole of the visible world insofar as it comes within the range of man's influence and of his striving to satisfy his needs. The expression "subdue the earth" has an immense range. It means all the recourses that the earth (and indirectly the visible world) contains and which, through the conscious activity of man, can be discovered and used for his ends.⁷

Historically, this theology of work has been despicably abused and badly implemented giving rise to global cultural imperialism and economic worldwide sabotage beginning with the phenomenon of colonialism by the West and catapulting in the world-trade union among the rich, developed, industrialized countries in the second millennium.⁸ Without any rancor or claims to innocence, we blame human greed, the product of the three colonial G masters: guns, gold and God.

It is not a matter of exonerating Catholics but it will be equally too sweeping a statement to assert that the Roman Catholic Church has not done anything to alleviate this disastrous, ecological backlash. For example, Thomas Nairn argues that the concern for the environment has been there for discussion for years stretching even up to the promulgation of John Paul II's *Centesimus annus*, celebrating the one hundred years of Catholic social teachings.⁹ With reference to the ecological debate, this social tradition may be seen, according to Nairn, as having at least three different though related phases: the first from Leo XII until the beginning of the II Vat Council; the second from the Council through the pontificate of Paul VI, and the third during the present pontificate of John Paul II. However, although these phases are in fact different, not to mention the historical milieu around which these papal documents had been written, they revolved around two common key hinges: in each, the Church situated the question of the environment within the larger canvas of justice and the common good.

In spite of differences --and to the consternation of contemporary ecologists--, in each period the ecological question soon risks becoming

⁷ *Laborem exercens*, par. 4.

⁸ See Wright, *Ecological Healing*, pp. 52-53.

⁹ "The Roman Catholic Social Tradition and the Question of Ecology," AA.VV. *The Ecological Challenge, Ethical, Liturgical & Scriptural Responses* (Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, (1994), pp. 27-38.

instead a question of social justice with man as the central focal point, grounding therefore, ecological ethics on an insufficient housing; instead of appreciating ecology for its own worth and sake.

Added to this contribution, there have been ongoing fora /colloquia /conferences all over the world regarding reinterpreting some specific theological perspectives that may have contributed to a worldview detrimental to a bio-spiritual ecology, for example, the development of "eco-justice."¹⁰

For one, Thomas Berry, a well known Passionist priest who would rather prefer to be addressed as "ecologist," coins a term that describes the new millennium as the Ecozoic Age, an era of mutually enhancing human-earth relationships as gripped continuously by the *primacy* of the Earth.¹¹ For him, this calls for a revolution of the religious theo-

¹⁰ Dieter Hessel describes this ecological perspective in this way: "A combination of ecology and social justice, "eco-justice" refers to the interlocking web of concern about the earth's carrying capacity, its ability to support the lives of its inhabitants and the human family's ability to live together in harmony. It highlights the interrelatedness of such pressing issues as world hunger and world peace, the energy crisis and unemployment; appropriate technology and good work, biblical stewardship and feminist consciousness, racial justice and pluralistic community, life-style choices in response to poverty and pollution. The historic questions wherein God speaks with loving justice are whether humans will permit each other to live and enjoy a fair share of the fruits of the earth, and whether human activity will respect the limits of the earth's ability to support the community of life into the future." (Dieter T. Hessel ed *For Creation's Sake*, [Philadelphia: The Geneva Press, 1985], p. 12). See also K.C. Abraham "A Theological Response to the Ecological Crisis," AA.VV. *Ecotheology* ed. David G. Halhnan (New York: Orbis Books, 1994) pp. 67-68. Besides development in eco-justice, several episcopal conferences were held all over the world, e.g., Dominican Republic, 1987; the Philippines, 1988; Indonesia, 1989; Lombardy, 1988. Of course, there is the 1990 World Day of Peace Message by Pope John Paul II, entitled "Peace with God the Creator, Peace with All Creation." In Asia, the Federation of Asian Bishops Conference (FABC) held a number of colloquia on the theme of Environment, e.g., the Fifth plenary Assembly of FABC, 1990, Bandung, Indonesia; *Colloquium on Social Doctrine of the Church: Foundation for a New Evangelization in Asia*, 1992, Pattaya, Thailand; *Colloquium on Education in Asia: Challenges and Responses*, 1992, Bangkok, Thailand.

¹¹ See Barbara Reid, OP. "Paul for the Ecozoic Age," AA.VV. *The Ecological Challenge, Ethical, Liturgical & Scriptural Responses* (Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, (1994), p. 16ff. She bases her observation on the book of Thomas Berry which he co-authored with Thomas Clarke, *Befriending the Earth. A Theology of Reconciliation between Humans and the Earth* (Mystic, Conn.: Twenty-Third Publications, 1991). See

logical ways of thinking about the world, man and God.

He somewhat talks about the presence of God as "the ineffable, pervasive presence in the world,"¹² comparable to the *shekinah* presence of Yahweh in the Old Testament, a kind of a localized presence through theophanic manifestations, natural or man-made. This is rendered in the New Testament as the *Emmanuel* theology. It is the immanence over and above the transcendence of God.

We do not quarrel with the Bible in acknowledging the universe as being created in time. However, we share no longer the biblical consciousness that the universe was created once and for all. It appears to be an overarching tenet among ecologists today that the world we live in is emergent undergoing irreversible sequences of transformations over billions of years. The challenge for Christians, as Berry sees it, is to move into a sense of developmental time as sacred time. In a way, this is echoed in the following admonition of John Paul II in his recent papal encyclical *Ecclesia in Asia*: "It is the duty of Christians and of all who look to God as the Creator to protect the environment by restoring a sense of reverence for the whole of God's creation."¹³

This requires a titanic metamorphosis: from perceiving the world as *cosmos*, to perceiving it as, in Berry's suggested expression, *cosmogenesis*. That is, moving out of a static talk about the world into to an understanding of the same as *becoming*, a process.¹⁴ A sense of an inner transformation in all global fronts is very evident in today's

also the other book by Berry, *The Dream of the Earth* (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1988); and with Brian Swimme, *The Universe Story* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992). In a brief article entitled "Ecology and the Future of Catholicism," Berry emphatically insists the indispensable role the Catholic Church should play in assisting the human community "in renewing the earth as a bio-spiritual planet." Berry warns the Church that in order "to regain effective status within the human community or in the earth process," and in order for the idea of the divine "to survive in the human community," the Church should assume her religious responsibilities in terms of "preserving the splendor and the beauty of the natural world." AA.VV. *Embracing Earth, Catholic Approaches to Ecology*, ed. Albert J. LaChance & John E. Carroll (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1994), pp. xi-xii.

¹² Ibid., p. 17 citing Berry's work, pp. 10-11.

¹³ Par. 41.

¹⁴ Reid, "Paul for the Ecozoic Age," p. 17 citing Berry's work p. 74; also Wright, *Ecological Healing*, pp. 82-83; Gregorios, *The Human Presence*, pp. 44-47.

ecological discussions. Mother earth never remains the same, but is in a process of continuing transformation due to inevitable human interventions, deliberate or not.

There are three key words in the title of this article: "Anthropology," "Eschatology" and "Ecology." However, I shall not discuss them in that particular sequence. In what follows, allow me then to make a critique of Dermot A. Lane's "Anthropology and Eschatology"¹⁵ in order to map out what I consider may be the main contribution of St. Thomas Aquinas to this ecological debate. In other words, I shall consider Lane's article as the jumping board of my discussion here.

On Modern Anthropologies

The self which is the key factor in anthropology has come under strict scrutiny by contemporary issues such feminism, ecology, and modern cosmology. That there is an inherent nexus between anthropology and eschatology is presumed *deja vu* in theology. However, a sharp edge between these two has recently been persistently inserted as acutely as to pose serious difficulties arising from modern theories about man.

In general, two contending theories vie for current attention today: *individual eschatology* arising from glorifying the self-sufficient subject fashioned after the culture of individualism over and against *social eschatology* fomented by the Marxist inspired collectivist anthropologies thus undermining the dignity of the individual and the possibility of a *personal* eschatological destiny.

Lane's intention is really to propose a post-modern anthropology which he thinks would happily merge these two contending theoretical parties.

But before proceeding to offer his own theory, he first sets to draw up summarily succinct critiques of these modern shades of individualistic anthropologies. What is most significant to our topic is the critique germane to ecological concerns.

According to many ecologists, the critical state of the earth today has been attributed to an excessive *anthropocentrism* in recent centu-

¹⁵ *The Irish Theological Quarterly*, Vol. 61 (1995), pp. 14-31.

ries.¹⁶ Man, since the time of the Enlightenment –and partly incensed by the Church– has situated himself at the center of the earth. White is more exaggeratedly sharp here when he asserts: “Especially in its Western form, Christianity is the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen.”¹⁷ It is a relation of domination and exploitation. Man’s relation to earth is one that is of practical and pragmatic value. Earth must service man’s needs come what may as proven by the unfolding of world history. Since the earth is considered a “lifeless” matter by the Enlightenment, in consequence it has been “the object” of manipulation by modern science and technology. Extreme objectification and human alienation ensue from this. Although man invents technology, he finds himself in the end the vile victim of his own inventive doings.¹⁸

This calls for a renewed human engineering understood in terms of “re-inventing the human;” “replacing a narrow anthropocentric sensibility;” rethinking the “modern notion of the self;” and developing a “chastened anthropocentricity.”¹⁹ One way of “reinventing” the humankind is through the lens of deep ecology. Deep ecologists, like its regarded founder, Arne Naess, and Bill Devall, would rather shift the ecological concerns away from what is now dreaded as anthropocentrism towards the emphasis on *ecocentrism* or sometimes called *biocentrism*. They frown upon the attitude shown by radical environmentalists of looking simply at the world as valuable natural “resources” for human needs.²⁰

¹⁶ See, for example, Paulos Mar Gregorios’ analysis of the nature of “nature” and how this led to a myopic view of anthropocentrism in his *The Human Presence*, pp. 13-23; also John Muir, “Anthropocentrism and Predation,” pp. 23-25; and Bernard Williams, “Must A Concern for the Environment Be Centered on Human Beings?” pp. 46-52, AA.VV. *Reflecting on Nature*.

¹⁷ White, *The Historical Roots*, p. 10

¹⁸ *Gaudium et spes*, par. 4.

¹⁹ Lane, “Anthropology and Eschatology,” p. 18.

²⁰ See Bill Devall, “[From] Deep Ecology and Radical Environmentalism,” AA.VV. *Reflecting on Nature, Readings in Environmental Philosophy*, ed. Lori Gruen & Dale Jamieson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 115. following this article is a critique of Deep Ecology entitled “[From] Defending the Earth,” by Murray Bookchin, pp. 122-131. In response to the challenges aired by deep ecology, see Keith Warner, OEM, “Was St. Francis a Deep Ecologist?” AA.VV. *Embracing Earth, Catholic Approaches to Ecology*, ed. Albert J. LaChance & John E., Carroll (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1994), pp. 225-240.

Next, Lane takes to task constructing an alternative anthropology. And the first step is to affirm what many ecologists believe the world is essentially: *relational*. Every item, human or non-human, is basically and organically related, interconnected, and interdependent. Justifiably, we must be conscious that the global note of relationality imports its immediate correlative term: *individuality*. One cannot stand outside of the other. Whereas relationality is to attachment and connectedness, on the other hand, individuality is to autonomy or independence. This couplet co-exists in varying degrees within every human destiny. To exist individually is always to co-exist, to be is always to be interrelational. In other words, relational existence births individual existence.

Whether biologically, psychologically or theologically speaking, always a chronological consciousness leads us to infer that the humankind evolves and merges out of a radical relationality. This is the ontologicity of the development of the humankind.

If the world (and all it contains) is a cosmogenesis, then self-constitution and individuation is, out of necessity, continuously open towards other selves in order to sustain itself in process.

In this respect, Lane discovers a strong illustrative support in Pannenburg's principle of *exocentricism*: "It is only in and through the movement out towards others that the self maintains itself in existence and that self-consciousness is expanded to embrace a deepened co-awareness of a transcendent, divine dimension within the human and the natural world."²¹

Said differently, the humankind is radically relational, always in process of becoming even to the extent of a transcendental verticality towards a sense of the Divine, and, therefore, relative to this assertion, has within itself a certain flexibility of development. Paradoxical as it may seem, this kind of talk is, indeed, hard to describe in the current vernacular understanding. If any, Lane suggests this description, however: "the human person as a historical being-in becoming and a historical becoming-in-being."²²

²¹ Ibid., p. 19-20 citing W. Pannenburg, "The Christological Foundation of Christian Anthropology," in *Humanism and Christianity, Concilium*, ed. C. Geffré, Vol. 86 (New York: Herder & Herder, 1973).

²² Ibid., p.21.

In effect, a sort of a theology of time is involved here: "a relationality reaching back to origins, embracing the present and stretching out towards the transcendence of the future."²³

It is at this juncture that Lane suggests retrieving Aquinas' understanding of the self as substantial being within a new relational framework through the aegis of the neo-Thomist, W. Norris Clarke SJ: "Clarke seeks to recover the classical notions of substance and relation within a more dynamic reading of Aquinas. He [Clarke] argues that the 'we are' of interpersonal dialogue is a more appropriate starting point for metaphysics."²⁴

But, instead of retrieving what I do believe is an interpretation of an only putative metaphysics in St. Thomas, first, it would be more in conformity with the right and genuine spirit of Thomism had Lane recovered rather a splinter group of Thomists who discovered a deeper reality in the mature metaphysics of the Angelic Doctor. Second, the matter of retrieving what was considered neglected in traditional theology may prove to be as handy as it is a potential contribution to the emergence of an ecological ethic. Along this line of reasoning does John Pawlikowski see the entrance of St. Thomas Aquinas in ecological discussions. I quote:

Granted, there are sections of the tradition which have been largely ignored in the past and which can be retrieved today in the service of an ecological ethic. Yet there is considerable disagreement among scholars about their proper interpretations. This is particularly the case with regard to the writings of Thomas Aquinas. *Should Thomas be seen as fundamentally an ally or a foe of environmental concern?*²⁵

²³ Ibid., p. 22.

²⁴ Ibid., p. citing W. N. Clarke, "The 'We Are' of Interpersonal Dialogue as the Starting Point of Metaphysics," *The Modern Schoolmen* Vol. LXIX (March/May 1992), pp. 357-368; reprinted as Appendix I in W. Norris Clarke, SJ, *Central Problems of Metaphysics* ed. Nemesio S. Que SJ (for use by Ateneo de Manila University), pp. 155-166.

²⁵ John T. Pawlikowski, OSM, "Theological Dimensions of an Ecological Ethic," AA.VV. *The Ecological Challenge, Ethical, Liturgical, and Spiritual Responses*, ed. Richard N. Fragomeni & John T. Pawlikowski, OSM (Collegeville, Minnesota, 1994), p. 41.

The apparent answer is 'Yes!' as gathered from the arguments of Nairn. In his article quoted above²⁶ Nairn has shown that basically all papal encyclicals one way or the other had shown indebtedness to St. Thomas for some philosophical anchorage. St. Thomas's concepts of natural law, order and common good had been "borrowed" by the Popes to teach social doctrines. In fact, Pope Leo XIII's *Rerum novarum* states quite emphatically that the philosophy of St. Thomas is a "received tradition" of the Catholic Church.

Now, if the social doctrines of the Church have been faulted for the exploitive ascendancy of science and technology which today have been brutally criticized by ecologists as the main culprits for current ecological degradations, then obliquely, the philosophy of St. Thomas suffers the same fate!

However, let me now proceed to elucidate my own critique of Lane's retrieval. My aim here is to offer this alternative as a better anchorage on which Lane's eschatological vision would rest more securely and more articulately. Definitely, I shall prove that Aquinas is an ally of environmental concern!

A Critique of Lane's Retrieval

All in all, the thrust of Lane's article is to come up really with an anthropology that so balances the demands of individual eschatology and social eschatology as mentioned above. At first blush, when one comes across the terms "individual" and "social," the former is considered the antithesis of the latter; a happy tension at that which psychology terms as *eustress* as against *distress*.

As alleged, the plummeting popularity of Thomism in the recently concluded century may be attributed, according to Thomas Smith, to the following historical factor:

Much of the modern criticism of Thomas' methodology is actually a reaction to the Neoscholastics' tradition of interpretation rather than to Thomas himself. The modern distaste for what seems to be overly speculative or, in a pejorative sense, "philosophical" in Thomas is more aptly leveled at Cajetan, Billot and Neo-scholastics...²⁷

²⁶ See *supra* p. 2.

Another aspect of reality took the center stage of philosophical discussions about the turn of second millennium and continuing thereafter in the fifties: the penchant for "analytic talk about talk."²⁸ The attraction towards language and its various expressions. Thrilled by the challenge of the times, a group of Thomists rediscovered and recovered the rightful place of the Platonic/Neoplatonic strains in the basically Aristotelian metaphysics of St. Thomas.²⁹ In this regard, the names Andre Hayen,³⁰ Arthur Little,³¹ Louis de Raemaeker,³² and, of course, the pillars of the group: the Italian philosopher Cornelio Fabro³³ and Louis Geiger,³⁴ a French Dominican theologian-philosopher, to name but a few, readily come to mind in this pioneering pursuit.

²⁷ Smith, Timothy, "Thomas Aquinas' *De Deo*: Setting the Records Straight on His Theological Method," *Sapientia*. Vol. I-III (1998) p. 135; see also p. 147. Emphasis is mine. Smith gives a very concrete example of this Neo-scholastic misinterpretation: "The titles *De Deo* and *De Deo Trino* [for example] are nowhere to be found in Thomas. The terms Thomas uses are *unitas* and *distinctio*. He outlines qq. 2-43 according to what pertains to the unity of persons followed by what pertains to the distinction of persons. The aforementioned titles have been attached to the text by commentators since the time of Cajetan. The incredible inertia of these longstanding terms have unfortunately led to the assumption that they are indeed in the text and accurately reflect the structure of the text. Hence, many modern theologians simply refer to the text in these terms with little nor no notation of Thomas' own divisions. . ." (Ibid., pp. 136-137).

²⁸ Langdon Gilkey, *Naming the Whirlwind: The Renewal of God-Language* (Indianapolis, New York: The Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), p.14. See also G. Girardi, "Secularization et sens du problème de Dieu," AA.VV. *L'analyse de théologique. le nom de Dieu* (Paris: Aubier, 1969), p. 441; Barry Gross, *Analytic Philosophy* (New York: Pegasus, 1970); John Passmore, *A Hundred Years of Philosophy* (New York: Basic Books, 1966).

²⁹ See Helen James John, "The Emergence of the Act of Existing in Recent Thomism," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 2 (1962), p. 602.

³⁰ See his *L'intentionnel selon s. Thomas* (Paris: Desclée, 1947).

³¹ See his *The Platonic Heritage of Thomism* (Dublin: Golden Eagle Books, 1949).

³² See his *The Philosophy of Being*, trans. Edmund H. Ziegelmeyer (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1952).

³³ His pioneering masterpieces are *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo s. Tommaso d'Aquino*, rev. ed. (Torino: Società editrice internazionale, 1950) and *Partecipazione e causalità secondo a. Tomaso d'Aquino*, rev. ed. (Torino: Società editrice internazionale, 1960).

³⁴ See his dissertation, *La participation dans la philosophie de s. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 1953).

This trendy philosophical language-fascination occasioned a rivulet to form within the mainstream of Neo-Thomism. This daring new breed of contemporary Thomists are in the likes of Hampus Lyttkens,³⁵ the Jesuit George Klubertanz,³⁶ Ralph I McInerny,³⁷ the Italian Battista Mondin,³⁸ and the Dominican Bernard Montagnes.³⁹ Their independent studies seemed to converge on the re-evaluation of the doctrine of analogy in the metaphysics of St. Thomas, now better and faithfully expressed within the rediscovered participative strands.

Vaulting out of the molds of the likes of Marechal, Rousselot, Maritain and Gilson, this independent rivulet of Neo-Thomism smacks of greater and more intense Platonic, or better, Neo-Platonic influences on St. Thomas, a far cry from what traditionally was held.⁴⁰ So, these dissenters contend that the mature metaphysics of St. Thomas operates within a Platonic framework of participation buttressed superbly by Aristotelian principles of causality and analogy.

In a kind of analogy which the Scholastics termed as "the analogy of intrinsic attribution" there must always be a focal point of reference A to which B is said to be related. B is related to this focal point A because of a shared "something." This shared something C –which is

³⁵ See Lyttkens himself remark that what led him to study Aquinas in depth was the 18th century Protestant metaphysics which at that time was influenced heavily by Suárez. In other words, via Suárez, Lyttkens was led to study Aquinas more closely regarding analogy. See Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World: An Investigation of Its Background and Interpretation of its Use by Thomas of Aquinas* (Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri AB, 1952), p. 11.

³⁶ See Ralph McInerny, *Being and Predication* (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986); Ibid., *The Logic of Analogy* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961).

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³⁸ See Battista Mondin, *Il sistema filosofico di Tommaso d'Aquino* (Milano: Editrice massimo, 1985); Ibid., *St. Thomas Aquinas' Philosophy in the Commentary to the Sentences* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975); Ibid., *Il problema del linguaggio teologico dalle origini ad oggi*, (Brescia: Queriniana, 1971); Ibid., *The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology* (The Hauge: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963).

³⁹ See Bernard Montagnes, OP, *La doctrine de l'analogie de l'etre d'après saint Thomas d'Aciuin* (Louvain: Editions nauwelaertsm 1963).

⁴⁰ Tomas G. Rosario, Jr., "Thomism in the Next Millenium," *Unitas*, Vol. 72 (1999), p. 471.

called an *analogon* or a perfection in philosophy— is said to be attributed primarily to the focal point A and secondarily to B. It is intrinsic because it remains immanently present in both A and B. This obtains for us an analogical talk. The presence of this shared something C is partly-the-same and partly-different. It is partly the same because both A and B do possess C; but partly-different because A possesses C primarily as the source, while B only secondarily in the sense of having received it from A.

Here is a parallelism, however crude it may be. The water in our faucets: Is it the same as the water in La Mesa Dam? It is and it is not. It is because the chemical composition is identical; and equally, not quite because the water in La Mesa is a reservoir of water while that of the faucet is not.

Clearly, like a silhouette, the basic contour of the doctrine of *participatio* undercuts this kind of analogy. I have called this participative interpretation of St. Thomas' metaphysics "participationist existentialism."⁴¹


Based on Aquinas's commentary on Boethius's *De hebdomadibus*, lec 2. n. 24,⁴² the doctrine of *participatio* has three elements: the source or font, (I call here the *participatum*) which possesses a perfection totally and unrestrictedly; the subject participating, (I address here as the *participans*) which shares in the perfection in a limited, determined and particular way simply because "whatever is received is received according to the manner of the recipient"; and the perfection shared (I call the *nota participata*) which is found in the *participatum* eminently and only partially in the *participans*). In all appearances, to participate, in the very words of the Angelic Master is, "As it were, to possess

⁴¹ See Jose Antonio E. Aureada, OP, *The Language of the Grace of God: A Re-evaluation of the Analogical Character of Sanctifying Grace according to St. Thomas Aquinas*, Dissertatio ad Lauream in Facultate Sacrae Theologiae apud Pontificiam Universitatem S. Thomae in Urbe (Roma 1994), pp. 177-189.

⁴² Other quasi etymological renditions are found in *In comm. de cael. Mund.*, c. 12, lec. 18, n. 6; *In lib. De causis*, lec. 4 and *S.C.G. I*, c. 32. *In metaphys.*, I, lec. 10, n. 154 is typical. It states that "for that which is something in its entirety does not participate in it but is essentially identical with it, whereas that which is not something in its entirety but has this other thing joined to it, is said properly to participate in that thing."

part of something, and, therefore, when something receives in a particular mode that which pertains universally to another, it is said to participate in this.” How does the God-man relationship considered philosophically fit into this mold of *participatio*?

SCHEMA:



At the end of the day, we thank God for the many blessings he has showered us in his goodness. We count the many but little miracles that we have received. And the greatest miracle we ever thank God for is for giving us “another day” – a metaphorical expression which actually signifies the gift of a sustained existence. In philosophy, this gift is precised as, i.e., *esse* or the act of being. It is considered a principle and at the same the reality in virtue of which I AM, you ARE, we ARE. It is the animating principle of life.

Another gift we thank God for is for being WHO we are. In philosophy this gift is given the name essence – the principle and the reality in virtue of which man is man, i.e., we are who we are. But between the *esse* and the essence of man which is the greatest gift of all? It is ESSE, which St. Thomas calls the “the proper effect of the highest cause, i.e., God,”⁴³ and “the first among all effects.”⁴⁴ How then does the doctrine of participation apply to these ultimate principles of reality in man?

The participatory strains of Thomistic metaphysics are seen in the actuating power of *esse* (precisely as the principle of act) bestowed on its co-principle ESSENCE as the principle of potency, our ability to receive or to be acted upon. Once the intensive act of being, at the moment of informing, effects the actualization of essence, a being becomes

⁴³ S.T., I-II, q. 66, a. 6, ad. 4.


⁴⁴ S.C.G., III, c. 66.

this particular singular *concrete* individual. Only after the marriage of these two ultimate principles do I find comfort in stating "I am factually existing" or to import a philosophical twang, "I am *ens*."

One nagging question, though, is: Where did this animating principle called *esse* come from? Only from God.

Accordingly, within the compass of the God/man relationship, (and applying now the basic three elements in a participative relation) the *participatum* is God as the source of *esse*; the *participans* is man as the factual existing individual; and the *nota participata* is the perfection of all perfections – in this case the *act of being* or *esse*.

SCHEMA:



Now, in this description of the ultimate principles of reality, the latent and subtle presence of the *analogy of intrinsic attribution* begs for sufficient attention and inclusion.

This analogy makes us describe the dynamic, participative structure of each being as caused or participable. Here, there is a perfection e.g., *esse* that is found intrinsic or immanent in God as well as in man. However, the *esse* as it is found in man is participable,⁴⁵ i.e., partial or incomplete or received, and, therefore, caused. The rigor of this rea-

⁴⁵ In a word, Derisi is justified in calling the basic character of a creature an effect of God "creatureliness" (*la creaturidad*) or participability" (*la participabilidad*). "Participability" is the aptitude or "the capacity to participate or receive being" (*la capacidad de participar or recibir el ser*). See O. Derisi, "Participación, acto y potencia y analogía en santo Tomás," *Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica*, vol. 61(1974), p. 420. See also J. Pieper, "The Concept of Createdness and its Implications," AA.VV. *Atti del congresso internazionale: Tommaso d'Aquino nel sue settimo centenario 6: L'essere* (Napoli: Edizioni domenicane italiane, 1974), pp. 189-198.

soning makes man, in the expression of St. Thomas, an *ens per participationem* ("a participated being").⁴⁶ The received state of created *esse* necessarily points to God as the source of the perfection shared. That is why He is called an *ens per essentiam* ("a being by essence" or "an Unparticipated being"). Within this participational framework, the dependence is always explicitly *causal*.⁴⁷ The very nature of why man is and who man is is participated. In other words, man is participated *per se*.

Precisely, this is what Fabro and company strongly believe as the rightful place of *participatio*: It rather stands at the very heart of St. Thomas' metaphysical system which tended to be sadly neglected for many centuries. Quite rightly –and so it seems– that Louis Geiger is convinced that "the philosophy of St. Thomas may quite rightly be called a philosophy of participation."⁴⁸ In effect, the group of Fabro asserts the non-tenability of the so-called Aristotelico-Thomistic philosophy, a

⁴⁶ As an ontological fundament, therefore, participation lies at the very bosom of a creature's nature. An *ens per participationem* is a caused being, one whose *esse* is received: "A creature is not *esse* and yet is named a being because it participates *esse*," (Sweeney, "Existence/Essence in Thomas Aquinas' Early Writings," AA.VV. *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, vol. 37, *Philosophy in a Pluralistic Society*, ed. Leo A Foley & George F. Mclean, OMI, [Washington: The National Office of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1963] p. 123). See also *II Sent.*, d. 16, q. 1, a. 2, c.


⁴⁷ Essentially, therefore, the analogy of intrinsic attribution "implies altogether the causal dependence of the analogues by a relation to the primary (of beings by relation to God), and the intimate possession of the perfection of being. The relation (of dependence) *ad unum* is then essential to analogy," (Cornelio Fabro, "Nuovi orizzonti dell'analogia tomistica," *Esegesi tomistica*, Cathedra Sancti Thomae Pontificiae Universitatis Lateranensi 11. P. Cornelio Fabro, CSS [Roma: Libreria Editrice della Pontificia Università Lateranense, 1969], p. 412).

In the words of Wallace: "The analogy of intrinsic attribution . . . is dynamic in that it is based explicitly on causality and dependency. To extend the example of the existence of substance and accidents to that of subsistent being, *esse* belongs properly to *ipsum esse subsistens* alone, but it is predicated of other beings because they receive their *esse* in dependence on subsistent being itself. Such analogy is called intrinsic attribution because each being really does have *esse* intrinsically, even though this is dependent on the *esse* of substance," (William A. Wallace, OP, *The Elements of Philosophy: A Compendium for Philosophers and Theologians* [New York: Alba Press, 1977], 125-126).

⁴⁸ "La philosophie de S. Thomas peut etre appelée a juste titre une philosophie de la participation." Geiger, *La participation*, p. 451.

philosophy never supported by the texts themselves of Aquinas' major works, a fault that may have convoluted, perhaps, the mind-set of some, if not all, neo-Thomist scholars away from the true and genuine St. Thomas Aquinas, the Angelic Doctor.

SCHEMA:



On Eschatological Bearing

Lest we forget the article of Lane comes to its climax in a move to open various ways of reconstructing traditional eschatology.

According to Lane, the insistence on the capacity of the individual existent to be involved in human relationships actively and passively opens towards the rightful place of eschatology in an ecological scheme. Here is how Lane explains this second opening:

This capacity to receive individuality through relationship puts the human subject in touch with God and the rest of humanity at

the beginning of life and through life. The grace of existence, co-conferred on the human subject of God, the Creator both *ab initio* and within history through the gift of being radically relational, is the foundation of immortality. Pannenburg's principle of exocentricism, Rahner's emphasis on the human subject as a relational self-transcending reality and Lonergan's focus on the dynamic interrelationality of the human subject in relationship [and may I add Aquinas' obediential potency, i.e., man's natural desire to know more about God in Revelation] are each, in their own incomplete way, expressions of a fundamental orientation and relatedness of the human subject towards the divine mystery. An important link exists between divine-human relationality and immortality, and this link provides an opening towards eschatology.⁴⁹

Very clearly, it is existential eschatology that Lane is espousing here.⁵⁰ This kind of eschatology does not wait for the final day to come. History here is not pictured in a linear way where the end of the linear rope means the dawning of a different segment; call it the future segment. Lane's interpretation of history under this proposed anthropology already connotes the breaking of God's eschatological presence in the present moment made ever present by man's capacity to recall or by man's gift of memory buoyed by the theological virtue of hope.

If this is the case, the note of relationality is made more eloquently pronounced by a participative reading of St. Thomas's metaphysics. If man is basically participative, not to answer to this basic need will spell out an ontological disaster on the part of anthropology. Extremely, man's ultimate hunger to be divinely related is an eschatological principle.

The development dimension of the humankind positions itself as a veritable and strong opening towards a consideration of eschatology in ecology. This Lane considers as the third opening:

Any suggestion that the human subject is some kind of fixed, self-contained substantial entity seems to preclude the kind of change and transformation offered by each; the enclosed self may be amenable to the continuities of Greek immortality but not to

⁴⁹ Lane, "Anthropology and Eschatology," p. 26.

⁵⁰ See Richard P. McBrien, *Catholicism*, Study Edition, pp. 1118-1119.

the transformation of Christian eschatology. There is a need to move away from fixation in the understanding of the self, without eliminating the importance of an underlying continuity within the development of the self. To be human is to be *en route*, even at the point of death. It is precisely this fundamental openness of the human subject in his historical life and in death that is the object of eschatological reflection. Likewise, the focus on the historical character of the human self raises questions about life, its direction and completion, that eschatology seeks to address.⁵¹

Again, the participative interpretation of Aquinas' metaphysics augurs very well with this vision. Man, the participant, will always fall short of the source, the ideal. However, it is this deficiency, ontological in man, that pushes him to aspire for more inputting; and the more man does such, he finds himself in a continuous and transformative process. Always, man's aspiration is grounded in history because of this deficient image. Man's ability to aspire does not mean leaving behind man's sensuality or man's earthliness. It is in this process of aspiring for more lofty ideals that the more man finds himself existentially grounded. The more man goes upwards, the more he goes downwards. This brings us to the fourth opening.

That whatever item, whether human or not, is concerned, each is always related to the Whole. This is Lane's fourth opening:


A forth aspect concerns the solidarity of the self with the whole of creation. An independent, self-sufficient detached human subject seems out of sympathy with the aspirations of a social anthropology. On the other hand, a self that is cosmic and social in origins is open to an eschatology that is social and cosmic in conclusion. More and more it is becoming evident that the perspectives of the so-called "hard" and "soft" sciences that the destiny of the self is bound up with the destiny of the world. The individualism of modern anthropology and its concomitant isolation of the individual from the cosmos restricts the construction of a social and cosmic eschatology... A renewed socio-cosmic anthropology calls into question the credibility of a purely individual eschatology and paves the way for highlighting the necessity of a unified individual, social and cosmic eschatology.⁵²

⁵¹ Lane, "Anthropology and Eschatology," p. 26-27.

⁵² Ibid., p. 27.

Lane's desire to see the two contending theories of individual eschatology and social eschatology married is neatly resolved in Aquinas' participative existentialism. If man is by nature participational, the insistence on the source is a given presupposition without which, talk about participation is moot and academic. This source is sometimes called the exemplar in the framework of exemplarism and in ecological discussion, the Whole.

SCHEME:



All items in the universe, human or non-human have each the basic gift of ESSE – this *esse*, by virtue of which, each individual *is*, is simply a participation in the Reservoir of all *esses*, the Whole,⁵³ the

⁵³ "The basic principle in any sense of ecology is the perception of the Whole as the foundational reality. Differentiation takes place within the whole, and the more creative the differentiation, the more profound the unity and the wider the scope of the activity. The distinct contributions of the various members need to be protected by the other members if the Whole is to flourish and each member thereby enhanced. This simplistic self-interest gives way to complex community interest, self-centeredness to all-together centeredness, in which the sharing activities of the many participants are what make the Whole work, make it – them all – live and develop and enjoy. Motivations make a subtle shift from desiring that life be good for me to desiring that life be good for us; on the active side the desire that I should achieve the good expands into the will that the good itself be attained. There is a growing realization that the good cannot be attained by parasitic activities, in which one member is served by others or others are seen as existing for the convenience of the privileged one. Such privilege

Cosmic God. Although each item is gifted with the ability of this divine participation, each does not end most evidently a cloned divinity. Each still retains its earthliness, in the framework of participation, its being deficient. Always, despite our orientation towards one single common Goal or the Whole, each of us –human or not– in this vast universal expanse retains our own distinct characteristic of being an image, simply a vague image of the Almighty Exemplar, the Cosmic. Here each is pictured simultaneously as an individual as well as cosmic.

From this particular viewpoint of eschatology, we end up affirming that man is a gift but at the same time a task. As a task man has to contend with the fleeting moments of time: the past, the present and the future. As he admires and messes up with the *mysterium temporis*, he affirms more solidly his commitment to always aspire to transform without losing the basic human continuity that he is: human *and* divine. Man is constantly living in a fleeting and moving moment of time, the point of intersection between the past and the future without losing the ontological ground of his human identity. Thanks to the gift of memory that sustains us in this pilgrim road buoyed with the sense of hope.⁵⁴ As a *peregrinator* does man share in the task growing up in the image of God who says “Behold, I make all things new.”⁵⁵

With his appreciation of the future, man is always open to possibilities. Confronted with them, man is equipped with all goal-oriented tools necessary to make that divine image in him of which he simply is a reflection of the Whole to be more and more, little by little, step by step conformed to its Exemplar. This task as a process Paulos Mar

begins to be seen as unhealthy. Relations need to be symbiotic, enhancing the general life, the shared life.” (Beatrice Bruteau, “The Theotokos Project” AA.VV. *Embracing Earth, Catholic Approaches to Ecology*, ed. Albert J. LaChance & John E., Carroll [Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1994], p. 71).

⁵⁴ See Jeremy Worthen, “The Theology of Time Regained: Eucharist, Eschatology and Resurrection,” *New Blackfriars*, Vol. 80 (November, 1999), pp. 512-523; Geoffrey Wainwright, *The Eucharist and Eschatology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971); John Mouroux, *The Mystery of Time, A Theological Inquiry* (Desclee, 1962). Now, although he has not written a separate treatise or devoted a papal exhortation/encyclical on the theology of time, however, a glimpse of John Paul II’s mind regarding this timely topic is in his Apostolic letters, *Tertio millennio adveniente* and *Dies Domini*; and his papal encyclical *Redemptoris mater*.

⁵⁵ Rv 21:5.

Gregorios calls the creative art of image making or *iconopeia*, a process that affirms our ontological constitution to be always deficient in the face of the most eminent reality: God, the Divine Exemplar.

As Christians we are not concerned primarily about survival, either personal or collective. Our central interest is in discerning the signs of the times, in order to be prepared for *iconopeia*, that subtle art of creating images which are in conformity with both our possibilities and our own vocation as human beings [created in the image and likeness of God]. *Iconopeia*, however, will remain an ever incomplete attempt, since whatever images we make of the future, there is every likelihood that we will miss out certain vital dimension which are as yet unknown to us.⁵⁶

Conclusion

Reinstated within a participative metaphysics, St. Thomas Aquinas calling man a *microcosmos*⁵⁷ is, as this article essayed to show, equivalent to calling him a *cosmogenesis*, for he mirrors the unity in diversity of the world out there within the development of time; but unlike the world out there, man's *microcosmos* is a "reasoned" world. It could reach back to and be inspired by the past; be conscious about and innovate the present; and it could project towards and be challenged by the future. It is tantamount to stating that, first, man's innate nature is to be at-one-ment with the world for man's ability to reach back, to be conscious and to project are but one activity of he being a relational being. Therefore, his reasoned world gains bearing, knowledge and projection –only in relation to others. Second, man's ambidextrous ability to move back (to the past) and forth (towards the future) is here interpreted as the gift of freedom.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Gregorios, *The Human Presence*, p. 99.

⁵⁷ See, for example, Marcos Manzanedo, "El hombre come «Microcosmos» según santo Tomás," *Angelicum* Vol. 56 (1979), pp. 62-92.

⁵⁸ For Mary Rosera Joyce, the ecological debate demands that we review our traditional concept of freedom, a review of which will definitely lead us to accept that man's ability to control and dominate nature is a masculine trait that needs be tamed by a feminine counterpart reinterpretation of freedom; and that is, receptivity. In her own words: "True human freedom does not mean, primarily, the ability to control ourselves or anything else. Control is secondary without our freedom. Controlling is mas-

In matters of freedom, Gregory of Nyssa, according to Gregorios, has this to say:

Gregory holds that man becomes divine in the measure in which he becomes conformed to God through developing the "qualities" of God, that is, the good. But what does "the good" mean? Here he uses three central terms: *eleutheria* (freedom), *apatheia* (nonpassivity) and *arete* (effective practice of the good). Freedom, inseparable from the other two qualities – *apatheia* and *arete* – is the very essence of God, and the major constitution of the "image of God" in which man is made...

This human freedom, of which *apatheia* and *arete* are only two aspects, is not completely identical with the freedom of God. There is a difference between the archetype [exemplar] and the icon [image]. It consists primarily in the fact that God is what He wills to be, and does not will something other than He is. So God's nature is in no need of change, while the only thing which is constant about the image, that is, man is that it is in a continuous process of change. . . For the good in which he is to grow has no bounds or limits which can be reached at a particular time. There is infinite possibility within the good, and man must continue, in freedom to grow infinitely.

Gregory qualifies this notion of permanent and infinite change by pointing out that continuous change does not mean the absence of any continuity except that of change. Our created identity remains.⁵⁹

Man, being a deficient image always, calls for relational resolution. There is something in man despite being *cosmogenetic*, i.e., open to transformations. This is his being cosmic, i.e., he being a being retaining a distinct human identity. That is, that of being always an

culine. Freedom is basically feminine, basically receptive, not controlling. Control is authentic only when receptivity precedes it. Then the feminine and the masculine (receptivity and a healthy kind of control) can balance each other in harmony.

Freedom is basically our ability to receive the gift of being as it is given to us. Receptivity does not exist in animals – nor in rational animals. Receptivity exists deep in a *person's* preparitional life and inner space between thoughts and actions. Because of inner receptivity, persons know how to have dominion over nature without domination." (Mary Rosera Joyce, "A Revolution in Human Ecology," AA.VV. *Embracing Earth, Catholic Approaches to Ecology*, ed. Albert J. LaChance & John E., Carroll [Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1994], p. 49).

⁵⁹ Gregorios, *The Human Presence*, p. 70.

image. Within this specific purview of cosmic open-endedness does Beatrice Brutaueu insists that

we are coming to understand that ecologies are not simply "balanced" ecologies, like everything living, are always at least a little off balance, as the various components pursue their respective agendas. There is no preestablished harmony laid on by nature—or even by the Creator—but the patterns of interactions arise from the grass roots. This is the secret of the creativity they manifest. Not having top-down control gives the system the flexibility that enables it to adjust to changing conditions and to invent new interactions.⁶⁰

And because his being a deficient image and being open to possibilities, man's reasoning may be blurred by ignorance and sin so that his mirroring of the world, in general, is blurred and defective. And in the end, man no longer mirrors what the world is rightly; but, on the contrary, the world now mirrors what man is in his distorted and capricious perception of self-image:

This gives rise to a question: Why is it that the power given to man from the beginning by which he was to subdue the earth turns against himself, producing an understandable state of disquiet, of conscious or unconscious fear and of menace, which in various ways is being communicated to the whole of the present-day human family and is manifesting itself under various aspects?

This state of menace for man from what he produces shows itself in various directions and various degrees of intensity. We seem to be increasingly aware of the fact that the exploitation of the earth, the planet on which we are living, demands rational and honest planning. At the same time, exploitation of the earth not only for industrial but also for military purposes and the uncontrolled development of technology outside the framework of a long-range authentically humanistic plan often bring with them a threat to man's natural environment, alienate him in his relations with nature and remove him from nature.⁶¹

The beauty of nature is enveloped by the mystery of time. In fact, it is this mystery that sustains the beauty of nature in time. But

⁶⁰ Brutaueu, "The Theotokos Project," p. 73.

⁶¹ *Redemptor hominis*, par. 15.

because man affirms the measure in time, he sees that as subjected to the brutal fact of time, the beauty of nature generates and dies; generates and dies (and this includes human life). However, in this uncontrollable cyclic movement of birth and decay in the environment, man is the only one who can capture an aspect of this cyclic movement and study it in time. Under study, this aspect pushes man to accept that the world has to end one day. But this end is actually a recapitulation of everything in God and not a return to nothingness, for God is the author of the environment; he gives birth to it; sustains it in its duration and receives it back as his at the end time. Man's stewardship⁶² therefore in time includes an eschatological perspective of the environment.

Now, the world is shrinking fast into decay simply because of the all-pervading philosophy that has left man with an attitude of Nietzsche's nihilism. It has produced variegated senses of the self-efficient, self-reliant, self-centered self of modern anthropology! If ever there are lots of abuses and misuses in the environment, it is because the *micro-cosmos* that is man, originally created by God with an innate sense of ordering and right mirroring, is no longer at peace with itself. How do you expect the environment to be constantly respected if man the only one to measure its rhythm and beauty could no longer even measure the movements of his own small universe?⁶³ If ever there are these abuses and misuses it is first of all because of man's lost sense of self-

⁶² Gregorios is of the opinion that the stewardship issue should not be a substitute for the "dominion mandate" theory. Whether it is the former or the latter, the issue of treating nature as an object "out-there" remains intact. We still are tied up with the idea of nature as "nothing but." This brings to the fore the inclusive-exclusive argument in ecology. In a question form, this argument goes this way: Is humanity *part of or apart from* nature? For Gregorios, this is a false problem whose resolution is easily through the incarnation of the Son of God. He reasons out: "God includes the whole universe in his creation as well as in redemption in Christ. This does not remove all distinctions between humanity and the rest of creation. Humanity has a special vocation as the priest of creation, as the mediator through whom God manifests himself to creation and redeems it. But this does not make humanity totally discontinuous with creation, since a priest has to be an integral part of the people he represents. Christ has become part of creation, and in his created body he lifted up the creation to God, and humankind must participate in this eternal priesthood of Christ." *The Human Presence*, p. 89. See also Jennifer Welchman, "The Virtue of Stewardship," *Environmental Ethics*. Vol. 21 (Winter 1999), pp. 411-524.

⁶³ *Gaudium et spes*, par. 10.

respect for his own world! After all, no one gives what it does not have in the first place! This want is attributed to the absence of a Divine grounding!

When all is said and done, the nature of man determines the nature of the world and vice-versa. Unless man wakes up to the truism about his own self-worth and self-respect and sees this as cradled by a sense of eschatology, the world will remain to be as it is today: broken, under distress and some say, near extinction.

Many current environmentalists believe that there must be a close nexus between environmental philosophy ("ecosophy")⁶⁴ and environmental action. Here I have, therefore, essayed to present a decidedly radical suggestion with the view of helping work out an appropriate environmental ethics – one rooted in the rediscovered/recovered doctrine of participation of St. Thomas' metaphysics. Then and only then can we have a genuine ecological ethics, an ethics that finally produces *sustainable* and truly *humane* cities around the globe, or else "creation in reverse"⁶⁵ apocalyptically begins:

In the end, man destroyed the heaven that had been called earth. For the earth has been beautiful and happy until the destructive spirit of men moved upon it. This was the seventh day before the end.

For man said, "Let me have power in the arty," and he saw that power seemed good, and he called those who sought to bring recognition "weaklings," "compromisers," "appeasers." And this was the sixth day before the end.

And man said, "Let there be division among all people. I will divide the nations which are for me from the nations which are against me." And this was the fifth day before the end.

And man said, "Let us gather our resources in one place and create more instruments of power to defend ourselves; the radio to control men's minds; the draft to control men's bodies; uniforms and symbols of power to win men's souls." And this was the fourth day before the end.

⁶⁴ Duvall, "Deep Ecology and Radical Environmentalism," pp. 116-117.

⁶⁵ Benigno P. Beltran, SVD, *Journey into Solitude, A Manual for Retreats and Recollections*, (Manila: Arnoldus Press, 1986), p. 159.

And man said, "Let there be censorship to divide the propaganda from the truth." And he made two great censorship bureaus to control the thoughts of men; one to tell only the truth he wishes known at home and the other to tell only the truth he wishes known abroad. And this was the third day before the end.

And man said, "Let us create weapons which can kill vast numbers, even millions and hundreds of millions, at a distance." And so he perfected germ warfare and deadly underwater arsenals, guided missiles, great fleets of warplanes and destructive power to the extent of tens of thousands of millions of tons of T.N.T. And it was the second day before the end.

And man said, "Let us make God in our image. Let us say God does as we do, thinks as we think, wills as we will, and kills as we kill." So man found ways to kill with atomic power and dust, even those as yet unborn. And he said, "This is necessary. There is no alternative. This is God's will."

And on the last day there was a great noise upon the face of the earth and man and all his doings were no more, and the ravished earth rested on the last day..⁶⁶ □

⁶⁶ Ibid.