

Chinese in the Philippines Yesterday and Today*

By

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I appreciate this opportunity to share my ideas with you, and I look forward to your reactions to what I have to say. The topic of "Chinese in the Philippines" is one on which so much has been said over so many years that it may be difficult for me to present anything that will be new to you. It seems to me, however, that because I am a specialist in Chinese studies and have spent a good deal of time studying Chinese people both within and outside of China, my perspectives on this topic may be different from those that are most familiar to you.

In this talk I will adopt the perspective of the Chinese themselves, and attempt to explain the interest and motivations from the Chinese side that have shaped their history in the Philippines. My ultimate objective here will be to throw some light on the following questions: How "Chinese" are the Chinese in the Philippines? How "Filipino" are they? The first part of the lecture will outline the causative forces that, in my opinion, have shaped the development of Chinese society in the Philippines and its "Chinese-ness" and/or "Filipino-ness". I will then outline the major periods in the history of the Chinese in the Philippines and briefly characterize each period. The middle part of the lecture will summarize the history of each of these periods. In the final part of the lecture I will at-

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tempt to make some analytical generalizations based upon the material covered.

I. Causative Factors

It is possible to argue that the history of the Chinese in the Philippines has been shaped in large part by the interaction of six causative factors: immigration and demography; opportunity; community institutions; relations with China; generational change; and cultural interaction with Filipinos. Immigration and demography have much to do with the "Chineseness" or "Filipinoness" of the Philippine Chinese. As with other ethnic minority communities, the Chinese, if present in large, concentrated populations, that are regularly replenished by new immigration, are more likely than otherwise to maintain Chinese culture and a sense of separateness. Small, scattered, and unreplenished Chinese populations, by contrast, are more readily filipinized.

By "opportunity", the second factor, I am referring to both material opportunity and socio-political opportunity. Since the motivation of most Chinese immigrants (and most voluntary immigrants generally) has been material betterment of themselves and their families, access to economic opportunity and its underpinnings (e.g., education) is of critical importance to them. Thus, nationalizing laws and policies, or other restraints on material opportunity are likely to encourage a sense that there is no other choice than to be Chinese and to look for whatever opportunities may remain, legal or otherwise. By "socio-political opportunity" I mean opportunity to become citizens with relative ease and freedom to participate fully in the society and polity.

The "community institutions" I have referred to are those organizations and practices that an immigrant community and its descendants establish and maintain in order to maintain the economic, social and cultural life and interests of the group. They are most likely to flourish when there are no alternative means of preserving the group and when there is a sense that members of this group are in a vulnerable and insecure position in the country to which they have migrated. Here we can cite as examples the multiplicity of Chinese organizations, from old-style family and hometown associations, brotherhoods, and charitable bodies, to more modern Lions Clubs, youth organizations, or school alumni associations.

The fourth factor — "relations with China" — operates both individually and collectively. It is both personal and political. At the personal level of Chinese in the Philippines it may include business and investment networking with "home" or ancestral localities in Fujian province. Or it may be focussed on personal remittances of money to support families in China or donations in support of local betterment projects in the ancestral hometown. At the personal level, too, before 1949 one looked to the

ancestral village in China as the place where, with luck and savings from years in the Philippines, one could retire.

The collective meanings of relations with China for Philippine Chinese have also been numerous. China's aid has been sought when the Philippine Chinese have felt weak and vulnerable in the face of limitations on their opportunity in the Philippines. In such cases, the appeal is for political and diplomatic support from China. More generally, Chinese governments have provided cultural support to the Philippine Chinese, particularly through their aid in maintaining the Chinese schools. Finally, support from China — or merely the invocation of the name of Chinese as a possible supporter — is a powerful weapon that organizations and individuals make use of in the context of Chinatown politics in Philippine Chinese communities.

By "generational change" I refer to the cultural modifications — principally filipinization of one kind or another — that mark the difference between Philippine-born Chinese and China-born Chinese. There is also the distinction between the first generation to be born in the Philippines (which is usually called the Second Generation) and the second generation to be born in the Philippines (usually called the Third Generation). More about this later. The general point is that where and when you are born and grow up can be culturally decisive when speaking of "Chineseness" or "Filipinoness".

That brings us to the sixth factor: cultural interaction with filipinos. At any given time, how extensive and how free is that interaction? Is it structured to appear only in certain roles: employers vs. customer, etc.? Or is it looser, less structured, definable in a variety of ways?

II. Major Periods

The six factors I have just described have interacted, and continue to do so, over the whole of the history of the Philippine Chinese. That history can be divided into four major periods. In each of these the mix of factors and the way they interact have been different and so have been the results. The four periods are: 1) ca. 1550 - ca. 1750, which I characterize as "The Formation of Chinese Society" in the Philippines; 2) ca. 1750 - ca. 1850: The Formation of Chinese Mestizo Society; 3) ca. 1850 - ca. 1930: The Formation of Political Relations with China; 4) ca. 1930 - present: The Formation of the Chinese-Filipinos. I will discuss each of these periods, with the greatest attention paid to the last period.

1) Ca. 1550 - ca 1750: The Formation of Chinese Society.

Although a small number of individuals and families had resided in the areas of Cebu and Manila earlier, it was the coming of the Spaniards and the expansion of Fujian's overseas trade in the 16th century that

created a Chinese population of considerable size in the Philippines. That size fluctuated, from 10,000 or less to as many as 30,000, centered on Manila.

Chinese occupations were varied: commercial, artisanal, and market gardening. But there were restraints on full economic opportunity. Spanish policy aimed at controlling and, if possible, converting the Chinese to Catholicism. Restraints were put on the number of Chinese who would settle and where they might settle. But these limitations were mitigated by granting exemptions from them to those who became Catholics and married Filipinas. This is the period of the foundation and early development of the Dominican ministry to the Chinese, involving churches, and hospital and other activities.

Periodically, Spanish-Chinese relations broke down, and there were crises: Chinese uprisings and Spanish killings of large numbers of Chinese. The Spanish colonial government attempted to control the Chinese in part by appointing a Headman, or Captain from among the Chinese leaders. But the Headman, and the heads of the principal trade and artisan guilds were also part of an institutional structure that organized the Chinese on their own terms and represented their economic or other interests.

Relations with China were personal and individual. Chinese came to the Philippines primarily to sojourn — that is to reside temporarily, while sending earnings back to family members in China, hoping, in the end, to return and live in their ancestral villages with their families. Despite this sojourning tendency (common in many immigrant groups worldwide — not just Chinese in the Philippines), there were many Chinese who settled permanently in the Philippines. These were the ones most likely to have become Catholics, to have intermarried, and to have fathered the first generation of Philippine-born Chinese *mestizos*.

2) Ca. 1750 - ca. 1850: The Formation of Chinese Mestizo Society

In this period the early waves of immigration from China receded, leaving behind a residue of Chinese *mestizos*. This was an era of limited Chinese immigration, one in which the Chinese population ranged between 5,000 and 10,000. In contrast to the period before 1750, when economic activities in the Philippines tended to be dominated by Chinese, this was the era of rising Chinese mestizo economic preeminence. Many of the activities that had previously been a Chinese monopoly, or nearly so, now became largely occupied by Chinese *mestizos*.

The Chinese population that remained, now mostly Catholic, was settled and stable. This population was now kept apart from the transient Chinese merchants who came on their ships each year from China. These merchants were housed temporarily in the *Alcaicería de San Fernando*,

located in what is today the San Nicolas part of Manila. Meanwhile, the old Parián was finally destroyed. The settled Chinese population was centered upon Binondo, which had been a special settlement for Catholic Chinese from its inception in the 1590s. But by the early 19th century Binondo had become the business center of Manila, a great urban area with a population of Chinese, Chinese mestizos, and Filipinos. No longer were there the crisis years of uprising and massacres that had occurred periodically before 1750. Spanish controls on the Chinese were stringent in the late 18th century but increasingly eased by the 1820s and after. Meanwhile, the first organizations of a type found in Chinatown today — musical societies cum brotherhoods — made their appearance.

Relations with China, for the Philippine Chinese, continued to be personal and non-political. To the long-standing Hokkien immigration — as with the Hokkien, much of it involving remittances to support families “at home” in China.

3) ca. 1850 - ca. 1930: The Formation of Political Relations with China

This period is marked, above all, by two things: a new wave of Chinese immigration to the Philippines, greater in scale than any before, and new, unprecedented relations between the Chinese in the Philippines and China.

The Chinese population, in this era, rapidly expanded from about 10,000 to 100,000 by 1898 and perhaps to 200,000 by 1930. For the Chinese, expansion was not only numerical; it was spatial and occupational as well. The relaxation of restrictions on Chinese immigration, settlement, and kinds of economic opportunity resulted in the settlement of Chinese in significant numbers almost everywhere in the Philippines — a very different situation from that of any earlier period. Besides the occupations they had formerly engaged in, Chinese now became active as purchasing and sales agents in the provinces, as operators of sari-sari stores everywhere, as rice and corn processors and dealers, and as urban laborers. These changes took place because from the mid-19th century onward the Philippines became involved in trade with world markets. The Spanish government of the day abandoned economic restrictions in the interest of promoting development; and, with that idea in mind, not only allowed a new wave of Chinese immigration, but encouraged it. After 1898 the Americans, in their turn, applied the Asian Exclusion Laws in force in the United States, but did so loosely; not encouraging Chinese immigration but not really discouraging it either.

The Chinese in the Philippines now began to generate many new organizations — in fact, nearly all of the types of organizations found today in Philippine Chinese society. These included the Charitable Association, which supervises the Chinese hospital and cemetery; the Chamber of Commerce; the family and hometown associations; the modern

Chinese-style trade associations; and the Chinese schools. Schools had not really been needed before. Sojourners did not have their children with them; they remained in China. Settlers who had their families with them were usually sufficiently well off to be able to send their children to China for a Chinese education. But from 1900 onward more Chinese women were coming and because of this there were more purely Chinese families and more interest in providing Chinese schools in the Philippines.

Of perhaps more importance, Chinese governments, for the first time, had developed a serious and sustained interest in the fortunes of Chinese societies outside of China and wished to be in regular contact with them. It is from this time that Chinese governments begin to solicit in Chinese settlements outside China the funds they need for modernization projects in China, or for national defense expenses, or disaster relief, or political causes. The new Chinese schools established in the Philippines and elsewhere at this time can only be understood in this context. Chinese governments from 1900 onward wished to bind the Chinese outside of China to China itself — economically, culturally, and politically. The schools, which China promoted and supported, were intended not only to teach practical business skills but also Chinese culture, loyalty to China and concern about China's problems and its future. Thus, these schools attempted to reclaim for the Chinese "community" not only the purely Chinese children but at least the first generation of Philippine-born Chinese mestizos. While mestizos of the second or third generation were becoming a part of the general Filipino society, first generation mestizos were sometimes filipinized and sometimes re-sinified, or reclaimed as "Chinese."

Not surprisingly, considering the growing involvement with China on the part of the Philippine Chinese as a group, the earliest Chinese political parties, including the Kuomintang (KMT), established Philippine branches at this time. The earliest Chinese-language newspapers in the Philippines also date from this time. Much of their content and orientation was related to China.

Finally, groups of Chinese leaders in Manila began to seek the support of Chinese governments and political parties in order to advance Philippine Chinese interests, or to promote closer relations with China, or else to benefit their own position in Manila's Chinatown politics. Thus, by the 1930s, the Chinese population was much bigger and much more diverse than before, and a new element — China, as a political and diplomatic force, had been added to the mix of factors that shaped Philippine Chinese history.

4) ca. 1930 - present: The Formation of the Chinese-Filipinos

This is the period that my current research is about. We are speaking here of the three generations of people that are alive and active today in the Philippine Chinese society.

In the 1930s and 1940s the Philippine Chinese were caught between pressures from China and those from within the Philippines. In China the effects of the World Depression and of Japanese invasion created political and economic instability, thereby encouraging migration by Chinese dependents to join their sojourning breadwinners in Southeast Asia. In this fashion, many more all-Chinese families appeared in the Philippines. Meanwhile, the Japanese invasion of China led to intensified appeals from the Nanjing government of the Kuomintang for monetary and other expressions of support from Chinese living outside China. In the Philippines the pressure to be concerned about China and China's politics now became intense. In the Chinese schools patriotic fervor was at its height. New teachers and political workers came from China. Not only the resistance to Japanese invasion but identification with one or the other side in the Left-Right politics of China became part of Philippine Chinese life. Not surprisingly, when the Japanese invaded and occupied the Philippines, Chinese resistance guerrillas were divided into Left and Right Wing groups.

While these pressures from China were being experienced, there were also threats from within the Philippines. The Commonwealth Government of the late 1930s wrote a constitution that put citizenship on the basis of father's status, rather than on the *ius soli*, or place-of-birth criterion. The effect of this was to make all Philippine-born children of a Chinese-citizen father citizens of China, whether or not they so wished. At the same time, the Commonwealth government began nationalist programs and promised others that would limit certain economic opportunities to citizens.

The threat of national restriction became a reality in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Beginning in 1954 the government of the now independent Republic promulgated a series of laws nationalizing retail trade and the rice and corn business. Since these were sectors long since dominated by ethnic Chinese, the intent of the legislation was clear. Other nationalist laws restricted to citizens the practice of professions. The existence of such legislation reflects, among other things, an awareness by law-makers of the growing numbers of ethnic Chinese who were now attending Philippine universities and taking professional courses. The result of the legislation was that Chinese could continue to study in the professions but could not practice them after graduation, unless they wished to go abroad to do so.

While nationalist policies restricted and channelled Chinese opportunities in the Philippines, opportunities in China were now almost completely cut off. When the Communist government was established there in 1949 and it subsequently carried out radical land reform and collectivization policies, it ended the hope of "Overseas Chinese" that they could realize the old dream of savings and retirement to land-owning local

prominence in their ancestral villages. Even the ability to communicate with one's ancestral home and relatives was sharply curtailed by the Cold War. Immigration to the Philippines was reduced to a dribble. From 1949 onward the Philippine Chinese became increasingly a society of settlers. With almost no replenishment from China, the growth of the population was mostly due to natural increase.

Thus, from a population whose majority was China-born, the Philippine Chinese became a population of mostly Philippine-born. Increasing numbers of this population had no personal contact with China. Yet, despite their essentially Philippine experience, most of them were unavoidably Chinese citizens. In the 1950s and 1960s the citizenship laws that followed the blood line of the father were still in effect. A change of citizenship was possible, but only the wealthy Chinese could afford the money and difficulties that were required. Thus, the Chinese population was squeezed between laws that restricted many opportunities to citizens and the inability of most of them to become citizens.

The Chinese met this situation in several ways. Those who could afford to do so went into new fields that were open: light manufacturing, wholesaling, and, by the 1960s, banking. Others took their talents or money elsewhere: Taiwan, Hong Kong, or the United States. New organizations were created to maximize the negotiating power of economic and cultural sectors in Chinese society. Several organizational pyramids were created in the 1950s by federating various organizations. At the top of all organizational pyramids stood the Federation of Filipino Chinese Chambers of Commerce and Industry, founded in 1954 as the ultimate spokesman for Chinese interests and the most powerful organization in Chinese society. Thus, at least on paper, the Chinese were organized as never before.

Relations with China now focussed on relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan, the descendent of the Kuomintang government at Nanjing. In the Cold War context of the 1950s and 1960s, relations between Taiwan and the Philippine Chinese achieved a new intimacy. So did relations between the Republic of China and the government of the Philippines. The reasons were several. A common fear of and opposition to Communism was one binding force. The dominant Philippine Chinese leaders, the R.O.C. government, and the Philippine government all had a common interest in maintaining non-communist and, if possible, anti-communist sentiments in the Philippine Chinese society. Chinese education was an important part of that and the ties of Chinese schools to Taiwan and the R.O.C's Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission now became especially close. In economic terms, growing involvement with Taiwan was the natural result of geographic proximity and cultural similarity. Most of the businessmen in Taiwan were, like Philippine Chinese, of Fujian background. Throughout this growing involvement with Taiwan,

the Philippine Chinese attempted to take advantage of overlapping areas of common interest while pursuing their own interests.

Towards the end of the 1960s a new era began. The harbinger of it was the appearance of the middle generation of those still active today — the generation born in the 1940s. Here we can see the influence of the generational change and cultural interaction with Filipinos. This was a generation that had experienced little direct contact with China; its experiences were Philippine. A significant proportion of this generation had received university education.

By the 1960s they were becoming aware of themselves as a new and unique cultural group. To express their cultural identity they experimented with terms of self-designation like "Pin-Sinos" or "Sin-Pinos." Much later, by the late 1980s, they would adopt the usage "Chinese-Filipinos," drawing on American multicultural terminological practice. Most recently, they have proposed another term: "Tsinoy" — an amalgam of "Pinoy" and "Tsino." It is too early to tell whether or not this expression will take hold.

In the 1960s there were debates over issues of assimilation or integration. Assimilation implied the disappearance of the Chinese cultural heritage. Integration suggested maintenance of at least some aspects of it. The hyphenated and amalgamated terms just referred to reflect a search for a word that would express a simultaneous commitment to the Philippines but an intention to preserve one's Chinese cultural heritage to the extent possible. In that sense, the expression "Chinese-Filipino" was useful because the noun is "Filipino," suggesting the fundamental identity and commitment, while "Chinese" is a modifying adjective that indicates the type of Filipino being described.

The important issue here is the attempt to separate culture from politics. Philippine policy, up to the 1970s, had proceeded on the assumption, drawing upon Spanish views and practices and the experience in dealing with 20th century Chinese governments, that culture and political loyalty had to go together. If one had any affiliation with Chinese culture then his political loyalty to the Philippines was suspect. It was this linkage between culture and politics that the generation that came of age in the 1960s and 1970s sought to break, making it possible for a loyal Filipino to be at least partly Chinese in culture.

In the 1970s, the Martial Law government of Ferdinand Marcos recognized the Beijing government, thereby severing its formal ties to the R.O.C. on Taiwan. The Philippines now entered an era of arms-length relations with both Mainland China and Taiwan. The Chinese schools in the Philippines were now filipinized, thereby reducing both the Taiwan influence and, more specifically, the amount of Chinese language and cultural content of the education they offered. Not surprisingly, the Chinese language and cultural skills of students at these schools now began to

decline. They declined for another reason as well. Marcos not only filipinized the schools, he legally filipinized most of the Chinese population, by making naturalization, for the first time, easy and inexpensive. The majority of the Chinese population now became Philippine citizens and thereby acquired access to those opportunities available only to citizens. In terms of jobs, then, there was now less reason than before for a young Chinese to need to have Chinese language and cultural skills. The combination of generational change and opportunity change brought about by the Marcos policies of the 1970s, taken together with the largely settler character of the Chinese population since 1949 made the Philippine Chinese a group clearly "here to stay."

These changes in the Philippines can only be understood against the background of relevant world events and policies elsewhere. We have seen that in the period from 1850 to 1930 the Philippine Chinese — and, indeed, the Philippines itself — were increasingly influenced by external forces: world markets and politics, and the interest of China in the Chinese in the Philippines. External forces were even more important in the 1970s and 1980s. Globally, by those two decades, events in China and Hong Kong were encouraging new waves of Chinese migration. Simultaneously, several countries — Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States — were changing their immigration policies to welcome Asians. In addition, the technological developments of the post-World War II period had multiplied the possibilities of long-distance transportation and communication.

The result was to set into motion a new group of Chinese. Some of them go to be united with their families abroad; others, already possessed of resources and skills that are marketable internationally, seek new opportunities and enhanced stability for their families. The result has been a true "Chinese diaspora" — a scattering of Chinese to every part of the earth, in significant numbers for the first time. There are now, literally, "global Chinese". Hong Kong magazines are aimed at them and report on their doings worldwide. Television programming keeps them in touch with Hong Kong, China, and each other. Chinese in the Philippines are part, in other words, of a world-wide scattering of Chinese people — one in which many Chinese have cousins in many parts of the world. Much of this "global Chinese" diaspora is still in motion. But these "new sojourners" are not planning to retire to China someday. They are looking to the next destination after the present one, if the present one turns out to be less than desired.

In other words, we can see globally, in the past twenty years, two trends that involve Chinese outside China. One, as in the Philippines, is a trend towards settlement — towards Chinese population that are "here to stay" and fully committed to the countries where they now live. The other is a renewed sojourning group — the Chinese in motion, the global

Chinese. It is difficult to say how these two trends will work themselves out in relation to each other.

In the Philippines we can see, from the 1950s, and especially since 1970, the emergence of a number of new types of organization, such as Chinese Lions Club, Chinese fire brigades, Chinese charity clinics, and the alumni associations of large Chinese schools. These are organizations that, one way or another, have a great deal to do with non-Chinese as well as Chinese. The organization most specifically related to socio-cultural interactions between Chinese and Filipinos is the Chinese-Filipino integrationist association, *Kaisa para sa Kaunlaran*.

These newer style organizations reflect a "here to stay" orientation. But that does not mean their activities are necessarily limited to the Philippines. Indeed, the Lions Clubs avidly network with international Lion bodies in Asia and elsewhere, and the alumni associations establish local chapters abroad — wherever their graduates are settled. These newer organizations have grown up alongside the older-style societies, not necessarily replacing them. Not only do many of these older organizations show impressive vitality, many of them — even the humblest — attempt to create or join international networks. In other words, the technological possibilities of "globalizing" anything and everything, referred to above, affect both the more "modern" associations and the more "traditional" ones.

Relations with the two Chinese governments — Mainland and Taiwan — now have less the aspect of protection for the resident Chinese in the Philippines. The latter are now mostly Philippine citizens. For the ethnic Chinese of the Philippines it is economic issues that are now of most interest where relations with Chinese governments are concerned. With access to trade and investment in both Taiwan and Fujian, personal or organizational networking is now probably more important than ever. And, as before, there remains Chinatown politics, with its lining up as "Left" or "Right" and support — nominal, at least — from Mainland or Taiwan sources.

III. Generalizations

In the foregoing we may observe the interaction of the six factors described at the outset. What analytical generalizations may be made from this historical overview? Here are some:

1. Contrary to popular belief, the activities, attitudes and fortunes of the Chinese in the Philippines and the nature of their relations with Filipinos have not had a single, constant set of characteristics. As the foregoing presentation should make clear, there have been many changes over the course of some 400 years of history. The characteristics and stereotypes associated with the Chinese today — even if based on facts —

conceal the historical evidence of Chinese adaptability and willingness to change with changing demography, opportunity, socio-cultural environment, and international context.

2. Chinese have sojourned in the Philippines, rather than settling, when opportunities in the Philippines are better than those in Fujian, but too restricted to encourage permanent settlement. They become settlers when opportunities in the Philippines are better than those in Fujian and there are few restraints, or when there are restricted opportunities in the Philippines but none at all in Fujian.

3. The Philippine Chinese, through much of their history, have been a divided social group. Although we often call them a "Chinese community," they have been unified as a community only when they feel threatened by lack of opportunity, or fear of expulsion or violence. The visible unity involved in economic cooperation among Chinese networking in search of economic advantage is crosscut by the intense competition between individual networks of Chinese business associates.

4. In all probability, the Philippine Chinese will always be economically and culturally related to China. But they become politically related when: (a) they need protection or Chinese government economic or cultural aid and they think China will help them; (b) when China's governments have shown they wish to intervene in the affairs of the Philippine Chinese; (c) when invoking the name and possible support of China is useful in Chinatown politics; (d) when Philippine governments become too close politically to governments of China. On this last point, one might draw the conclusion that for the Philippine Chinese the healthiest relationship between the Philippine and Chinese governments is an arms-length one, similar to the kind the Philippines now has with both Mainland China and Taiwan. The experience of the Philippine Chinese in the period 1550-1750, when many were killed without any response from China may suggest that some kind of presence by governments of China is desirable. Although one would like to believe such things would never happen again, the safest situation may be one in which Philippine and Chinese governments are neither too close to each other nor too distant from each other.

What is the future of the Chinese in the Philippines, assuming an indefinite continuation of present conditions and policies? Here are some possibilities:

1. Assimilation, by intermarriage with Filipinos, *mestizaje*, and disappearance as a separately identifiable group. This is the historic process followed from the 16th century to 1930.

2. Integration, retaining some Chinese cultural characteristics, and hence maintenance as an identifiable group. This is the route sug-

gested by the *Kaisa* organization. It seems to me that this can happen only if one or both of the following occurs:

(a) Filipino resentment of perceived economic advantage and dominance by the Chinese is reduced. This can be done by more Chinese entering non-economic pursuits and more Filipinos replacing them.

(b) Filipinos generally accepting the ideal of a multicultural Philippines and of hyphenated identities, including one for the majority. Thus, if Chinese committed to the Philippines are called "Chinese-Filipinos," the majority population is to be called "Malay-Filipinos." This, of course, is an imported "solution" from North America, where it has had some success. But in North America the relations between Chinese-Americans and other Americans are very different based than those in the Philippines. This strategy may not work, or, in any case, might be only supplementary to (a) above.

Meanwhile, important changes continue to take place. Younger Chinese (the youngest generation — those born in the 1970s) increasingly use Philippine languages as their basic form of speech and, as the two older Chinese generations now alive complain, are less skilled in Chinese language and less interested in becoming so. Their friends are as often Filipinos as they are Chinese.

Those Filipinos who see a Chinese monopoly of business through language, cultural, and business practices that they do not share with Filipinos should consider the following. A Chinese skills decline within Chinese society the availability of Chinese studies to non-Chinese has gone up. These studies include not only language and culture but Chinese business methods as well. These days North America is awash in courses and lectures on how Chinese do business. A well-known text on the subject was written by a Chinese-Filipino professor at the Asian Institute of Management in Makati. The opportunity for "hands on" knowledge of Chinese business methods is there in China and Taiwan for Filipinos and others who can travel to those places. "Opportunity," as used in this paper, is now, so to speak, two-way.

Finally, both Chinese governments have softened their appeals to Chinese outside China. They still seek sympathy, technical aid, and investment. But they now recognize that "Overseas Chinese" are increasingly "here to stay" in their countries of residence.

Consider the changes since 1850 in the terms used in China to refer to Chinese people outside of China. Between 1850 and 1900 the expression used in Chinese documents was "*huashang*" or "Chinese merchants," focussing on the major occupation of Chinese people living outside of China. From 1900 to the 1970s, the prevailing term was "*huaqiao*", or "Chinese sojourners" (most often translated "Overseas Chinese"). The clear implication of this term was that all Chinese outside of China intended to return

eventually. Use of this term implied ultimate cultural loyalty — and perhaps political loyalty, too — to China. Thus, whether they wanted to be or not, Chinese outside of China in this period were labelled by both government and private writers in China “sojourners”. Indeed, it has often been the case that the most persistent labels put upon the Chinese outside of China were not ones of their own making, but tags manufactured by governments in the countries where they have lived or by governments of China.

Beginning in the 1970s two new terms have been used: “*hua-yi*” and “*huaren*”. *Hua-yi*, or “Chinese descendants” refers to those of Chinese parentage born abroad. The use of this special term implies an acceptance that such people have undergone some kind of cultural change in the countries where they were born and raised. In the Philippine case, use of the term implies that some filipinization has occurred, and that some degree of “Filipinoness” is present. In their respect, it is of interest to note that one common distinction made in the Chinese society of the Philippines these days is between “Chinese-Filipinos” and “Filipino-Chinese.” The former are likely to be *hua-yi* — people of Chinese background born and raised in the Philippines. The latter are people of predominantly Chinese background, probably born in China. It is of interest to note that the organization of Chinese-Filipino integrationists referred to earlier, the *Kaisa para sa Kaunlaran*, uses the term *hua-yi* in the Chinese equivalent of its Philippine language name.

The term *huaren* is as neutral a term as one could find to refer to ethnic Chinese. It means merely “Chinese people”. The expression says nothing about loyalties or possible cultural change. It merely indicates a person, or group of persons, of Chinese background, whatever may now be their circumstances or orientations. It is the most general and inclusive term for Chinese people outside of China and, as such, is the name of a Hong Kong-based magazine that reports on the doings of the Chinese around the world, whether “here to stay” or “new sojourners.”

In light of all the changes we have been talking about, the categories and definitions we have used seem now to have boundaries that are becoming blurred and no longer firm. These changes make it easier now for all of us to think in new ways about such topics as the Chineseness — and the Filipinoness — of the Chinese in the Philippines. □