

ontology to avoid the limitations of pure phenomenology—a voice notably missing in Burgos’s dialogue.

Furthermore, Burgos’s claim is best understood not as a claim to ultimacy in the absolute sense, but as a first in its sector. Much like Levinas asserted ethics as first philosophy, Burgos asserts anthropology as first in the realm of the human. However, as the realist tradition maintains, one cannot deny the primacy of being without eventually relegating all meaning to subjectivism. Burgos admits that metaphysics can provide an auxiliary general vision of the cosmos, but he insists it cannot modify the structure of anthropology determined by direct experience. It would have been beneficial had there been more engagement with a Thomist and a Thomistic scholar of Karol Wojtyła to better refine this important and timely work.

In conclusion, *Personalism and Metaphysics* makes a significant contribution by daring to pose new perspectives on the relationship between ontology and anthropology. Its most successful achievement is providing a rigorous grammar for articulating personal structures like self-determination and affectivity that traditional Scholasticism often left in the shadows.

However, the book should be read through the specific lens of an anthropological point of view rather than a total replacement of the metaphysical backstop. Burgos successfully demonstrates that anthropology does not require permission from any other science to validate its specific contents. Yet, for those who believe that the person is fundamentally an *ens* participating in the *Ipsum Esse*, metaphysics remains the ultimate stabilizer. While Burgos’s work is a fascinating and in-depth study, his *Integral Personalism* is perhaps more accurately viewed as a necessary enrichment of the realist tradition rather than its total dethronement. For a student of philosophy, this book is an essential invitation to look beyond dry categories and confront the overwhelming factual phenomenon of the human person directly.

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Braver, Lee. *Heidegger on Thinking*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2024. pp. 61. ISSN 2976-5668.

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.55997/3011pslxi186br5>

This work by Lee Braver is part of the *Cambridge Elements: The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*, which focuses on presenting Heidegger’s thinking of thinking. In this brief work, Braver puts flavor to Heidegger’s endeavor

of thinking by weaving his complex thought and presenting it in a way that is essential and primary.

In accomplishing this, Braver divided his work into four sections: 1. Introduction: What is Called Thinking by Heidegger?; 2. Part I: Early Heidegger; 3. Part II: Later Heidegger: Thoughtful Thinking; and 4. Conclusion: Thinking in Question. At the outset of this Element, Braver is resolute with his goal, which is, "... [to] unpack both how he [Heidegger] thinks and what he takes thinking to be, i.e., what he shows us and what he says about thinking." (p. 3, brackets mine)

Following the brief Introduction, Part I provided a summary of the Early Heidegger's philosophy by anchoring it with thinking, which Heidegger considered as the essence of human being. Hence, thinking is presented as the very goal of the project of *Being and Time* because to understand being one must "first understand understanding in order to understand anything at all" (p.1) From this, Braver pointed out the departure of Heidegger from traditional thinking, which, accordingly, encloses thinking to articulation and thematization. Consequently, this showed precisely how Heidegger's thinking also departed and differed from the philosophers starting with Plato up to Kant. Nevertheless, Braver also pointed out Heidegger's acknowledgement of those who came before him specially Kant and Husserl and their Transcendental Idealism. From this, Braver transitioned to Part II, entitled 'Later Heidegger: Thoughtful Thinking,' which presented the shift in Heidegger's disposition towards being. In this part, he presented how Heidegger argued against modernity's call for autonomous thinking and enshrinement of man. In addition, he presented how Later Heidegger understands thinking as response to the compelling of Being rather than a subjective act intended towards an object. It is also highlighted how Heidegger went beyond Nietzsche's nihilism by grounding meaningfulness on the so-called contemporary meaninglessness. This part also nuanced Heidegger as sympathetic towards Descartes', Kant's, and Nietzsche's quest of departing and breaking free from tradition, but he moved forward and believed in the calling of Being. Towards the Conclusion, Braver briefly described his thesis as: "Thinking is changing" (p. 49). In this part, he showed how thinking has been observed and practiced throughout history of Philosophy in relation to how Heidegger perceived it as well as the path forward that he advocates.

As a scholar, Braver was able to achieve the stated aim at the beginning of this element. The genius of Braver lies in presenting the topics in short statements that served like a thesis statement in each section. This is helpful for those engaged in Heideggerian explorations because it gives them a renewed look on the things

that they thought before and for those who are not so familiar with Heidegger because it allows them to grasp certain ideas analogously without the danger of misreading or misinterpreting the text. As a researcher, Braver is well-versed with intricacies of Heidegger's work, which is evident with how he easily weaves themes and topics together. It is commendable how Braver remained faithful to what Heidegger stated and not going overboard. Nonetheless, he strengthened these by supplementing his points and supporting these with direct statements from Heidegger.

Furthermore, Braver gradually guides readers on how to navigate Heidegger's complex thought by using thinking as framework of understanding. In accomplishing this, Braver categorized the philosophy of Heidegger into general statements which served as main points on how to understand his thinking. As such, he was able to present how early Heideggerian concepts gain new significance in relation to the shift in Heidegger's disposition found in his later writings. Accordingly, these points are so interlinked with one another that Braver was able to weave Heidegger's work as an ongoing inquiry into Being, which is fundamentally and primarily, the thinking, the very thing that he is speaking about. It is the very wondering which he refers to Socrates. Furthermore, this thinking is a kind of stance appropriate for Being, because history has showed how "being manifests itself to thought, so acknowledging that **there is more to being than we can know or circumscribe** means, that we cannot predict what new epochs will bring in the future ... [and] we cannot exhaustively determine what any epochal being was in the past." (p. 53, emphasis mine)

Ultimately, thinking is an ongoing mode of being. It is not only finding answers to questions posed by human life situations. It is not only having the capacity for intelligibility. It is not simply a cognitive operative. Rather, it is the very existence of being. It is what beings, thinkers, are also called to participate and engage with. For as Braver puts it: "true thinkers are not those who have aimed at finished views in need of no revision but rather those who know how to perpetually learn them." (p. 56, underline mine)

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