

**Fr. Angel de Blas, OP on Human Affectivity:
An Exposition on Fr. Angel de Blas’
*Naturaleza de la Afectividad***

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Abstract: The paper contributes to the assertion that the University of Santo Tomas in Manila has historically been active and involved in continuing the tradition of Thomism, particularly in the Philippines. The paper is part of a project that presents the Thomist scholars of the University in the 19th and 20th centuries. It talks about the contributions of Fr. Angel de Blas, OP, who left some writings that merit academic explorations. His main works were in the areas of Logic and Psychology (particularly experimental psychology, which Fr. de Blas explicitly distinguished from philosophical psychology). The present discussion will revolve around this second major interest of Fr. de Blas, and will venture to talk about his contribution to the then and now debates about the relevance and importance of understanding human affectivity.

Keywords: Human Affectivity, Emotions, Human Freedom, Thomism, University of Santo Tomas

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Introduction

This paper discusses one of the major works of Fr. Angel de Blas, OP, who was well regarded as an administrator and professor at the Colegio de San Juan de Letran and the University of Santo Tomas (UST) in Manila, Philippines. He was actively engaged in the academe during the middle of the 20th century. Fr. de Blas's major works include textbooks which were used as didactic materials for the instruction of Experimental Psychology¹ and Logic² at the University of Santo Tomas, and a series of articles, written in Spanish and remained untranslated until today, published in five parts through the University journal, *Unitas*. The series is given the title 'Naturaleza de la Afectividad',³ and it is this work that this paper is mainly focused on.

Fr. Angel de Blas, OP's work in the Academe

Fr. Angel de Blas, OP's engagement in the academic landscape of the Philippines through the University of Santo Tomas was punctuated by his commitment to the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas. He was an administrator, a professor, and an author, yet amidst the variety of his works, he is visibly a committed student of the Thomist tradition. As an academician, he mostly worked in the field of Philosophy, but he was among the first in the Philippines to argue for a specific methodology that led to the development of a separate field in Psychology. As I already mentioned elsewhere, the standard accounts on the history of Psychology in the Philippines would include the name of Fr. Angel de Blas, OP, even if, strictly speaking, he was not a Psychologist by profession.⁴ As an author, his philosophical works are in Logic, Psychology, and other topics. Below is a tabular summary of Fr. de Blas' published works at the University of Santo Tomas, Manila.

¹ Angel de Blas, OP, *Experimental Psychology*. Manila: UST Press, 1932/1952.

² Angel de Blas, *Nature and Essentials of Logic*, reprinted, from *Unitas* (Manila: University of Santo Tomas, Committee on Textbooks, no date).

³ Angel de Blas, OP. "Naturaleza de la Afectividad," *Unitas* 12, no. 1 (July 1933): 1-55; "Naturaleza de la Afectividad, Capitulo II," *Unitas* 12, no. 2 (August 1933): 107-155; "Naturaleza de la Afectividad, capitulo III," *Unitas* 12, no. 3 (September 1933): 195-244; "Naturaleza de la Afectividad, capitulo IV," *Unitas* 12, 4 (October 1933): 296-349; "Naturaleza de la Afectividad, Segunda Parte," *Unitas* 12, no. 8 (February 1934): 578-596.

⁴ See Patricia Licuanan, "Psychology in the Philippines: History and Current Trends," *Philippine Studies*, 33 (1985): 68 and Richard Velayo, "Philippine Psychology: A Glimpse at Its History and Recent Developments," *International Psychology Reporter* 7, no. 2 (2003): 16 as cited in Joel Sagut, "Thomistic Psychology in the Works of Fr. Angel de Blas, OP," *Philippiniana Sacra* 56, no.171 (Special Issue - Part 2, 2021): 1359-1382.

Table 1: The Works of Fr Angel de Blas, OP recorded in the Miguel de Benavides Library of the University of Santo Tomas, Manila

Logic	Psychology	Other Topics
Logical Structure of Judgment (<i>Unitas</i> , 1941) ⁵	<i>Experimental Psychology</i> (1932, 1952 / Textbook) ⁹	Spiritualist phenomena (An Introduction to the Work of P.C. Bravo) (no date, mentioned in Neira et. al) ¹³
The Science of Logic (<i>Unitas</i> , 1941) ⁶	Naturaleza de la Afectividad (<i>Unitas</i> , Parts 1-4, 1933 / Part 5, 1934) ¹⁰	Thirteen Months of Captivity Among the Communists (no date, mentioned in Neira, et. al)
Essentials of Logic (<i>Unitas</i> , 1950) ⁷	The Modern and Thomistic views regarding the constitution of Psychological Personality: An Opening Exercises Address (<i>Unitas</i> , 1941) ¹¹	Supremacia De La Literatura Sobre Las Demas Bellas Artes ¹⁴ (<i>Unitas</i> , 1931)
Nature of Logic (<i>Unitas</i> , 1950) ⁸	The Psychology of Mysticism (<i>Unitas</i> 1963) ¹²	The need for Catholic philosophy as a foundation for human life (<i>Unitas</i> , 1952) ¹⁵
<i>Nature and Essentials of Logic</i> , reprint ed, from <i>Unitas</i> (no date / Textbook)		The philosophy of the rosary (<i>Unitas</i> , 1954) ¹⁶
		La Botanica de Alberto Magno (<i>Unitas</i> , 1954) ¹⁷
		The Nature of Juridical Personality (<i>UST Law Review</i> , 1964) ¹⁸

⁵ Angel de Blas, OP, "Logical Structure of Judgment," *Unitas* 20, no. 3 (September 1941): 264-282.

⁶ Angel de Blas, OP, "Logical Structure of Judgment," *Unitas* 20, no. 3 (September 1941): 264-282.

⁷ Angel de Blas, OP, "Essentials of Logic," *Unitas* 24, no. 1 (January-March 1951):35-74.

⁸ Angel de Blas, OP, "Nature of Logic," *Unitas* 23, no. 3 (July-September 1950): 513-589.

⁹ See Footnote no. 1 above.

¹⁰ See Footnote no. 3 above.

¹¹ Angel de Blas, OP, "The Modern and Thomistic Views Regarding the Constitution of Psychological Personality: An Opening Exercises Address," *Unitas* 50, nos. 2 & 3 (June-September 1977): 187-193.

¹² Angel de Blas, OP, "The Psychology of Mysticism," *Unitas* 36, no. 1 (March 1963): 1-24.

¹³ Eladio Neira, OP, Hilario Ocio, OP and Gregorio Arnaiz, OP. *Misioneros Dominicanos en el Extremo Oriente, 1836-1940* (San Juan: Orientalia Dominicana, 2000), 503.

¹⁴ Angel de Blas, OP, "Supremacia De La Literatura Sobre Las Demas Bellas Artes," *Unitas* 10, no. 6 (December 1931): 325-330.

¹⁵ Angel de Blas, OP, "The Need for Catholic Philosophy as a Foundation for Human Life," *Unitas* 25, no. 1 (January-March 1952): 153-166.

¹⁶ Angel de Blas, OP, "The Philosophy of the Rosary," *Unitas* 27, no. 4 (October-December 1954): 828-834.

¹⁷ Angel de Blas, OP, "La Botanica de Alberto Magno," *Unitas* 12, no. 5 (November 1933): 405-424.

¹⁸ Angel de Blas, OP "The Nature of Juridical Personality," *UST Law Review* 15, no. 1 (Aug. - Sept. 1964): 50-55.

His students would, however, attest that the published writings could not capture the depth and richness of Fr. de Blas' thoughts. Describing him as a scholar and author, Espinosa claims:

The published writings of Fr. Blas during his lifetime are few and far between. Among these, some may fairly represent decisive portions of his thought. There was much in his class lectures as well as in his spirited discussions with some of his students which do not appear in his published writings and which he did never bother to publish.¹⁹

Now, more than seven decades removed from his death (November 1961),²⁰ it becomes doubly difficult for us to ascertain the extent of Fr. de Blas' scholarship and influence. He must be well-regarded during his time at the University of Santo Tomas as he was once described by a journal editor in 1964 as one of the top ten psychologists in the world.²¹ No justification was provided for this claim, but this suggests that this is how he was then hailed by some scholars, at least in the Philippines.

Doing an exposition on Fr. de Blas today could have been greatly helped if the plan of his students in 1962 pushed through, as they were then hoping 'to publish his most important lectures and other papers posthumously.'²² Sadly, it seems that such a plan did not materialize, and it's unfortunate that even the records in the University Archives only have the drafts of his already published works in logic and psychology. We wonder where the mentioned notes of Fr Blas had gone, including those notes referred to by some of the authors who spoke about him like his *Lecture on the Psychology of Emotions*, which Prof. Jose Samson dated to have been delivered in 1948.²³

If we would moreover look into the list of published works that survived in the Miguel de Benavides Library of the University of Santo Tomas (see the table above), it becomes apparent that Fr de Blas' main concern was to provide materials for his students. His textbooks on Logic and Experimental Psychology survived him and remained in use even after his death, a testament of his lasting influence to his students.

¹⁹ Jose Espinosa, "Fr. Angel de Blas, The Scholar," *Unitas* 35, 1 (March 1962): 3.

²⁰ See Angel de Blas, OP, "The Psychology of Mysticism, *Unitas* 36, no. 1 (March 1963): 1, editor's footnote.

²¹ See Editor's footnote for de Blas, "The Nature of Judicial Personality," 50.

²² Espinosa, "Fr. Angel de Blas, The Scholar," 3.

²³ Jose Samson, "Fr. Angel de Blas, The Psychologist," *Unitas* 35, no. 1 (March 1962): 7.

Fr. Angel de Blas, OP's *Naturaleza de la Afectividad*

As mentioned, *Unitas* has published Fr. de Blas' main treatise on the 'nature of affectivity' in five parts from July 1933 until February 1934. The text was, however, in Spanish, and has not been translated. For a quick reference, I provided the following summary of these articles:

a. Chapter 1: An Introduction

Table 2: Quick Guide for *Naturaleza de la Afectividad* (July 1933)

Publication Details	Themes Provided by the Article	Propositions forwarded by the article
<p><i>Naturaleza de la Afectividad</i>, Chapter 1</p> <p><i>Unitas</i>, Volume 12 (July 1933): 1-55</p>	<p>Introduction</p> <p>The Chapter is an 'Introduction' to the relevance of affectivity in moral life of the human person. It surveys the thoughts of the following:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pythagoras 2. Plato 3. Aristotle 4. Plotinus 5. The Christian Psychologists <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. Tertullian b. Lactantius c. St. Gregory of Nyssa d. Nemesius of Emesa e. Monachus f. Alcher of Clairvaux 6. The Scholastics 7. Juan Luis Vives 8. Francis Bacon 9. Immanuel Kant 10. Étienne Bonnot de Condillac 11. The Scottish School (Thomas Reid) 	<p>There are undefined boundaries between feelings, emotions, and affectivity. It was uncertain whether these three are synonymous or not.</p> <p>Affectivity is different from appetite and cognition (both sensitive and rational)</p> <p>Affectivity is localized in a bodily organ: the heart, the liver, the brain, and the blood in the vessels.</p>

This first article introduces the project and provides the rationale for the whole treatise. Fr. de Blas here spoke of the importance of offering full attention to the topic of affectivity because this is an area that has not been sufficiently, in his assessment, attended to by past thinkers. Certainly, affectivity (invariably introduced by terms like feelings, emotions, and passions) is discussed here and there but is never fully attended to because in philosophy, particularly in philosophical psychology, the attention is more focused on the will and the intellect. The *Naturaleza* provides a response to that lack which de Blas finds relevant, especially in the instructions

for the students. This is a crucial point to emphasize. Here, we could already see Fr. de Blas' emphasis on the distinction of 'affectivity' from appetite and cognition/intellection (both sensitive and rational). This is important for his later advocacy on the establishment of a separate course for *Experimental Psychology*.

On the other hand, when modern psychology emerged, as will be shown in the third and fourth chapters of his *Naturaleza*, most modern psychologists also failed to appreciate the authentic contributions of the earlier thinkers - including Thomas Aquinas, particularly his discussion on the faculties of the soul - in understanding the role of affectivity in human agency and morality. Hence, Fr. de Blas declared his plan of going through a historical treatment of 'affectivity' and later argued for Aquinas' relevance and contribution.

The list of names in the second column of the table above gives us an idea of the range of his historical treatment (from the Sophists down to the Scottish school of the late 18th century). Fr. de Blas grouped them together because of their common interest in identifying the faculty (understood as a bodily organ) which serves as the seat of affectivity. The usual nominees for such an organ are the heart, the liver, the brain, and even the blood in the vessels.²⁴ The dominant answer among these theorists is that the seat of affection is either the heart or the brain.

b. Chapter 2: The Intellectualist Doctrines on Affectivity

The second chapter of the treatise talks about the 'intellectualist doctrines' on affectivity, and the table below provides a glimpse of its content:

Table 3: Quick Guide for *Naturaleza de la Afectividad*, Capitulo II (August 1933)

Publication Details	Themes Provided by the Article	Propositions forwarded by the article
Naturaleza de la Afectividad, Chapter 2 <i>Unitas</i> Volume 12 (August 1933): 107-155	The Intellectualist Doctrines on Affectivity The chapter asserts that there are philosophers who may be grouped as proponents or advocates of the intellectualist doctrines of affectivity.	

²⁴ Even in the local parlance among the Filipinos, there is a well-known close connection between emotion and the blood. We have the expression, 'kumukulo ang dugo ko' (literally translated as 'my blood is boiling') to signify the intensity of one's anger.

	<p>This development was directed to the rejection of the relevance of the doctrine faculties and their powers.</p> <p>The chapter featured the following philosophers:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rene Descartes 2. John Locke 3. Baruch Spinoza 4. Wilhelm Leibniz 5. David Hume 6. David Hartley 7. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 8. Johann Friedrich Herbart 9. M.G. Dobrisch 10. Joseph Nahlowsky 11. Herbert Spencer 12. Sigmund Freud 13. Alfredo Fouille 	<p>The relationship between knowledge and affection needs to be better understood. Fr. de Blas claimed that “It is impossible for an idea to exist without affectivity, and a feeling without an idea.”²⁵</p> <p>It is important to resolve the question on whether ‘emotion is primarily cognitive.’</p>
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As evident in the table provided above, the second chapter of the treatise focused on the philosophers of modernity, particularly those whom he termed as intellectualists. We could also observe that Fr. de Blas’ survey, with the introduction of Descartes’ *Cogito*, has pointed out the emergence of a mind-body dualism that leans more to the former at the expense of the latter. Again the names in the second column are identified by de Blas as proponents of the intellectualist school. He argued that this development has contributed to the decline and eventual rejection of the relevance of the discussion about the role of ‘human organs’ in the talk about emotions.

What remains a central concern even of the intellectualists is the relationship and distinction between knowledge and affection, which is manifested, for example, in the claim that “it is impossible for an idea to exist without affectivity, and a feeling without an idea.”²⁶ Fr. de Blas also argued that the intellectualist school began an inquiry that remains important even for most of our contemporary psychologists, that is, the question of the relationship between emotion and cognition.²⁷

²⁵ de Blas, “Naturaleza de la Afectividad, Capitulo II,” 154.

²⁶ de Blas, “Naturaleza de la Afectividad, Capitulo II,” 154.

²⁷ See for example, Luiz Pessoa, “On the relationship between emotion and cognition,” *Nature Reviews Neuroscience* 9, 2 (February 2008): 148-158; Thomas L. Spalding, James M. Stedman, Christina L. Gagné, and Matthew Kostelecky, “Emotion and Cognition,” in *The Human Person* (Cham: Springer, 2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-33912-8_5; and Maïke Salazar Kämpf et al, “A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship Between Emotion Regulation and Social Affect and Cognition,” *Clinical Psychological Science* (March 2023): 1-31. <https://doi.org/10.1177/21677026221149953>.

c. Chapter 3: The Physiological Theories

The third chapter focused on what Fr de Blas would call the emergence of the physiological theories on affectivity. Advocates of this school strongly criticize the primitive findings of classical authors, particularly the earlier attempts to trace the seat of affectivity and localize it in one physical organ of the human body. They argue that the classical authors did not have the laboratory instruments needed for the experimentation that would validate their claim about the powers of the human faculties. In the mind of Fr. de Blas, however, this third group gave too much exclusive importance to the physiological and material functions of the human body over the facts of human consciousness.

Table 4: Quick Guide for *Naturaleza de la Afectividad*, Capítulo III (September 1933)

Publication Details	Themes Provided by the Article	Themes Provided by the Article
<p><i>Naturaleza de la Afectividad</i>, Chapter 3</p> <p><i>Unitas</i> Volume 12 (September 1933): 195-244.</p>	<p>The Physiological Theories</p> <p>The chapter presents the reactions to the classical search for a faculty/organ of the body that serves as the seat for affectivity and appetition, which highlights the lack of external experimentation that could have helped verify the claims of the older theories.</p> <p>The thinkers that represented this school were:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Carl Georg Lange 2. William James 3. Théodule-Armand Ribot 4. Walter Bradford Cannon 5. Gregorio Marañón 6. William Moulton Marston 7. The Behaviorists <ol style="list-style-type: none"> a. John Watson b. Howard Warren c. Knight Dunlap d. Walter Brown Pillsbury e. Carl Seashore f. William McDougall 	<p>The emotional state is not necessarily preceded by a prior cognition, and its origin may not be located in any particular bodily organ that serves as its seat.</p> <p>Two claims are central in the discussion:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Affection/emotion is independent, if not prior, to perception or intellection. 2. Emotions, including moral emotions, move us into action.

The scholars in this school of thought forward at least the following claims:

- a) affection or emotion is independent, if not prior, to cognition and intellection, and
- b) emotions, including the so-called moral emotions, move us into action. Regarding the first, it can be said that in some cases, emotion - which is the more original experience - is already fossilized when the stimulus is processed and entered into the consciousness. Hence, the like of William James will simply argue that emotions

are the more reliable guides for our actions.²⁸ Too much intellectual mastery pales the emotion, and hardly stimulates our curiosities, and so we no longer become as motivated to act as when something is new to us. The reason for this is the lack of stimulus in our emotions, which had gotten used over the matter in front of us. Fr. de Blas' review of the thoughts of Walter Pillsbury allowed him to highlight the close link between 'emotion' and 'instinct' where Pillsbury traces the immediacy of emotion as it flows as if from instincts even before one's cognition of harm and benefit. Pillsbury gives expression to the assertion that emotions can, in fact, be prior to intellection.²⁹

One of the lasting influences of the physiological school is, perhaps, the claim about emotions' strong influence over our actions. Commenting on the contribution of Théodule-Armand Ribot, Fr. de Blas pointed out that there are emotions that dispose us into action because of our innate tendency to realize our goods as human persons. These are called 'moral emotions,' which are regarded as impulses that make the human person who feels them come out of himself, manifesting themselves in external and internal movements, where human persons act as if they follow their instincts.³⁰

d. Chapter 4: The Psychophysical Theories

The fourth chapter presents Fr. de Blas' discussion of the contemporary (that is, the early 20th century) findings in experimental psychology. He grouped these authors as advocates of the psychophysical theory, which appears to be the synthesis of the cognitivist/intellectualist group, on the one hand, and the advocates of the physiological theory, on the other.

²⁸ The James-Lange Theory of emotion posits that human experience of emotion arises from physiological changes in response to external events. James himself said that "Our natural way of thinking about these standard [strong, occurrent] emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My thesis on the contrary is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion." See William James "What is an Emotion," *Mind* os-IX, no. 34 (April 1884): 189-190 as cited by Matthew Ratcliffe, "William James on Emotion and Intentionality," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 13, no. 2 (2005): 180. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09672550500080405>.

²⁹ Fr. de Blas' comments on Pillsbury's theory recalls, "La *emoción* es un proceso mental intermedio entre los sentimientos, instintos y operaciones intelectuales. Está íntimamente relacionada con el movimiento, pero se distingue de la voluntad, en que esta termina en los objetos exteriores y aquella en el organismo. A la base de cada *emoción* hay, pues, siempre un instinto que la da su carácter de movilidad y de fuerza. Toda *emoción*, por lo tanto tiene su lado instintivo, y todo instinto su lado afectivo" (de Blas, "Naturaleza de la Afectividad, Capítulo III," 236).

³⁰ "La *emoción* moral, si se la distingue convenientemente de la idea moral, tampoco puede negarse que se constituya por las transmutaciones corporales. Toda *emoción* moral, vivida y experimentada es un choque, un impulso que hace salir de sí mismo al que la siente, manifestándose en movimientos externos o internos, y obrando muy semejante en todo a la manera que tienen de obrar los instintos," (de Blas, "Naturaleza de la Afectividad, Capítulo III," 211).

Table 5: Quick Guide for *Naturaleza de la Afectividad*, Capítulo IV (October 1933)

Publication Details	Themes Provided by the Article	Propositions forwarded by the article
<p><i>Naturaleza de la Afectividad</i>, Chapter 4</p> <p><i>Unitas</i>, Volume 12 (October 1933): 296–349.</p>	<p>The Psychophysical Theories</p> <p>The chapter presents the reaction to the overly mechanistic views of some behaviorists (largely due to their rejection of the cognitive and even psychic element of human affectivity).</p> <p>The discussion here leads to the exposition of the thoughts of:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Wilhelm Wundt 2. Harald Hoffding 3. Oswald Kulpe 4. Edward Titchener 	<p>The revival of the classical question regarding the relationship of soul and body, but now availing of modern psychology's experimental and scientific findings, with valuable data that come especially from human physiology.</p>

Many of the thinkers in the psycho-physical school of thought provided immediate reactions to the overly mechanistic views of the physiologists who developed what came to be known as the school of behaviorism, which had the tendency to reject the cognitive and psychic elements of human psychology and argue instead that human behavior is largely determined by our reaction to external stimuli. So, there are two things that are important for them: the quality of the external stimuli and our own personal history. For behaviorism, the training of our behavior therefore needs our proper attention to this dynamic tension between the stimuli and our personal history.³¹

As a reaction to the tendency of behaviorism to view human formation and education in largely mechanistic terms, the psychophysicalists revived the classical question of the relationship between the soul and the body. Yet, given the advances of experimental psychology, the psychophysicalists no longer avail of the answers provided by Plato, Aristotle, and the Scholastics, and not even by the answers of the moderns like Descartes and Leibniz. They resorted instead to the recent findings of experimental psychology, particularly on the more advanced scientific data from human physiology.

Needless to say, this has been the eventual direction of the discussions on emotions today. It has become commonplace to talk about emotions in the area of neuroscience and even biomedical engineering.³² In an entry for the online *Standard*

³¹ See Marc-André Cotton, "Behaviorism and the Shaping of the American Mind (Part 1)," *Journal of Psychohistory* 52, no. 1 (Summer 2024): 62-73. <https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/behaviorism-shaping-american-mind-part-1/docview/3088753153/se-2>.

³² See Rituparna Barooah, "Physiology of Emotion," in *Application of Biomedical Engineering*

Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Andrea Scarantino and Ronald de Sousa point this out, saying:

In view of the proliferation of exchanges between researchers of different stripes, it is no longer useful to speak of the philosophy of emotion in isolation from the approaches of other disciplines, particularly psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology. This is why we have made an effort to pay significant attention to scientific developments, as we are convinced that cross-disciplinary fertilization is our best chance for making progress in emotion theory.³³

Clearly, Fr. de Blas has seen the positive contributions of this development so much so that he has insisted on putting up the needed laboratory for experimentation, which - as has been argued above - has become a pioneering effort in the Philippines. Yet, at the same time, Fr. de Blas insisted that this scientific development should not deny the valuable insights of the classical thinkers, particularly the philosophical understanding of human nature, which was the reason for him to conclude his treatise with a review and affirmation of the Thomistic contribution in understanding the nature and importance of human emotions. The last chapter of the five-part series then is a study that Fr. de Blas dedicated on St. Thomas Aquinas' thoughts about human affectivity.

e. Chapter 5 (Part II)³⁴ : The Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas

The last Chapter presents Thomas Aquinas' view on affectivity. For Fr. de Blas, Aquinas' treatise is up to par with the views of modern psychologists even if Aquinas did not benefit from the scientific advances of modern times. Below is the tabular summary of the themes presented in the article.

in Neuroscience, edited by Sudip Paul, 415-435 (Singapore: Springer, 2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-7142-4_21.

³³ Andrea Scarantino and Ronald de Sousa, "Emotion," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Summer 2021 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2021/entries/emotion/>.

³⁴ In the text that Fr. de Blas published in *Unitas* in February of 1934, he indicated that this chapter is the Segunda Parte, indicating that the first four chapters constitute as the first big component of his whole work, and this special attention on Aquinas is the second part. This only shows the importance that Fr. Angel de Blas placed on the thoughts of Thomas Aquinas in investigating the nature and relevance of human affectivity. It seems, however, that what has been printed is but also an introduction of the intended exposition on Aquinas' contribution to the question. Despite the limited scope of the published exposition on Aquinas, the discussion below hopes to provide what I see as central in Fr. de Blas' views.

Table 6: Quick Guide for *Naturaleza de la Afectividad*, Segunda Parte (February 1934)

Publication Details	Themes Provided by the Article	Propositions forwarded by the article
<p><i>Naturaleza de la Afectividad</i>, Chapter 5</p> <p><i>Unitas</i> Volume 13 (February 1934): 578-596</p>	<p>The Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas</p> <p>The chapter presents the Thomist view on human affectivity. The discussion was divided into the following sections:</p> <p>Chapter I: The Essence of Affectivity</p> <p>Article 1: Affectivity in General</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Different Genres of Psychic Operations or Functions 2. Tendencies as the Root of All Psychic Functions 3. Essential Constitution of Natural Tendencies 4. Kinds of Natural Inclinations in Man 	<p>St. Thomas held that psychology is neither a part of general nor of special metaphysics but is under the genus of natural sciences.</p> <p>As a natural science, psychology is also an experimental science (understood as a science that uses the method of experimentation). It studies the psychic phenomena (since the soul is its object) as the senses reveal them, and ends by verifying its conclusions with the same data of experience.</p> <p>The human 'faculties' and their operations are the bases for the diversity of human actions despite proceeding from a universal essence of human persons.</p>

In the chapter's introductory discussion, Fr. de Blas already argued that with a closer look into the text of St. Thomas, it becomes clear that St. Thomas classifies psychology not as part of either general or special metaphysics but as one type of a natural science. The distinction between psychology and philosophy was not yet clearly defined during Fr. de Blas' time. In fact, even William James at Harvard, when he started teaching psychology in the late 1800s, was not very optimistic about the future of psychology as a natural science.³⁵ On the contrary, and as mentioned above, Fr. de Blas has always been insistent on the distinction between Rational/philosophical psychology on the one hand, and experimental psychology on the other, and he regarded the latter as a natural science.

With such a distinction, Fr. de Blas continues to argue in this fifth chapter that St. Thomas would even agree that psychology is a science that relies on the method of experimentation.³⁶ As a science that uses the method of experimentation, it will

³⁵ Department of Psychology, University of Harvard, "William James," <https://psychology.fas.harvard.edu/people/william-james>.

³⁶ de Blas argues, "Siendo la Psicología una ciencia natural se sigue que, para Sto. Tomás, la Psicología es una ciencia eminentemente experimental, que debe comenzar por el estudio de los

study psychic phenomena (since the soul is its object) as the senses reveal them, and end by verifying its conclusions with the same data of experience.³⁷

Fr. de Blas argues that the Thomistic reading of psychology is aligned with the most recent developments of modern psychology, which has correctly departed from the exclusively physiological reading of psychological data. He however claims that a psychology that limits only to what is empirical in the human person without attempting to understand human nature is insufficient. This now lays the ground for Fr de Blas' importation to experimental psychology of the notion of human 'faculties' and their operations, arguing that the appreciation of the role of human faculties and their operations will help provide an explanation for human diversity that does not deny our common essence or origin as human persons.³⁸

The rest of the chapter discusses what Fr de Blas' sees as essential teachings of Aquinas on the psychic phenomenon. These will be issues that I will try to go back to again before I end this paper.

fenómenos psíquicos tal como los sentidos nos los manifiestan, y terminar, comprobando la exactitud de sus conclusiones, con los mismos datos de la experiencia" (de Blas, "Naturaleza de la Afectividad, Segunda Parte," 580). Commenting on Aristotle's second lecture of the *De Anima*, Aquinas claims that Aristotle "shows that knowledge of the soul pertains to natural science or 'physics'" (Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on 'De Anima,'* lec. 2, par. 23).

³⁷ Para que el ente real sea verdaderamente metafísico se requiere que esté en el tercer grado de abstracción, como el ente en común y el ente Dios; pero el mundo y el alma están en el primero, o son entes físicos, por lo tanto, entran de lleno bajo la consideración de las ciencias naturalis (see de Blas, "Naturaleza de la Afectividad, Segunda Parte," 580).

³⁸ "La esencia, realidad común a todo el ser, y origen radical ciertamente de todas esas funciones, es evidente que no puede ser considerada como principio de su diversidad, pues todo lo común es necesariamente principio de unidad, luego entre ellas y la esencia hay que colocar otras entidades del orden accidental que sean la razón inmediata y suficiente, según su diversa naturaleza, de la distinción que se observa en las operaciones humanas. Tales entidades son las facultades aristotélico-tomistas. Añadase a esto que toda actividad en los seres vivientes debe atribuirse, según Aristóteles y Sto. Tomás, al principio vital, al alma, sentencia en nada opuesta a las modernas teorías, y se tendrá la doctrina de las facultades del alma de la psicología escolástica" (de Blas, "Naturaleza de la Afectividad, Segunda Parte," 584). He would even add that the doctrine of the faculties or powers of the soul, as responsible for the diversity of the actions of the soul, is also held by Aristotle and Aquinas, who claims that "since the essence of the soul is one principle, it cannot be the immediate principle of all its actions: but it is necessary that it should have several and different ones corresponding to the diversity of its actions for the potential is said correlatively to the act; hence according to the diversity of actions there must be a diversity of powers (Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle's 'De Anima,'* lec. 1, par. 12). Aquinas even further explains that the diversity of the actions that human persons are capable of is directly proportional to the nobility of the human person's rational soul. He would again argue that, "the higher the soul, the wider is the range of its activities; and the wider its active range the more, and the more distinctly diversified, organs or bodily instruments are required by it. So the relatively greater nobility of the rational soul calls for a greater diversity of its bodily organs, whilst the far lower soul of a segmented animal or a plant has only a narrow field of activity and therefore needs a body that is more uniform and less articulated, and in any part of which, taken separately, it can maintain its being" (Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on 'De Anima,'* lec. 14, par. 208).

f. Important Insights from Fr. de Blas' Naturaleza

From this quick survey of Fr de Blas' 'Naturaleza de la Afectividad', the following general impressions and insights can be emphasized.

The first thing that could be said is that the *Naturaleza* shows Fr. de Blas' effort to provide a rational justification for experimental psychology as a discipline that is separate from philosophy. In the introduction above, we made mention of Fr. de Blas' efforts and contribution to the establishment of the discipline of psychology in the country through his initiatives at the UST College of Liberal Arts. Those concrete projects he had as an administrator of UST in the 1940s find their grounding in his earlier convictions in the *Naturaleza*. He particularly finds it important that Experimental Psychology be offered as a separate course in UST because he is convinced that this development is not inimical to the philosophical foundations of Christianity and that the Catholic voice needs to be heard even in this emerging field of the natural sciences. He explicitly stated in the Preface of the textbook on Experimental Psychology, first published in 1932, that:

... some would think it's absolutely unnecessary to write a new textbook, since excellent textbooks already exist on *Experimental Psychology* in the English language. But it must be taken into account that the greatest majority of such textbooks have been published by non-Catholic authors who not infrequently propose some doctrines not in exact conformity with the teachings of the Church, and it is not advisable to place those books in the hands of Catholic students.³⁹

Fr. de Blas' push for a course on Experimental Psychology, we then could say, is born from his missionary spirit as a Dominican. His dedication to the field of psychology as a natural science is his personal response to the task of evangelization.

Secondly, the survey of authors mentioned in the *Naturaleza* shows how updated Fr. de Blas' sources are. His familiarity with the classics (shown especially in his erudite defense of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition) did not prevent him from thoroughly studying the thoughts of the contemporary scholars of his time: Wilhelm Wundt (August 16, 1832 - August 31, 1920), Harald Höffding (March 11, 1843 - 2 July 1931), Oswald Kulpe (3 August 1862 - 30 December 1915), and Edward Titchener (11 January 1867 - 3 August 1927).

This may sound quite trivial for us now, but if we would imagine the world of the 1930s, when internet was not yet available and the circulation of books and other materials was not as convenient as they are today, it takes a heart of a

³⁹ de Blas, *Experimental Psychology*, iii.

committed scholar to aim for a global and updated perspective in order to arrive at a more comprehensive reading of the matter at hand. I would like to argue that such a commitment is even manifested in his administrative efforts, such as the establishment of the first experimental psychology laboratory in the country, which he placed at the UST College of Liberal Arts in 1940.⁴⁰

We could safely argue here that the Thomism of Fr. Angel de Blas has provided him with important insights into his work as an administrator. The Thomism he displayed in the *Naturaleza* has led to his advocacy for Psychology as a separate discipline and the successful efforts of sponsoring the BS Psychology program - and later of the Graduate Program - in the University of Santo Tomas, Manila, together with the mentioned establishment of the laboratory in the 1940s, paved the way for a robust Psychology program of the University, and even of the country in general.

Human Affectivity in de Blas' *Naturaleza de la Afectividad*

a. Fr. Angel de Blas and the contemporary discourses on emotion

As shown in the title of his work, Fr. de Blas preferred the word *afectividad* over *emoción*. He sparingly mentioned *emoción* in his expositions, and it is apparent that he treated the notion of *afectividad* as broader in scope. A closer look into Fr de Blas' discussions will moreover reveal that *afectividad* is presented as even more than the classical notion of *passiones animae*, and this became evident in his exposition on Aquinas, which dwelt on the human person's natural inclinations in almost the same extent as he treated Aquinas' notion on the passions of the soul.

In his book, published a little more than a decade ago, *The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion*,⁴¹ Nicholas Lombardo argued that despite theology's renewed interest in emotion, the Thomistic account has been largely neglected.⁴² He lamented over such omission, given that recent literature on Aquinas also showed a growing interest in 'emotion.' Yet, even in Lombardo's appreciation of the recent historical reemergence of 'emotion' in the scholarship on Aquinas (a survey that covered the literature of the late 1800s down to the contemporary time), his discussion focused on the West, and very little has been said about the efforts done in lesser known places like the Philippines. The omission of the scholarship in the Philippines is most

⁴⁰ See Marissa Nicasio, "Angel de Blas, O.P. and the Development of *Experimental Psychology* in the Philippines," *Philippiniana Sacra* 51, no. 154 (2016): 618 as cited in Sagut, "Thomistic Psychology in the Works of Fr. Angel de Blas, OP," 1363.

⁴¹ Nicholas Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2012).

⁴² Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire*, 3.

likely due to the lack of circulation of the Filipiniana sources, even if we could argue that Fr. Angel de Blas, OP could well be cited as having historically contributed to the project. So, we posit in this paper that Fr. de Blas has done his part of animating that project on emotion, particularly in the thoughts of Aquinas, here in the Philippines.

Among the prominent themes in the contemporary literature on emotions is the relationship between cognition and emotion and the role that emotion plays in moral life.⁴³ This included questions like: How much can we do to control or regulate our emotions?;⁴⁴ and how much can emotion-regulation do to help address the ever-increasing concern for our mental health?⁴⁵ Much recently, however, the questions of the psychophysical theorists are augmented by the findings of neuroscience and psychiatry so that issues like the causal relations between the imbalances in mental health and the disorder in a person's natural bodily constitution have become central in the discussions on emotional and mental health.⁴⁶

Obviously, Fr de Blas' *Naturaleza* did not provide innovative investigation on these questions since among its initial and main interests is to first convince its readers that the natural sciences could also study the human person's psychic reality. His task in the Philippines was to promote scholarship in experimental psychology as a discipline distinct from philosophy. Hence, his review of the long tradition of the scholarship on *afectividad* throughout the history of Philosophy was primarily intended to support that claim. It merits to mention, however, that Fr. de Blas' exposition also offers a critique of the overly materialistic conception of natural sciences by emphasizing that the human person's psychic reality has to accommodate the existence of an immaterial soul, whose powers and functions are responsible for the operations of the human body. The *Naturaleza's* insistence on the contribution of Aquinas anticipated the discussions on the nonmaterial components of the human

⁴³ See Chang Sun, "The Relationship Between Emotion and Cognition with Moral Self-regulation," *Lecture Notes in Education Psychology and Public Media* 38, 1 (January 2024): 157-163. DOI:10.54254/2753-7048/38/20240624; Sandra Baez, Adolfo Garcia and Hernando Santamaria-Garcia, "Moral Cognition and Moral Emotions," in *Neuroscience and Social Science*, 167-197 (Cham: Springer, 2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68421-5_8; Pessoa, "On the relationship between emotion and cognition," 148-158, Spalding et al, "Emotion and Cognition," in *The Human Person* (Cham: Springer, 2019), and Kämpf et al, "A Meta-Analysis of the Relationship Between Emotion Regulation and Social Affect and Cognition," 1-31.

⁴⁴ See James Gross, ed, *Handbook of Emotion Regulation*, 2nd edition (New York / London: The Guilford Press, 2014).

⁴⁵ Deleene S. Menefee, Tracey Ledoux and Craig Johnston, "The Importance of Emotional Regulation in Mental Health," *American Journal of Lifestyle Medicine* 16, 1 (2022): 28-31.

⁴⁶ See Kirsten Weir, "The Roots of Mental Illness: How Much of Mental Illness Can the Biology of the Brain Explain?" *Monitor on Psychology* 43. 6 (June 2022): 30; and Elaine Fox, "Perspectives from Affective Science on Understanding the Nature of Emotion," *Brain Neuroscience Adv.* (December 2018), <https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7058241/>.

person's psyche, an issue that is now gaining increased attention even among natural scientists, particularly in the area of neuroscience. Increasingly, neuroscientists begin to accept that understanding the life of the mind is much more complicated than simply learning the fundamental constitution of the human brain.⁴⁷

The historical account of *Naturaliza* moreover shows us that while the notion of the soul has begun to fade with the emergence of experimentation that accompanies the modern and contemporary theories on emotion, the eventual gaps encountered in these areas allow the re-appreciation of what de Blas has already emphasized in Aquinas' insistence on the 'nature' of the human person, anchored on the notion of the rational soul. For de Blas, Aquinas' anthropology provides a more insightful understanding of our human condition than the purely physicalist understanding of the human person, a view held strongly by popular contemporary neuroscientists such as Anil Seth.⁴⁸ Despite such insistence, however, it still is apparent that even with the sophistication of contemporary laboratories such denial of the notion of the soul is still not universally agreed even among scientists themselves.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Adrian Woolfson, "The Biological Basis of Mental Illness," *Nature* 566 (2019): 180-181, <https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-019-00521-2>. In an article for *Time*, Jamie Ducharme pointed out the complexity of the work in making mental illness diagnoses claiming that "some conditions, like schizophrenia, have clearer links to genes than others," which paves the way for a more objective reading of the patient's schizophrenic condition, in other cases "we don't have biomarkers. We don't have a lot of things that you would have in other parts of medicine." Ducharme further describes the difficulty saying: "it's essentially up to each clinician to decide, based on what they observe and their patient tells them, whether symptoms have crossed the line from normal to disorder—and this process is increasingly occurring during brief appointments on teletherapy apps, where things can easily slip through the cracks" (see Jaime Ducharme, "America Has Reached Peak Therapy. Why Is Our Mental Health Getting Worse?," *Time*, August 28, 2023, <https://time.com/6308096/therapy-mental-health-worse-us/>).

⁴⁸ In an interview with the neuroscientist, Anil Seth, Daniel Mediavilla reported Seth's claim about the growing obsolescence of the notion of the soul. Seth was quoted saying, "We have to wait and see. The notion of the soul, for instance, maybe that's already outlived its usefulness. Concepts like free will are already succumbing and losing that sense of mystery" (see Daniel Mediavilla, "Anil Seth, neuroscientist: 'The notion of the soul may already have outlived its usefulness,'" *El Pais*, May 07, 2023), <https://english.elpais.com/science-tech/2023-05-06/anil-seth-neuroscientist-the-notion-of-the-soul-may-already-have-outlived-its-usefulness.html>); see also Gaia Vince, "Being You by Professor Anil Seth review – the exhilarating new science of consciousness," *The Guardian*, August 25, 2021, <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2021/aug/25/being-you-by-professor-anil-seth-review-the-exhilarating-new-science-of-consciousness>.

⁴⁹ In their report on the link between neuroscience and the soul, Preston et al. narrated their experiments on "how exposure to neuroscience research impacts belief in the soul." They argue that "belief in soul decreases when neuroscience provides strong mechanistic explanations for mind. But when explanatory gaps in neuroscience research are emphasized, belief in soul is enhanced, suggesting that physical and metaphysical explanations may be used reflexively as alternative theories for mind" (Jesse Lee Preston, Ryan Ritter, and Justin Hepler, "Neuroscience and the Soul: Competing Explanations for the Human Experience," *Cognition* 127, 1 (2013): 31–37, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2012.12.003>). Such an argument echoes de Blas' emphasis on the nonmaterial component of the human psyche.

What Fr. de Blas' *Naturaleza* has shown, I think rather adequately, is the dynamic tension between the need to treat the soul as a subject of the natural sciences (that is, psychology as a natural science) and the nonreduction of the human soul, and therefore of the human person, to a merely material phenomenon. While the human person is part of cosmology and physics because we are part of the natural reality, we are endowed with human faculties that make us, using the parlance of Catholic intellectual tradition, an *imago Dei*. Ultimately, our psychological and mental health can hardly be separated from our self-understanding as a creature, particularly as a creature called to respond to the invitation toward holiness and meaningful existence.

b. Thomas Aquinas in the text of Fr. de Blas' Naturaleza

As presented in Table 6 above, the last published portion of the *Naturaleza* presented the "Essence of Affectivity (*Esencia de la Afectividad*)" and its discussion is divided into the following sections:

1. Different Genres of Psychic Operations or Functions (Generos Diversos de Operaciones o Funciones Psiquicas)
2. Tendencies as the Root of All Psychic Functions (Las Tendencias como Raiz de Todas las Funciones Psiquicas)
3. Essential Constitution of Natural Tendencies (Constitucion Essencial de las Tendencias Naturales)
4. Kinds of Natural Inclinations in Man/Human Person (Clases de Incluciones Naturales en el Hombre)

The above list of topics shows that Fr. de Blas' discussion on the essence of affectivity focuses on the study of the natural inclinations of the human person. This demonstrates that Fr. de Blas treats *afectividad* as an important faculty that allows the realization of the 'natural' inclinations of the human person.

In another text published by *Philippiniana Sacra*,⁵⁰ I pointed out that in the Thomistic psychology of de Blas, he talked about instincts, and in his book *Experimental Psychology*, he strongly emphasized that instincts are given to all creatures. So, it is not only that the animals have instincts, human beings too have instincts; and in the same way as animals find perfection in the realization of their instincts, human perfection too is found in the realization of our instincts. This is why Fr. de Blas talked heavily on natural tendencies and inclinations because these are human instincts, which are, simply, natural perfections for the human person. We

⁵⁰ See Sagut, "Thomistic Psychology in the Works of Fr. Angel de Blas, OP," 1359-1382.

could say that this is a core contention of Fr. de Blas because he reiterated the same theme in both of his major works on Psychology, where he emphasizes the notion of human instincts and insisted on the relevance of human ‘tendencies and inclinations’ in the appreciation of the role of human affectivity.

It has to be pointed out, moreover, that the discussion of human tendencies and inclinations was also preceded by a consideration of the operations and functions of human faculties, particularly the operations and functions of the human soul. He asserts that as natural beings, human persons too are given nature, which now defines our telos, manifested by our instincts or our natural inclinations and tendencies. Owing to the fact that our nature is constituted by the substantial union of the body and the soul, the faculties of the human person are not just simply the rational faculties of the intellect and will but also that of affectivity. It is important to note that such affectivity is exercised not simply because we are bodily but because we are comprised of the substantial union of the human body and rational soul. Affectivity is always a product of that dynamic relationship between the human body and the rational soul in the human person. We are always rational (even in the consideration of our feelings and emotions), and we are always bodily (so we cannot completely deny our feelings and emotions even in our rational considerations). This is why in the training of the human will, the education of our sensitive appetite (including our feelings and emotions) is also very important.

Fr. de Blas would say that every creature is given faculties, the operations of which allow it to pursue its end and, therefore, its perfection. So, for nonhuman creatures like ants, dogs or cats and others, they function using their powers in order to flourish in a way commensurate to their nature. For Fr. de Blas, we are not too different from them. We, too, are endowed with faculties, and the operations of those faculties allow us to realize our perfections as human persons.

It is, however, important to consider that since we are endowed with freedom, the perfection of which other creatures may not enjoy in the manner that we do, we are individually responsible for the operations of our human faculties. Interestingly, such operation of the faculties in realizing our nature, that is, our tendencies and inclinations, is at the heart of Fr. de Blas’ discussion on affectivity. Concretely, Fr. de Blas would claim that in the thoughts of Aristotle and Aquinas, the ‘essence’ of creatures belonging to a particular species is that which is common to all of them and is the radical origin of the functions of their faculties. The essence is the principle of unity.

Yet, he continues, to say that the essence could not account for the diversity that is observed in the individual members of the species. Such diversity is found

in the actual operations or functions of the faculties,⁵¹ where such diversity is in fact more visibly observed in the human person by virtue of the substantial union of the human body and rational soul. This is the reason why it is possible to argue that though we are of the same essence, we cannot be identical to one another; and despite our differences, we also cannot be too radically different from one another because, and as is the case with other creatures, there is a 'nature' that binds us together.

As human persons, our natural inclinations are rooted in our essence as the radical origin of the functions of our faculties. While, Fr. de Blas speaks of the diversity of the exercise of our freedom through the operations of our faculties, he also insisted on the objective foundation on the human essence so much so that while we talk about validating emotions (acknowledging the feelings of each one, which is the root of our diversity and plurality as individuals), we also could possibly speak of correcting our wrong perceptions of reality that are either reinforced or manifested by our emotions.⁵²

Conclusion

Fr. Angel de Blas' *Naturaleza de la Afectividad* is instructive especially in encouraging appreciation of personal freedom, ethical life, and human flourishing. It reminds us of our personal responsibilities in the determination of the operations of our faculties, where such operations allow in the human person the dynamic tensions among the faculties of sensitive appetite and cognition (emotions), rational appetite (the will), and rational cognition (the intellect). Following Fr. de Blas, these tripartite operations of our human faculties have to be appreciated as crucial in the exercise of freedom and autonomy. Fr. de Blas' *Naturaleza* emphasizes that freedom could hardly be fully appreciated without a consideration of *afectividad*. Human freedom always involves emotion so much so that when our emotional state is imbalanced, our pursuit of our perfection can also be gravely affected. Fr. de Blas insisted on paying attention to *afectividad* because most texts in philosophical psychology are focused primarily on the will and the intellect, and the emotions

⁵¹ de Blas would say that, "La esencia, realidad común a todo el ser, y origen radical ciertamente de todas esas funciones, es evidente que no puede ser considerada como principio de su diversidad, pues todo lo común es necesariamente principio de unidad, luego entre ellas y la esencia hay que colocar otras entidades del orden accidental que sean la razón inmediata y suficiente, según su diversa naturaleza, de la distinción que se observa en las operaciones humanas. Tales entidades son las facultades aristotélico-tomistas. Añadase a esto que toda actividad en los seres vivientes debe atribuirse, según Aristóteles y Sto. Tomás, al principio vital, al alma, sentencia en nada opuesta a las modernas teorías, y se tendrá la doctrina de las facultades del alma de la psicología escolástica" (See de Blas, "Naturaleza de la Afectividad, Segunda Parte," 584).

⁵² See Ewa Trzebińska and Anna Gabińska, "Correcting Emotions in Psychotherapy," *Annals of Psychology* 18, 3 (2015): 329-343.

are often put aside. He is convinced that such diminished appreciation of human affectivity leads to a truncated understanding of human freedom. This is the reason why Fr. de Blas insisted on the inclusion in the curriculum of a Psychology course that is distinct from Philosophical Psychology. Such inclusion is part of his vision for a more holistic education.**ES**

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