

Governor Bustamante's Assassins: A Historical Appraisal*

An Introduction: The Tragedy of Historical Distortion

Those who do not revere historical truth and misrepresent it through maliciousness and prejudice; those who employ the flight of fancy and imaginative meandering as a source of history; those who palm-off dreams as history and those who are deeply immersed in bitter hatred, contend slanderously that it was the friars who were guilty of the intrigue, plot and eventual murder of the Philippine Governor, Don Fernando Manuel Bustillo Bustamante y Rueda, on that infamous October 11, 1719.

The truth of the matter, however — the sacred and historical truth — is that the treachery and murderous deed must be attributed shamefully to the high-ranking government officials and to the elite in the Great Walled City of Manila.

The real facts of the Bustamante assassination have been badly obscured, distorted and misrepresented by two renowned Filipino masters of the canvass: Félix Resurrección Hidalgo and Fernando Amorsolo who, working seventy years apart, have produced near-identical, non-historical, tragic representations and mistakes.

Hidalgo seemingly portrayed the Dominican friars as the treacherous murderers; Amorsolo, on the other hand, attempted to portray the Franciscans as the despicable assassins. Neither

* Recently, Father Pablo Fernández, a Dominican historian of Santo Tomás University, has brought to light an extremely interesting and a highly objective eye-witness account about the Bustamante tragedy.

The account was penned by the Franciscan, Fray Felipe José Gómez Montañez, some forty-one years after the treacherous double murder of father and son.

The reader is urged to peruse carefully the transcript of the valuable document together with its preliminary translation. Both items are found in the "Philippiniana Records" section of this issue.

one or the other masterpiece conveys any semblance of historical factuality or even an approximation of truth.

The totality of guilt for this misrepresentation, however, does not rest with the great master-painters. A large share of irresponsibility and distortion of facts and history must be attributed, in Hidalgo's case, to the expatriate

Antonio Regidor, an anticleric and Mason like most Filipino nationalists of his generation, who urged him to paint the violent death of a well-known governor-general at the hands of corrupt, vindictive friars. The suggestion led to Hidalgo's second masterpiece of dramatic tension and imposing measurements, *The Assassination of Governor Bustamante*, an incident immortalized in the novel *La Loba Negra*, dubiously attributed to the martyred Father Burgos.¹

The other master-mind, who must share the guilt, shame and irresponsibility of historical distortion is a certain Judge Guillermo B. Guevara, who commissioned Amorsolo to depict the tragic misrepresentation on canvass.

It was Judge Guevara who commissioned Amorsolo to produce this work of art, and was in constant conference with Amorsolo while the painting was being executed.²

It is deeply regretable that such reputable and renowned master-painters of the Philippines should have been trapped into such an embarrassing historical misrepresentation and culpable ignorance of factual truth so copiously recorded in history and so well-preserved in our libraries and archives.

This slanderous and prejudicial distortion of the Bustamante tragedy has not only been immortalized on canvass for all posterity, but it has also found its way into some pseudo-literature, such as the *La Loba Negra*, upon which the two master-pieces of Hidalgo and Amorsolo were apparently based. Professor Teodoro A. Agoncillo made this pertinent observation in his critical notes

¹ Emmanuel S. Torres, "F. Resurrección Hidalgo: Master of Cool Ardour," *Archipelago*, IX (September, 1974), p. 21.

² "Hidalgo and Amorsolo: They Produced Near-identical Paintings on a Tragic Incident in R. P. History," *Philippine Daily Express*, October 21, 1974, p. 25.

to the English edition of the above-mentioned work: "I believe Marco invented the story and made Burgos appear as the author."³

José Marco, one must remember, is also the deliberate fabricator of the so-called *Penal Code of Kalantiaw of 1433*, which was actually concocted in the year 1914.

There is, therefore, no present evidence that any Filipino ruler by the name of Kalantiaw ever existed or that the Kalantiaw Penal Code is any older than 1914.⁴

It is sad to add that after scholarly findings and proofs that José Marco was a fraud, that Kalantiaw never lived as a person and that the Kalantiaw Code was not written till 1914, a certain Chairman of the Historical Commission participated as a guest speaker at the inauguration of the *Kalantiaw National Shrine* in Aklan, on December 8, 1971.⁵

Unabatedly, historical truth continues to be twisted, violated and desecrated by certain newspapers. The tragic murder of Bustamante, supposedly at the hands of the friars, was highly publicized in the newspapers in October 1973 and again in full-page spreads on October 2, 21 and 24, 1974. Again these newspaper accounts were based upon the highly spurious *La Loba Negra* and authored by Judge Guillermo B. Guevara and his research assistant, Pilar M. Hilario.

An inaccuracy, an inadvertent omission or a slight error is certainly pardonable. However, the repeated publication of the Bustamante "tragedy of slander" against the Church and the friars, by the same authors, the same newspapers does not seem to be an error or a mistake; it may be something else.

³ *La Loba Negra*, trans. Hilario Lim, (Manila: Malaya Books, 1970), p.v. That Father José A. Burgos is not the author of this work has been well demonstrated by John N. Schumacher, S.J., the finest authority on Burgos, "The authenticity of the Writings attributed to Father José Burgos," in: *Philippine Studies*, 18, 1, (January, 1970). Cfr. Fidel Villarreal, O.P., *Father José Burgos, University Student*, University of Santo Tomás, Manila, 1971.

⁴ William Henry Scott, "Prehispanic Source Material for a Study of Philippine History," *Unitas* XLI, (September, 1968), p. 420.

⁵ "Kalantiaw Code Promulgation Observed Today," *Philippine Herald*, December 8, 1971, p. 12.

There is no doubt that much poison has been served the reading public; perhaps, it is time to offer the readers the fine wine of truth and genuine history.

The Arrival of Governor Bustamante and the Philippine State of Affairs

Don Fernando Manuel Bustamante Bustillo y Rueda, *Mariscal de Campo* and formerly *alcalde mayor* of Tlaxcala, Mexico, arrived to the Philippines in the early part of July 1717, aboard the Galleon *Santo Cristo de Burgos*. This was the same galleon that carried the long over-due *situado* or subsidy for the colony and a precious cargo of silver and goods worth well over two million pesos.⁶

The newly-arrived Governor and Captain-General disembarked in Bacon, Albay (now Sorsogon) together with his children and wife. The wife of the *Mariscal*, however, was gravely ill and her illness was further complicated by a premature delivery to a set of twins. Bustamante, prompted by a deep sense of urgency and duty to the affairs of the Colony, left his family behind and departed for Manila over-land. Shortly thereafter, on July 24, 1717, the wife of the *Mariscal de Campo* died and was buried in Bacon.⁷

Field-Marshal Bustamante was named Governor and Captain-General of the Philippines even as far back as September 6, 1708.⁸ He distinguished himself as a man of great merit and competence while *Alcalde Mayor* of Tlaxcala, Mexico. He made outstanding contributions to the City's trade, commerce and prosperity through his spirited and resolute manner. However, due to his military disposition he had tendencies toward extreme severity and despotism.⁹

⁶ José Montero y Vidal, *Historia General de Filipinas desde el Descubrimiento de dichas Islas hasta Nuestros Días*, (3 vols.) (Madrid: M. Tello, 1887), vol. II, p. 410.

⁷ Concepción Pajarón Parody, *El Gobierno en Filipinas de Don Fernando Manuel de Bustamante y Bustillo — 1717-1719*, (Sevilla, Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1964), p. 22.

⁸ Juan J. Delgado, *Historia General Sacro-Profana, Política y Natural de las Islas del Poniente, llamadas Filipinas*, 2 vols. (Manila: El Eco de Filipinas, 1892) vol. I, p. 204.

⁹ Juan de la Concepción, *Historia General de las Phelippinas*, (14 vols.), (Manila: Convento de Nuestra Señora de Loreto, 1790), Vol. IX, pp. 205-206.

On July 31, 1717 the shrewd and well-informed Bustamante arrived somewhere in Binondo in a very secretive, unannounced and a surprising manner and took over the governorship without much fanfare. In a spirit of over-enthusiastic determination and without any hesitation or regard for consequences, he plunged himself into the task of intensive and extensive investigation into the bad state of affairs of the far-flung Spanish Colony. It seems that prior to his departure from Acapulco, Bustamante was well-informed about the mal-administration of the *interim*-Governor, Don José Torralba; about the depleted Royal Treasury, the irresponsibility of the chief government accountant Don Vicente Lucea y Licea and the rampant corruption and dishonesty among the other high-ranking officials of the King.¹⁰

One of the first public and official acts of the newly-arrived Governor was the decree ordering the arrest of the temporary administrator of the Philippine Colony, Don José Torralba, on August 2, 1717. On this same day he published an order from Binondo summoning all high-ranking government officials to a meeting scheduled for August 5th. The chief account, the treasurers, the book-keepers and secretaries were asked to be present with their books, records, keys and other important papers so as to ascertain and determine the state of financial affairs in the land.¹¹

This urgent gathering, however, we learn from Bustamante's letter to the King on August 18, 1717, did not take place until August 7th. The reason for this delay was the obstinacy of the government personnel and the fact that the *Audiencia*, a governing body, was in shambles. Present for this rendering of accounts was Don Antonio de Casas y Alvarado and several others.

This small gathering of important government officials declared in the presence of Bustamante that only 33,226 pesos were on hand in the treasury plus another 500.00 in vouchers due the public treasury. All in all, there was the incredible sum of

This is perhaps the lengthiest and most detailed account of the Bustamante episode; the narrative runs from pages 183-424.

¹⁰ Parody, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

¹¹ Concepción, *op. cit.*, vol. IX p. 206. See also, Parody, *op. cit.* pp. 12-13.

700.000 pesos unaccounted for; 232,000 pesos of this was on hand when Don José Torralba assumed the task of *interim-governor*.¹²

What surfaced to the top from the short meeting and inquiry was this sad revelation and exposure: rampant irresponsibility in public office, mal-administration, malversation of public funds, depleted Royal and Public Treasuries, unpaid debts, uncollected taxes and badly neglected government properties.

Don Vicente Lucea Y Licea: An Irresponsible and Dishonest Chief Government Accountant

The Marshal's persistent and determined investigation of the finances of the island-government brought him into a serious confrontation with a very influential person in the life of the Walled City, Don Vicente Lucea, a *Contador de Cuentas*.¹³

At the same time that the Governor called together all the royal officials, he notified the Accountant Lucea that within eight days he would have to present a declaration of accounts with a sworn statement. The fearful culprit did not comply with the order because on the fourteenth of August another decree was served by the determined *Mariscal*. The *Fiscal* again called a new meeting of all the officials from which Vicente Lucea excused himself. On the third of November, after many pretenses, the unyielding Field-Marshal served an ultimatum and gave Lucea eighteen more days within which to submit the reports and settle his accounts. Don Vicente Lucea stubbornly refused to comply and kept giving excuses that he did not know what to declare or what to report.

Meanwhile, Fiscal Alvarado died and Bustamante appointed an *interim-fiscal* in the person of Don Agustín Guerrero who took over the case of Lucea, accused him of gross disobedience and demanded that he be taken into custody immediately while the books are being studied. Bustamante confirmed what the Fiscal had ordered and pronounced the imprisonment of Lucea. While on their way to Fort Santiago and near the cathedral Vicente

¹² Parody, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-72.

¹³ Parody, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

and enforcing the laws which were promulgated. There was seemingly no way of curbing the penchant for quick, dishonest wealth among the representatives of the King and among the privileged elite of *Intramuros*. The tedious and complicated, bureaucratic procedures with their high rate of inefficiency certainly compounded the difficulties.

Another factor which greatly aggravated the dismal state of affairs in the colonial Archipelago was the dishonesty of the Manila aristocracy; they flagrantly misdeclared goods shipped aboard the galleons bound for Acapulco and sought for ways and means in avoiding duties on the rich cargoes and silver brought from Mexico. These evasions and omissions were detrimental to proper governmental operations and contributed greatly to the impoverishment of the colony.

In fact, matters of state were out of hand so badly that the government was unable to pay port fees in Macao and Cantón; the Manila Galleon Trade was greatly prejudiced since there was nothing to load on the *naos* bound for Acapulco. As a result of all this, many people were deprived of work opportunities.¹⁶

It is still rather difficult to determine whether it was Bustamante's impetuosity and impulsiveness or decisiveness and firmness that prompted him to arrest the *interim*-governor Don José Torralba two days after his arrival to Manila. When Don Vicente Lucea was ordered arrested, a large number of government officials and elite scammed for the cathedral, the churches and *conventos* and claimed the right of sanctuary. Much of the *Intramuros* citizenry began grumbling and criticizing the severe tactics of the Marshal and for rushing into the matters of state with such rapidity and unrelenting determination. It seems, however, that one reason for such a mode of operation was the fact that the galleon bound for Mexico was leaving earlier than scheduled due to a change in weather conditions. It was Bustamante's hope to send His Majesty some first-hand information about the Philippine situation.¹⁷

¹⁶ Parody, *op. cit.*, p. 24. It would be well to make this observation that there were no difficulties, misunderstandings with the *Mariscal* and the ecclesiastics. These would appear later at the instigation of Lucea and Torralba.

¹⁷ Parody, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-24.

Bustamante Holds Back the Mexican Silver from the Manila Aristocracy

When Bustamante arrived to the Islands it was nearly two years since no subsidy had reached the Manilans. The situation was not only critical but almost desperate. The Galleon *Santo Cristo de Burgos*, which arrived to the Port of Cavite in the early part of August 1717 was the same *nao* which brought the newly-appointed governor and carried the rich treasure of silver valued at over two million pesos. This argosy was meant for the *ilustrados* of the great walled city of Manila most of whom were heavy debtors of the Royal and Public Treasuries.

In order to recover much of the debt from the aristocracy and replenish the depleted treasury, Bustamante made the daring move of withholding all the precious cargo of silver from the elite for a period of some four or five months and until those who owed the government large sums of money would settle their accounts first. Those, of course, who were free of debts received the silver that was consigned to them.

In a letter to the King, Bustamante proudly informed him that he was able to recover for the Royal and Public Treasury the incredible amount of some 220,000 pesos merely by withholding the silver fortune from delinquent tax and debt evaders.¹⁸

This seemingly coercive and terribly painful measure of not releasing the Mexican silver until the losses are recovered was definitely a fine move but it eventually had disastrous consequences upon Bustamante's rule. Any other legal procedure or clinging to established practice of the time would have been futile. The distance from Manila to the Royal Court of Spain was so great, the bureaucratic procedures so complicated and slow that nothing could have possibly been accomplished in ways of reform. In fact, moving through proper channels and utilizing standard procedures of the day was, in reality, detrimental to the growth and progress of this far-away colony of Spain. Requests, inquiries, consultations and decisions were always at least two years

¹⁸ Joaquin Martínez de Zúñiga 2 vols., *Historical View of the Philippines* trans. by John Maver (London: J. Asperne, Cornhill and Monaville and Fell, 1814), Vol. II, p. 19. Also, Concepción, *op. cit.*, vol. IX, pp. 207-213 and Parody, *op. cit.* pp. 75-76.

away. Some of the Governors were daring enough and made important decisions without Royal consultation. In fact, on May 8, 1722, the successor to Bustamante, Governor-General Don Toribio José de Cosío y Campo, Marqués de Torre Campo, wrote to His Majesty and merely informed him that he too took severe measures of withholding the silver of the galleon. The reason for this sensitive move again was to recover the unpaid accounts and debts of the wealthy class in Manila.¹⁹

It was only on August 24, 1717 that the Captain-General and Governor of the Philippines, Don Fernando Manuel de Bustamante Bustillo y Rueda, made his official entry into the Noble and Loyal City of Manila where he received the keys to the Walled City. Two sectors of the Manila society — those wielding political power and those holding economic power — were not only apprehensive but resentful about the triumphant entrance of Bustamante. The ceremony for them did not augur peace and prosperity, but pursuit and prison terms. Governor Bustamante's first twenty-four days in power created and generated a tense atmosphere of conflict and uncertainty. The bitterness of imprisonment, the flight for sanctuary, the silver embargo and the pressures of justice and righteousness had already pained and embittered these two sectors of the *Intramuros* Society. And so the very beginnings of Bustamante's tenure saw resentment, intrigue and revenge blowing in the wind and gaining momentum rapidly.²⁰

The Interim-Government of Don José Torralba, 1715-1717

Señor Doctor Don José Torralba arrived to the Archipelago as an *oidor* and *fiscal* in the year 1697. When the incumbent governor, Conde de Lizárraga, died at Manila on February 4, 1715, the task of temporary administration was assumed by the *Audiencia* member Torralba.²¹

In actuality, the senior *oidor* was Don José Antonio Pabón and the task of temporary governor should have fallen to him.

¹⁹ Parody, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

²⁰ Parody, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

²¹ Juan Ferrando, *Historia de los Padres Dominicos en las Islas Filipinas*, (6 vols.), (Madrid: Imprenta y Estereotipia de M. Rivadeneyra, 1871), Vol.

However, Don Pabón was accused of having failed to resist the visiting Cardinal Tournon's unwarranted assumption of authority in the Islands and thus he incurred the displeasure of the home-government. As a result he was deprived of his office and fined. His appeal for a reversal of the unfair sentence and restitution to his office and salary was heard and granted by a Royal Decree of April 15, 1713. This decree, however, reached Manila only after Torralba took the reins of the temporary rule. Torralba declined in re-instating Pabón under various pretexts.²² What more, Torralba attempted to obtain other evidence against Pabón causing him serious difficulties and forcing him to seek refuge in the Church of San Agustín.

The *interim*-rule of Don José Torralba was badly stained with dishonesty, ambition, treachery, imprudence and abuse of assumed power. He was quickly censured for one of his imprudent interventions in the affairs of the Recollect Friars by sending government troops to bombard the *convento* at Bagumbayan in order to bring back some recalcitrant friars to the *convento* in the Walled City and presumably restore unity to a divided community. To complicate matters, Torralba instituted proceedings against another *oidor*, Don Gregorio Manuel de Villa and two officers, Santos Pérez Tagle and Luis Antonio Tagle, on the charge of aiding the "recalcitrant" Castillian Recollect Friars in their revolt against their own Superior of the Order. Actually, they were opposing Torralba's intervention.

IV, p. 213. See also, Delgado, *op. cit.*, p. 204. The following documents from the Philippine National Archives cast some very interesting light on the person of Torralba: PNA, *Cedulario*, 1701-1708, Expediente 5, págs. 22-28 (Madrid, 14 de Febrero de 1701); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1675-1809, Exp. 80, págs. 378-379, (Madrid, 2 de Septiembre de 1705); PNA, *Cedulario* 1705-1724, Exp. 128, págs. 159b-162 (San Lorenzo, 7 de Agosto de 1718); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1718-1719, Exp. 137, págs. 347-349, (Manila, 22 de Diciembre de 1719); PNA *Cedulario*, 1720-1724, Exp. 1, págs. 1-3, (Madrid, 23 de Febrero de 1720); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1730-1733, Exp. 32, (Manila, 6 de Julio de 1720); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1705-1720, Exp. 105, págs. 174-178, (Cavite, 22 de Agosto de 1720); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1706-1722, Exp. 50, págs. 96-96b (Manila, 23 de Julio de 1722); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1705-1724, Exp. 178, págs. 262-266b (San Ildefonso, 24 de Septiembre de 1724); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1734, Exp. 20, págs. 159b-160, (Manila — de 1735); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1705-1720, Exp. 77, págs. 128-131b, (Madrid, 24 de Junio de 1712).

²² Concepción, *op. cit.*, vol. ix, p. 235. To merely state that Bustamante was throwing everyone into prison is unfair. The writer's intent here is to show that the violence and brutality were not committed by the ecclesiastics and friars. It remains for a genuine historian to write up this extremely interesting episode in Philippine history.

In due time, the King's royal *cédula* ordered their release from prison and restoration to offices, but again, Torralba conveniently refused to publish the decree.

As a result of these many injustices, many accusations against Torralba flooded the King's Palace and the Royal Court at Madrid. However, eventually a Royal Decree of suspension from office and a fine of some 20,000 pesos were imposed upon Torralba. This decree coincided with the order of imprisonment issued by the newly-arrived Bustamante on August 1, 1717, only two days after his unknown and unpublicized appearance in Binondo.²³

And so the very moment he set foot on the Philippine soil, this illustrious Marshal made law operative in the Archipelago. Amidst the corruptive complications, Bustamante was able to unearth the missing sum of some 700,000 pesos in public funds lost during the short two and a half-year term of José Torralba.²⁴

It was understood that Torralba's son had managed to escape with considerable property and wealth and that his wife and his younger sons had embarked for Acapulco at the close of his regime.²⁵

GOVERNOR BUSTAMANTE: A Man of Good Will and Bad Fortune

"When we study the character of Bustamante and see the many insurmountable difficulties he encountered, we must admit that he faced them all with good-will rather than good fortune."²⁶

The ill-fated *Mariscal de Campo* was fully aware of the animosity, the dislike and resentment he had created among the

²³ Emma Helen Blair and J. A. Robertson, *The Philippine Islands* 1493-1903, (55 vols.) (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1903-1909) Vol. 44, pp. 148-150. See also, Concepción, *op. cit.*, vol. ix, pp. 236-238 and Parody, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

²⁴ Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 421-422. See also Martínez de Zúñiga, *op. cit.*, vol. II p. 23

²⁵ Martínez de Zúñiga, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 23-24. In the opinion of many historians, Torralba emerges as an ambitious, shrewd and vengeful individual. As Ferrando put it: "He was one who took advantage of circumstances, manipulated people and exploited situations," *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 216.

²⁶ Parody, *op. cit.*, p. iii.

unjust government officials and the dishonest aristocracy through his iron-hand procedures, relentless investigations and uncompromising measures and tactics.²⁷

It would be well to state at the outset, that the wrong-doing was not only on the part of Bustamante, but it must also be attributed to others. Historically, it is not simple and easy to judge or evaluate the accomplishments and deeds of the Captain-General and Governor Bustamante since there were such numerous complicating circumstances which clouded and colored his administration. This complexity of intervening circumstances prevents us from projecting a crystal-clear evaluation of the man's intentions, actuations and performance. It seems, however, that his administration was well-intentioned and that his sole passion and purpose was to serve the King, the Philippines and the people. He was unrelenting and uncompromising in his pursuit of bringing about needed reforms; he was devoted to duty, responsibility and to the fulfilment of the royal orders.

Bustamante's fine qualities, however, were set in opposition by his authoritarian tendencies and by his lack of the so-called diplomacy. The Island Colony was passing through a critical stage, which perhaps could have been balanced-off by a diplomatic approach and a broad political vision. But as has been pointed out, the Marshal possessed neither of these qualities or traits.

²⁷ It would be well to mention here that one may be able to understand Bustamante a little more deeply by studying further the many documents that are available. The writer has unearthed some of the following documents pertaining to Bustamante: PNA, *Cedulario*, 1705-1724, Exp. 131, págs. 166b-168b, (Buen Retiro, 7 de Septiembre de 1719); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1718-1719, Exp. 134, págs. 327-342, (Manila, 29 de Diciembre de 1719); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1730-1733, Exp. 32, págs. 99-103, (Manila, 6 de Julio de 1720); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1730-1733, Exp. 70, págs. 112-121b, (Manila, 17 de Mayo de 1720); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1705-1720, Exp. 83, págs. 138-141, (Manila, 20 de Julio de 1720); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1705-1720, Exp. 89, págs. 152-153, (Manila, 30 de Julio de 1720); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1705-1720, Exp. 118, págs. 210-211, (Manila, 8 de Septiembre de 1720); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1706-1722, Exp. 21, págs. 38b-39b, (Balsain, 7 de Octubre de 1721); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1706-1722, Exp. 89, págs. 153b-156, (Manila, 20 de Marzo de 1722); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1706-1722, Exp. 900, págs. 156b-157, (Manila, 20 de Marzo de (San Lorenzo, 20 de Noviembre de 1722); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1722-1725, Exp. 11, págs. 144-145b, (Madrid, 20 de Noviembre de 1722); PNA, 1660-1820, Exp. 99, págs. 285-294, (El Prado, 15 de Febrero de 1728); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1727-1733, Exp. 59, págs. 274-384b, (Madrid, 23 de Septiembre de 1728); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1733-1736, Exp. 10, págs. 12b-13b, (San Lorenzo, 18 de Octubre de 1733); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1730-1747, Exp. 35, págs. 279-281b, (San Lorenzo, 18 de Octubre de 1733).

Many of the accusations directed against the person of Bustamante have never been proven by his contemporaries.²⁸

Many of the extant accounts, narratives, and written impressions of historians and personalities who had dealings with him, present Bustamante in an unfavourable light. One historian put it this way: "he was known to many as a man of severity; one who because of his military background, executed orders and mandates quickly and without hesitation thus giving rise to seemingly despotic resolutions."²⁹

Another historian admits that Bustamante certainly had the good of the nation at heart in making such heroic efforts in collecting the taxes due to the government. But he still criticized his "draconian" methods; pointing out also that he had to pay with his life at the end for his stern measures which sprang not so much from his earnestness to improve conditions in the country as from his ambition of personal aggrandizement and that of his minions. It was said that he spent large sums of money for diplomatic adventures with neighboring countries which brought about no tangible benefits to the Island Colony. "So many were his outrages stemming from his aggressive nature and punitive tendency that this ultimately occasioned his premature death."³⁰

The Archbishop of Manila, Fray Francisco de la Cuesta, in his letter of 1720 to the King, also gave a rather harsh portrait of the *Mariscal de Campo*:

The said gentleman reached this city on the thirty-first of July in the year 1717; and from the outset it seemed, with his disposition — unquiet, changeable, petulant, and with inordinately bad tendencies — that he directed all his efforts to the ruin of these islands. He persecuted the citizens, arresting some, exiling others with pretexts of embassies, conquests, and new expeditions and causing others to seek refuge for themselves, fearful of his harsh treatment; and he fattened on the wealth of all the people.

²⁸ Parody, *op. cit.*, p. 112 and also Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 422.

²⁹ Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 411.

³⁰ Joaquin Martínez de Zúñiga, *Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas*, W.E. Retana, ed. (Madrid: Viuda de M. Minuesa, 1893), Appendix, p. 171.

... it seems as if he had no other law than his own will, from which proceeded his despotic decisions, directed to his own advantage and not to the general and public welfare, which ought to have been his chief care.³¹

A Jesuit observer and confessor of the dying Bustamante, in his letter of November 19, 1719 to his Procurator in Madrid, gave a seemingly censorious, and an unkind impression of the representative of the King:

... Bustamante initiated his rule in these islands with such extreme violence that this very deed deprived him of life. Blinded by the two-fold passion of greed and pride and exercising the absolute power that the government of these Islands conferred upon him... all the citizens had to follow him and comply with his designs, which were directed to his own advantage and purpose... The dungeons of the prisons were filled with persons who opposed or might oppose him; and the *conventos* and churches were full of those who managed to claim the right of sanctuary. The few Spaniards (and they were few) who were outside and moved about the streets, with one foot within the church and the other outside; and with the fear that if they lay down at night in their houses, they would awake in a dungeon.³²

And so, with the writer, Concepción Pajarón Parody, we may pose the all-important question: "What was it that actually motivated Bustamante in pursuing such an authoritarian line of action? Was it the need of order? Or was it the ambition to enrich himself?"³³ The answers to these questions are still buried deeply in the Spanish and Philippine archives awaiting the interest and the touch of a genuine historian.

³¹ Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, vol. 44, "Archbishop's Letter of June 28, 1720," pp. 182-183. In the microfilm collection of the University of Santo Tomas, there is an interesting document on the imprisonment of the Manila Archbishop. See, AUST (Archivo de la Universidad de Santo Tomás), Manila, Microfilm, *Historia Civil de Filipinas* — 1600-1750, Series A. Rollo 47, Doc. 15, "Relacion del hecho violento de la Prisión del Illmo. y Rvmo. Sr. Maestro D. Francisco de la Cuesta, Arzobispo de esta Santa Iglesia, ejecutada de mandato del Sr. Gobernador de Estas Islas el Mariscal de Campo Don Fernando Manuel de Bustillo Bustamante Y Rueda," fols. 13-17.

³² Delgado, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 205. The letter was written by Father Diego de Otazo. An English translation appears in Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, vol. 44, pp. 165-181. These extremely unfavourable views of the Governor stem from the fact that many were unaware of the intrigues and machinations of Torralba and Lucea.

³³ Parody, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

One thing is almost absolutely clear: no matter what Governor Bustamante did, no matter what move he made or what remedy he applied, all his efforts remained futile. His dauntless pursuit of honesty, integrity in government service alienated him from a good portion of the citizenry; it made him an unwanted, undesirable and a hated man. He succeeded only, perhaps, in becoming an obstacle for many in their struggle for amassing wealth. Two factors set Bustamante in bitter opposition with certain sectors of the Manila society of the early eighteenth century; namely, his relentless pursuit for honesty in government service and the withholding of the precious cargo of silver from the grasping hands of the "ilustrados." These two moves created such a crisis that the Governor was never able to disengage or extricate himself for the rest of his tenure.

The many accusations and fabrications brought forward by the Governor's enemies never really held up. He was accused, for example, of demanding a percentage for releasing the silver, but a witness consulted by a mandate of the Viceroy, Marqués de Valero, before the *oidor* of the Audiencia of México, Don Juan de Olivas Rebelledo, testified that this was not true at all.³⁴

The Audiencia of Manila Virtually Non-Existent

The Audiencia or the governing body of the Philippines was in shambles and practically non-existent. The Marshal was actually a one-man-law; since there was not one legitimate *oidor* left for consultation or deliberation in matters of state.

Although circumstances brought about this abnormal situation to a certain extent even prior to Bustamante's assumption of office as Governor, the Manila elite looked upon this as an excellent opportunity for censure, criticism and condemnation.

The *oidores* or members of the legitimate Audiencia were dispersed or impeded from participation in the following manner: Torralba was imprisoned in Fort Santiago; Julián de Velasco and Francisco Toribio de Cosío were being held in confinement; Don José Antonio Pabón, who was cleared of all charges by the King,

³⁴ Parody, *op. cit.*, p. 73. The author here in her sketchy fine monograph makes some excellent observations and fine character evaluations.

was still not re-instated even by Bustamante; Don Gregorio Manuel de Villa, who was a functioning auditor, soon retired to the Convento of *Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe*, because he disagreed with the "harsh" and violent opinions and measures of the *Mariscal de Campo*.

The ambition and connivance of José Torralba did not cease with his imprisonment in Fort Santiago; he kept sending news of a general conspiracy which was being formed and fomented against him by the populace. It was because of these seeming overtures of concern for the problem-ridden Governor that Torralba managed to be transferred to the *Audiencia Hall* as a house-prisoner-of-sorts. What more, Bustamante for some unexplainable reasons re-instated Torralba as a functioning *oidor* and added two others: Doctor José Correa as associate judge and Don Agustín Guerrero as *interim-fiscal*, thereby constituting some semblance of an *Audiencia*. It must be remembered that Torralba was His Majesty's prisoner and Bustamante had no power to re-instate him to office. Nor did the Governor have the power to appoint the other two men as members of that body. The *Audiencia* was, in reality, an illegitimate body.³⁵

The Right of Sanctuary Violated by the Government Troops

The tragic downfall of Bustamante was set in motion when he brought together the improperly constituted *Audiencia*. Torralba, a seeming associate and confidante of the *Mariscal*, worked his satanic art of duplicity together with Correa from within the hall of the *Audiencia*. Another deadly enemy of Bustamante, Vicente Lucea worked his art of conspiracy and intrigue from within the walls of San Agustín where he took sanctuary in order to avoid imprisonment.

It was through Torralba's malign influence and dictates that many were cast into the dungeon-prisons while others were made to flee in terror for refuge and sanctuary. "Torralba had a terrible influence upon the person of Bustamante who, although authoritarian, way down deep on the inside was a weak person."³⁶

³⁵ Concepción, *op. cit.*, vol. ix, pp. 271-274.

³⁶ Parody, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

Among the numerous citizens of Manila who fled to the churches and who claimed sanctuary was a certain notary-public, Don Antonio Ozejo y Vásquez, who took with him the government inventories, protocols and other official records of the years 1717, 1718 and 1719. It was Torralba who incited or urged the Marshal to send troops into the Cathedral to recover the records thereby violating the Right of Sanctuary.³⁷

The Manilans who protested against the arbitrariness of Bustamante did not know that it was Torralba who engineered, manipulated and maneuvered many of the deeds of the Governor.³⁸

When the sacred precincts of the Cathedral were threatened and the right of sanctuary violated, the ecclesiastical authorities were greatly disturbed. The Archbishop, Fray Francisco de la Cuesta, was doubly perturbed when he received a decree and an order from the badly constituted *Audiencia* demanding the recovery and return of the official and public records held by Ozejo.³⁹

The Archbishop, a knowledgeable and a prudent man, consulted about the matter with the doctors of the two existing universities: *Santo Tomás* and *Colegio de la Compañía de Jesús*. A decision was given to the Prelate stating that in no manner and under no circumstances or conditions may the civil authorities exercise jurisdiction within the sacred places even under the order of the Governor or the *Audiencia*.

When the Governor sent another request about the recovery of the official records, the Archbishop informed him about the decision of the scholars of Santo Tomás and the Jesuits. In the same response, the Prelate included a note that he regarded the so-called *Audiencia* as illegally constituted.

The Governor's reckless use of authority and military force in the Cathedral at the instigation of Torralba, no doubt, provoked the Archbishop to publish an interdict upon the City and thus bring about the cessation of worship in all the churches.

³⁷ W. E. Retana, *Archivo del Bibliófilo Filipino*, (5 vols.), "Noticias de lo sucedido en la Ciudad de Manila en Octubre de 1719", (Madrid: Librería General de Victoriano Suárez, 1905), vol. v, p. 131.

³⁸ Concepción, *op. cit.*, p. 275. See also Ferrando, *op. cit.*, vol. iv p. 217.

³⁹ Cfr. AUST, Manila, *Historia Civil de Filipinas*, 1600-1750, Microfilm, Series A, Rollo 47, Doc. 13, "Noticia verídica de lo que sucedió en esta ciudad de Manila día 11 de Octubre de 1719", fols. 33-39.

As a counter-measure, Bustamante issued a public notice demanding all able-bodied men to present themselves armed at the palace whenever the cannon will be fired as a signal.

The Archbishop was quick to perceive who was responsible for this deed and therefore he utilized his moral power and published a public excommunication of Torralba and the son of Bustamante who was the *sargento mayor* at Fort Santiago.⁴⁰

On the evening of October 10, 1719, at about eight o'clock, Canon Don Manuel de Osio and the prebend of the cathedral, Don Juan de la Fuente, forced their way into the *Audiencia* hall where Torralba made his living quarters in order to announce the decree of excommunication.⁴¹ The suspicious Torralba detected the bad tidings and quickly snatched the ecclesiastical censure from their hands and drove them out of his quarters with a sword. Fleeing from the *Audiencia Hall* the two ecclesiastics were captured by the guards and ordered jailed for the night.⁴²

Don Vicente Lucea y Licea: Chief Government Accountant Turns Chief Assassination Strategist

In order to understand more clearly and grasp more fully all the complex intrigue and treachery that forced its way into the life, administration and eventual tragedy of Bustamante, we must now focus our attention on the ugly machinations of the bitter enemy of the unfortunate Governor, Don Vicente Lucea y Licea.

It would be well to recall that when the newly-arrived Bustamante made an attempt to investigate the books of Vicente Lucea, *Contador de Cuentas*, he stubbornly resisted. This corrupt and astute public servant was more shrewd than Bustamante: he outwitted the Governor by escaping imprisonment and dashing for sanctuary to San Agustín.

... from there he never ceased sending reports to the Royal Court against the Governor, thereby destroying

⁴⁰ Concepción, *op. cit.*, vol. ix, pp. 276-287. See also Parody, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 289.

⁴² Martínez de Zúñiga in Maver, *op. cit.*, vol II, p. 30. See also Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, vol. 44, p. 156.

his reputation and eventually bringing about the tragic downfall of the representative of the King.⁴³

San Agustín became a hornets-nest of intrigue; many of the dishonest, corrupt and wealthy tax-evaders took refuge there to save their necks and skins. Many of them were sending protests to the Royal Court; some accused Bustamante of opening sealed letters to the Viceroy in Mexico and to the *Consejo* in Madrid. One copious writer and correspondent was Vicente Lucea who denounced the proceedings of the Governor and informed the King that the *Audiencia* has been rendered non-functional due to the incarceration of the *Oidores*, while others were forced to seek refuge out of fear.

Since Bustamante suspected Vicente Lucea of foul-play and intrigue, he did make an attempt to intercept information and had occasion to do so when the Galleon *Nuestra Señora de Begoña* returned to Manila in 1718.⁴⁴

Very perceptively one writer points to the cunning Don Vicente Lucea:

... of an arrogant nature and bitter disposition, the chief accountant, when removed from his office, fomented trouble and sowed seeds of discontent among the elite of the Walled City. From within the safety and security of the Church, where he sought refuge, Don Vicente Lucea began his plot against the life of the *Mariscal*, until he fashioned and moulded public opinion against Bustamante's person.⁴⁵

There is certainly much evidence that points to the fact that "... he (Lucea) is the central personage in the entire scheme or plot concerning the death of the Governor."⁴⁶

⁴³ Parody, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

⁴⁴ It is interesting to note that this galleon sailed from Acapulco to Manila for some four months and twenty-four days, William Lytle Schurz, *The Manila Galleon* (New York: E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1939), p. 276. The point here is that such prolonged and delayed communication and complicated bureaucratic procedures worked havoc with proper and efficient government of these Islands.

⁴⁵ Parody, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 97. The writer cited here based her research on the wealth of unpublished correspondences and documents in the *Archivo General de Indias Sevilla, Spain*. Obviously, Don Vicente Lucea's letters are extremely revealing.

Lucea once accused Bustamante of selling some 170,000 cavans of *palay* from the Royal warehouses. This, of course, is only partially true; he did sell some of the stock, but only after he provided the garrisons of Manila and Cavite, and not before as they have accused him. "Was this a crime when the Filipinos were dying of hunger?"⁴⁷

Imprisonment of the Archbishop, the Major Religious Superiors and Other Ecclesiastics

When the Metropolitan of Manila learned that two of his ecclesiastics were cast into prison he drew up a list of excommunicates and had it posted in public places.

Apparently, during the night, the illegally constituted *Audien-
cia* decided to call the male citizens to arms and at the same time it also drew-up a decree of arrest against the Archbishop, the Major Religious Superiors and other ecclesiastics. On the following morning, October 10, 1719, a call-to-arms was sounded and the decrees of arrest posted on the cathedral doors and in public places.⁴⁸

It seems that at about the same hour, seven o'clock in the morning, all the Friar Superiors and other churchmen gathered and assembled at the Archbishop's Palace to discuss the impending troubles that were brewing in the Walled City.

... while we were discussing the matters and inferring from these premises the evil consequences which openly were dreaded for the ecclesiastics, through the doors of my archiepiscopal palace (which were open) entered the military officers, armed with great numbers of soldiers; and having filled the palace and surrounded it with infantry, the officers came upstairs with the adjutant who had been publicly excommunicated until they reached the room where I was with the superiors and religious.⁴⁹

It was through trickery, deceit and pretense that *Sargento mayor* or captain of the military managed to get the Prelate out

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

⁴⁸ Retana, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 135-136.

⁴⁹ Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, Vol. 44, pp. 190-191. See also AUST, Doc. 15, cited in footnote 43.

of his palace, supposedly to meet with the Governor and the *Audiencia*.

Although I did not consider the court to which he summoned me as the Royal Court, since the single auditor (Torralba) who composed it was execrable, I resolved to go in consideration of the public tranquility and the respect due to the royal name of his Majesty (in whose name this was being done).

But as soon as I left my palace, the military officers and soldiers surrounded me; and when we reached the door of the governor's apartments, by which I had to enter, I saw that it was all locked. I realized the deceit and malicious subterfuge by which they had drawn me from my house... they seeing my unwillingness to see anyone except the Governor, lifted me in the chair in which I was sitting and by force carried me... surrounded by armed soldiers as if I were a criminal who had committed atrocious offenses. They carried me to the Fort and Castle of Santiago.

... after seizing me, they proceeded to convey other prisoners: my secretary, the commissary of the Crusade; the schoolmaster and prebend of the Cathedral... placing them in the infantry barracks... with orders that no one should speak to them.⁵⁰

It seems that the entire house-hold of the Prelate would have been taken into detention if not for the populace who intervened and stood-up against the sacrilegious move. Archbishop de la Cuesta explained in his letter to the King that there was absolutely no reason for such a show of military power. And yet we learn that the Archbishop never excommunicated Governor Bustamante publicly up to this point, but he did excommunicate Torralba, the master-mind behind every move which was aimed to disgrace Bustamante and antagonize every citizen against him.⁵¹

The Tragic Murder of Bustamante and His Son Carlos

When the Manila citizenry and the friars learned of the violent imprisonment of the Archbishop, the prominent ecclesiastics and their Major Religious Superiors, they quickly rose up in loud

⁵⁰ Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.* Vol. 44, pp. 191-192.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

protest against such arbitrary rule of the Marshal. A tumultuous assemblage of Manilans was seen everywhere preparing to march upon the palace of the Governor. Many of the friars and religious of the various Orders joined the swelling masses of protesters with crucifixes in their hands and chanting: "Long live the Faith! Long live the Church! Long live our King Phelipe the V!" A certain historian, with a bit of irony, adds: "The crowds, of course, had their own slogans which they shouted and chanted."⁵²

... these religious were joined by those who had taken refuge in the churches; and by a great number of people of all classes; and they went in this array to the church of San Agustín. Those who had taken sanctuary there, who were among the most distinguished citizens, filled with fear lest they should be taken from their asylum and put to death, joined the crowd, and promoted the sedition, all providing themselves with arms.⁵³

And thus, the teeming and angry concourse of people and churchmen made their way toward the palace of the Governor.

The page-boy of Bustamante, upon hearing and seeing the turmoil and the long procession, entered the Governor's quarters and notified him of the great number of people moving toward the palace. Greatly disturbed, the Marshal sprang to his feet and shouted orders to the guards but none of them responded. He quickly and frantically dispatched an order to Fort Santiago to discharge the artillery pieces at the swelling crowds in order to disperse them. Several cannons were fired, but they were aimed so badly that the shots were buried in the esplanade of the fort itself.

It would be well to ask the question at this point: was the mass movement of people toward the palace of the Governor planned and deliberate? A certain writer gives us a fine answer when she states:

It is quite certain that the mutiny as such was not planned but that it just happened unexpectedly; there was no intention at all of spilling blood. But those who harboured thoughts of murdering the governor, encour-

⁵² Concepción, *op. cit.*, Vol. IX, p. 297. See also Retana, *op. cit.* Vol. V p. 140.

⁵³ Concepción, *op. cit.*, Vol. IX, p. 297.

tered in this moment the excellent opportunity for their ugly scheme or plot.⁵⁴

Shouting and sloganeering, the throngs of humanity were able to push through the door-way of the Governor's Palace without any opposition. Even before the disorderly mob approached the entrance, the palace-guards dropped their weapons and retreated either from fear or in conspiracy. Bustamante pleaded with the guards for protection but unexplainably the guard within the palace, either over-awed or conniving at the measure, made no effort in defending the beleaguered Governor.

A friar supposedly approached the Governor and made an effort to plead for the release of the churchmen, but Bustamante already lost his composure and was struggling with the furious mob. He fired his pistol at a citizen who was seemingly heckling him, but it missed-fire; quickly he drew his sabre and wounded the man. The latter, and with him the whole crowd, rushed and attacked the Governor angrily. They brought him down to the ground with a strong blow on the head and fractured his right arm. It seemed as if though he were killed.

Meanwhile, the son of Bustamante named Fernando Carlos in command at Fort Santiago, learning about the great turmoil at the palace of his father, mounted his horse and set-out to rescue his father from the the maddened crowds. He arrived speedily near the guard-rooms swinging his sword wildly and wounding anyone who came near his path. Greatly out-numbered at the entrance of the guards, he was attacked and wounded mortally and left there to die.

In all the confusion, turmoil and uncertainty, someone spread the word that the Governor was dead. This news spread through the Walled City like wild-fire. The mobs rushed to the dungeon-prisons and released many of the prisoners and churchmen. They did not leave the prisons empty, however, for they caught and cast into prison the friends and associates of Bustamante.

The height of this violence and tragic disturbance lasted from about eight till eleven o'clock in the morning. It is not too clear from the various sources whether the *Sargento mayor*, Busta-

⁵⁴ Parody, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

mante's son, died instantly or whether he lingered for sometime. We do know, however, that the Governor did not die till he received the death-dealing blows sometime in mid-afternoon.

Some of the individuals among the masses, moved by some unknown and hidden satanic impulse, subjected the wounded Captain-General and dying Governor to all sorts of inhumanity, indignity and disreverence

They dragged the wounded body along the corridors in a hammock... it was at this precise moment that the servant of Don Vicente Lucea, with the greatest reluctance, stabbed the Governor twice near the heart. The mortally wounded Bustamante was now placed in the prison-chapel of the palace. They also brought here the dead or dying son of Bustamante whom they dragged from the stables. Someone made certain that doctors or medical attention would be kept at bay."⁵⁵

Since the details of the actual murder and the persons responsible for it are so uncertain, hazy and incomplete in single accounts, it would be well to cite as many as possible to pin-point the tragedy as closely as possible.

When the plotters of the assassination learned that the Governor was still alive, they dragged the body up the stairs from the dungeon prisons. The servant of the chief accountant, Don Vicente Lucea, stabbed the wounded Governor twice. Bustamante died at about five-thirty in the afternoon.

His son who was dragged from the stables and who was also deprived of any medical assistance, died at the same moment as the father.⁵⁶

Another historian records this second fatal and tragic deed in this manner:

He very devoutly confessed himself and some of the mutineers seeing that he was still likely to live, carried him into an adjoining room and put him into a hammock, with a view to convey him to a dungeon in the palace prison; on the way out he was met by a slave of the chief accountant, Don Vicente Lucea, who gave him two mortal blows with a knife.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Concepción, *op. cit.*, Vol. IX, pp. 298-300.

⁵⁶ Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.* Vol. II, p. 426.

⁵⁷ Martínez de Zúñiga, *op. cit.* Vol II, p. 35.

It seems that the fatal blows executed by the servant of Vicente Lucea were dealt sometime in the early afternoon. Although the two Bustamantes were being deprived of medical attention by some definite intrigue, the friars and the priests made great efforts in providing spiritual comfort to the agonizing Governor. Father Diego Otazo demonstrated a tender, compassionate and a concerned heart by spending much time at the side of the dying Governor. He and other religious shielded and protected the slain Bustamante from the angry and blood-thirsty mobs.

Finally I found him whom they had considered dead; he was lying in an apartment, the blood dripping from his wounds; and he was surrounded with people. At his side was a friar who absolved him conditionally.

I spoke close to his ear and in a low voice and he, recognizing my intention answered me saying: 'Alas, my Father, all this is little compared with what I deserve for my sins, which I confess are infinite... I ask your grace that you will not leave me until I die, and that you will be my companion until death; that if it may be possible... to carry me to the hospital of *San Juan de Dios*...

Hardly had he said this to me when the people again came around us in a shouting manner; I turned to contend with them. I made every possible effort to provide for him what comfort I could, but I was able to secure this only, to have him carried to a more secluded place in the palace... I spent the time thus until about six o'clock, when he died.⁵⁸

When the mobs released the imprisoned Archbishop, Friar Superiors and other ecclesiastics, the Dean of the cathedral, Don Juan González, who was among those incarcerated, quickly hurried to the Governor's Palace. There he found the dying Bustamante without the benefit of a doctor; immediately he sent for the surgeon, Don Andrés Domínguez de Ancolchel. Unfortunately, it was all too late: there was a lack of light, non-availability of bandages and the Governor had lost much blood.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.* Vol. 44, pp. 169-171.

⁵⁹ Concepción, *op. cit.* Vol. IX, pp. 298-300.

The Murderers and Assassins of the Two Bustamantes

It is difficult to determine with absolute certainty and to point with clarity to those who were directly responsible for the abominable murder of the two Bustamantes. In analyzing closely all that has transpired on that infamous October 11, 1719, it would seem that the entire Walled City and its populace played its unwitting role. "But the massive crowds must have been moved by someone; some definite personage..."⁶⁰

There seems to be a common point of agreement among all extant historical accounts that the leader and prime-mover was none other than Don Vicente Lucea y Licea, the *Contador de Cuentas*. It is quite clear that Lucea used his servant, as the accounts relate, to deal the final death-blows. The question now is; who made the first violent attempt at the life of the Governor? Was it Lucea who struck the first deadly blow or did he employ another person to do it for him? None of the historical accounts cited thus far give any clear indication or even a hint of a name as to who struck the first mortal blow.⁶¹

Thus far no evidence can be found to show whether Don Vicente Lucea and Don José Torralba worked hand in hand in bringing about the tragic down-fall of the Governor. It seems that Torralba, through intrigue, down-graded, disgraced, embarrassed and alienated Bustamante from the people while Don Lucea schemed and plotted for his life.⁶²

It is shown that the *Sargento mayor*, the son of the Governor, was murdered by a certain Don Juan Gaínza, but this is not cer-

⁶⁰ Parody, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

⁶¹ It is interesting to learn that there were previous attempts at the life of Bustamante by Vicente Lucea and his close associates; Manuel de Jáuregui, Ignacio Alzate and Miguel de Castro. One attempt or plot was to be executed at a beach or near a river somewhere; another scheme was to mingle in with the beggars who went to the Palace and bring down the Governor; finally, an attempt at his life was to be made in a church of *Nuestra Señora de Guía*. All three plots were frustrated. A certain Agustinian, Fray Francisco Núñez, who knew of some of these plots brought them to the attention of Bustamante. See Concepción, *op. cit.*, Vol. IX, Cap. XIV, pp. 386-387.

⁶² Cfr. José Díaz de Villegas y de Bustamante, *Una Embajada Española a Siam a Principios del Siglo XVIII*, (Madrid: Ediciones Ares, 1952). See the interesting letter of Lucea, "Noticia de la Muerte del Mariscal que Redacta el Contador Lucea," pp. 169-174.

tain. A certain Don Diego Salazar, a close companion of Vicente Lucea was also accused and implicated.

Archbishop Fray Francisco de la Cuesta: Temporary Governor by Popular Acclaim

When the death of Governor Bustamante was made public knowledge, the people clamoured, pleaded and insisted that the Archbishop assume the temporary governorship of the Islands. The Metropolitan of Manila would hear nothing of it and rejected the proposal outrightly. When he was released from prison the people again pursued him with their pleas; he declined on the premise that he was not authorized to accept the responsibility and left Fort Santiago for his palace. While on his way and passing the Governor's Palace, the masses again made an attempt to force him to accept the reins of government. He resisted with determination and entered his archiepiscopal residence. There he ordered two notaries to examine the bodies of the murdered father and son. When reports were made official, the populace again assembled at his doors and resolved that the Archbishop must assume the leadership under all circumstances.⁶³

But the people who still remained under arms, cried out that they would not lay down their arms, until I should accept the government over them in the name of His Majesty. At this I made all possible protests and efforts to resist the pleas of prominent and learned persons of the city, not only the ecclesiastics; but they were unanimously agreed with the general feeling and opinion that I ought to accept the post in conscience and justice for the sake of quieting this community...⁶⁴

And so, Archbishop Fray Francisco de la Cuesta reluctantly accepted the temporary office of Captain-General and Governor of the Philippine Islands and took his oath, but not before the consent and approval of all the legitimate *oidores* of the *Audiencia*: Velasco,⁶⁵ Toribio, Villa and Pabón. All of these men relin-

⁶³ Martínez de Zúñiga, *op. cit.* Vol II, pp. 37-38.

⁶⁴ Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.* Vol. 44, pp. 194-195.

⁶⁵ This Don Julián de Velasco was an influential figure prior to his imprisonment by Bustamante. He became a bitter enemy and opponent of the Governor during his imprisonment. It is unfortunate that he was ap-

quished willingly any legitimate claim to succession and *interim*-rule and enthusiastically formed the new *Audiencia*.

The *interim* Prelate-Governor together with his restored and newly-organized *Audiencia* proceeded with matters of state: their first act was to render the solemn obsequies for the deceased Governor and his son, Carlos. The Archbishop-Governor prepared two stately and majestic tombs or crypts in the Cathedral for the fallen Bustamantes. The ceremonies and funeral rites were rendered in a manner befitting a representative of the King. The *Sargento mayor* was buried in the morning of October 12, 1719 in simpler rites whereas Don Fernando Manuel Bustillo Bustamante y Rueda received the full honors of Church and State that same afternoon.⁶⁶

The *Audiencia*, under the Presidency of the Archbishop-Governor, also set aside four thousand pesos for the maintenance and passage to Mexico of the deceased Bustamante's children. The wife, Doña Maria Bernarda de Castañeda y de Alfambra, as it was mentioned at the outset, died in Bacon, Sorsogon upon arrival to the Philippines in 1717.

The Bustamante Aftermath and the Conclusion

Shortly after the burial of the two Bustamantes, the Archbishop and his *Audiencia* set in motion an inquiry into the causes, motives and responsibility for the abominable murders of the *Mariscal de Campo* and the *Sargento mayor*. When the *Audiencia*

pointed later to head the investigations into the motives and causes for the tragic murders and assassinations of the two Bustamantes.

In the Philippines National Archives there are a number of interesting documents pertaining to him. PNA, *Cedulario*, 1705-1724, Exp. 131, págs. 166b-168b (Buen Retiro, 7 de Septiembre de 1719); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1705-1720, Exp. 83, págs. 138-141. (Manila, 20 de Julio de 1720); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1705-1720, Exp. 89, págs. 152-153, Manila, 30 de Julio de 1720); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1705-1720, Exp. 95, pág. 160b, (Manila, 5 de septiembre de 1720); PNA, *Cedulario* 1736-1780, Exp. 40, págs. 274-282, (Buen Retiro, 16 de Diciembre de 1737); PNA, *Cedulario*, 1737-1743, Exp. 26, págs. 196-204b, (Buen Retiro, 7 de Julio de 1739).

⁶⁶ Cfr. AUST, *Historia Civil de Filipinas* 1600-1750, a microfilm, Series A, Rollo 47, Doc. 15, "Relación del hecho Violento de la Prisión del Ilmo. y Rvmo. Sr. Maestro Don Francisco de la Cuesta Arzobispo de esta Santa Iglesia, Ejecutada de Mandato del Sr. Gobernador..." fols. 11-17. See also, Ferrando, *op. cit.* Vol. IV, pp. 225-226.

made an effort to investigate first the individuals who sought the right of sanctuary in the Church of San Agustín and also those who joined the masses in storming the Governor's Palace,, a new uprising was almost ignited. It was becoming very obvious that the matter was extremely delicate, very complicated and so deeply involved that any attempt in full-scale investigations could become highly explosive.

The Archbishop was aware of this complexity when he wrote:

... It is impossible, even with the greatest care and attention, to relate this affair with all its circumstances; so complicated and mysterious were many of them.⁶⁷

The Canon Manuel Ossio intervened and urged that all inquiries and procedures of investigation be dropped or suspended since these would greatly endanger the peace and tranquility which was beginning to set-in. Many were also of the opinion that the unrest, commotion and participation was too general and all those who went out on that fatal October 11, 1719, did so

in defence of the ecclesiastical immunity, the preservation of this City, the self-defense of its inhabitants and the reputation of the Spanish nation.⁶⁸

In the course of the initial proceedings it became apparent that determining the causes, motives and finding the guilty parties was truly a gigantic task and extremely complicated and delicate. And so, the *Audiencia* suspended the execution of the decree of investigation and sent whatever reports it gathered to Madrid.

Since the attempt in bringing to justice the guilty had failed or became abortive, the guardian of Bustamante's children brought a criminal suit before the Viceroy Marqués de Valero against four citizens of Manila: Vicente Lucea, Diego Salazar, Ignacio Caraballao and Juan de Gaínza. Salazar and Gaínza were arrested in Acapulco and returned to Manila in March of 1721. No significant gains were made in Mexico either, but since Castañeda brought forward various evidence in support of his claim, the Viceroy referred the case to the new governor in the Philippines,

⁶⁷ Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.* Vol. 44, p. 195.

⁶⁸ Concepción, *op. cit.* Vol. IX, p. 334.

Don Toribio José de Cosío y Campo, Marqués de Torre Campo, who took possession of the government on August 6, 1721.⁶⁹

Although the complicated web of motives, causes and personages was unclear and difficult to determine shortly after the tragic episode, today the matter is becoming quite clear and is already in sharp focus. Much of the intrigue and conspiracy has been exposed and many of the motives and causes are quite clear. What remains is to point with absolute certainty to those guilty of the actual murder. New evidence and accounts are constantly emerging and will continue to surface from many of the archival repositories.

Recent evidence and research is placing heavy responsibility upon four personages: Vicente Lucea, José Torralba, Juan de Gaínza and

there was another personality who pledged himself to all the machinations of Torralba, according to the Archbishop in his letter to the King, José Correa...⁷⁰

Don José Torralba was severely punished for his crimes by the King; he was imprisoned once in Manila and later in Cavite. He was also fined some 100,000 pesos, in addition to a previous 20,000 pesos, for the many crimes of corruption and mal-administration while temporary governor. Likewise, by a special Royal Decree Torralba was deprived perpetually from office and banished from the Philippines and banned from entering Spain. In fact, he was reduced to such a state of misery and poverty that he was forced to seek and beg alms. When he died in 1733, he was buried as a pauper near San Juan de Dios Church.⁷¹

It seems that the Archbishop was uneasy about his acceptance of the *interim*-governorship since he had no official sanction

⁶⁹ Cfr. AUST, Manila, *Historia Civil de Filipinas*, 1600-1750, Microfilm, Series A., Rollo 47, Doc. 15, "Carta de Sr. Marqués de Torre Campo al P. fray Sebastián de Totanes," fol. 1. This is only a fragment of a letter wherein the newly-appointed governor is inquiring, under the seal of strict secrecy and as a matter of conscience, whether he is obliged to re-open the investigations into the Bustamante murders. A royal order was issued him as early as October 6, 1720 to do so upon his arrival to the Philippines. He is greatly reluctant since two of the previous investigations have proven futile. He is also fearful that a new unrest may ensue as a result.

⁷⁰ Parody, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

⁷¹ Montero y Vidal, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 436-437.

from His Majesty the King. His fears were assuaged somewhat when shortly after his assumption of office he received a much delayed letter from the King ordering him to depose and arrest Bustamante and re-organize the *Audiencia*.

On August 6, 1821, Archbishop de la Cuesta, temporary Governor and Captain-General of the Philippine Islands, turned over the affairs of the government to new governor, Marqués de Torre Campo.

In a *Real Cedula* dated October 6, 1721, the Archbishop was informed about his transfer to the vacant Diocese of Valladolid de Mechoacan in the Province of New Spain. He arrived at Acapulco on January 11, 1724, took possession of his Diocese on April 18, 1724 and died on May 30 of the same year.⁷²

CANTIUS J. KOBAK, O.F.M.
Manila

⁷² PNA, Manila, *Cedulario*, 1720-1724, Expediente 24 págs. 374-376, and dated in Balsain, 7 de Octubre de 1721. See also, Blair and Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 160 and footnote 43.