



## Husserl and Stein on Empathy: Paving a Way Towards Integration

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Edith Stein is apparently better known than Edmund Husserl when it comes to a phenomenological understanding of empathy. Husserl served as her mentor in phenomenological studies, especially in her dissertation, *On the Problem of Empathy*, which introduced Stein as an important phenomenologist to reckon with in the world of philosophy. She continued to work closely with Husserl as his assistant, particularly in preparing to publish his *Ideas II*, the locus of the brewing controversy between Husserl and Stein concerning the phenomenological constitution of empathy. Some would argue that Husserl was influenced by Stein. However, she herself acknowledges that her consideration of empathy stays within the general framework of his phenomenology. With certain confidence, we can say that Husserl and Stein must have mutually influenced each other, but up to what extent? How can we delineate the grounds where they converge and diverge in constituting empathy? Can we find a way to integrate their phenomenological understanding of empathy? These questions revolve around the problem: *How do we arrive at a synthesis of Edith Stein's and Edmund Husserl's understanding of empathy?* This essay simply presents a preliminary context to this problem in the hope of finding salient aspects of their respective understanding, thus paving the way towards a possible integration, and perhaps a richer understanding of empathy.

**Keywords:** *Husserl, Stein, empathy, intersubjectivity, phenomenology, integration, synthesis*

## Husserl Leading the Way

Edmund Husserl's attempt to provide a firm foundation for objective knowledge paved the way to a phenomenological way of thinking which puts into question every bit of knowledge that we have acquired and presupposed.<sup>1</sup> As the slogan of phenomenology puts it, 'to the things themselves' (*zu den Sachen selbst*),<sup>2</sup> we are in a way led back to the original constitution of any form of knowledge we have – at the very origins of our consciousness in which all sciences (subjective and objective) took shape.<sup>3</sup> He ascribes to the so-called science of phenomenology,<sup>4</sup> "the method of questioning back into the ultimate conceivable presuppositions of knowledge."<sup>5</sup> It means subjecting into analysis through *epoche* (phenomenological reduction) everything that presents itself to our consciousness – so that it may be constituted phenomenologically.<sup>6</sup> In a radical and uncompromising tone, Husserl clarifies the task of phenomenology:

However, **it can and must be said that it is only through the thoroughly reflective work of phenomenology**...which fixes all the motives that lie in the phenomena and asks about their motivations, that **only by this means can the ontologically founded investigation unfold its full power and only thereby does it receive its full certainty. Only the phenomenologist will be competent to perform the deepest clarifications with regard to the essences** building themselves up in systematically constituted layers and thus to prepare the grounding of the ontologies of which we have so great a lack.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>1</sup> See Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (New York: Macmillan, 1952); also referred to as *Ideas I*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Theodore De Boer, *The Development of Husserl's Thought*, trans. Theodore Plantinga (The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), xx.

<sup>3</sup> Paul Ricoeur renders a guide in understanding Husserl's phenomenology, considering a few significant texts, namely: *Ideas I*, *Ideas II* and *Cartesian Meditations*, in his book, *Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

<sup>4</sup> In a lecture, Husserl announces: "Phenomenology: this term designates as a science, a complex of scientific disciplines; but it also designates at the same time and above all a method and an attitude of thought: the specifically *philosophical attitude of thought*, the specifically *philosophical method*;" *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. Lee Hardy (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 19.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. 'Epilogue', Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz & Andre Schuwer (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 406; henceforth referred to as *Ideas II*.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Klaus Held, "Husserl's Phenomenological Method," *The New Husserl*, ed. Donn Welton (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2003), 3. Victor Velarde-Mayol discusses in one whole chapter Husserl's phenomenological method; *On Husserl* (USA: Wadsworth Thomson Learning, 2000), 41-58.

<sup>7</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Third Book: Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences*, trans. Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl (The Hague/Boston/London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980), 90. This work is henceforth referred to as *Ideas III*. Emphases are mine.

That is how the crisis, which Husserl describes as the “seeming collapse of rationalism,” must be confronted and resolved.<sup>8</sup> In so doing, we may be able to ground our knowledge on a firm foundation (in a continuous process of verification) and thereby avoid nihilism (and also skepticism and irrationalism) which endangers all sciences.<sup>9</sup>

Such a grand project, whose path is “long and thorny,”<sup>10</sup> demands corresponding grand efforts to realize it – not just by one individual like Husserl but by every member of the whole human community, especially those of us who are engaged in the practices of scientific inquiry. Husserl sees phenomenology as an infinitely open horizon,<sup>11</sup> thus Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka describes Husserl’s project in view of its historical unfolding:

In fact, in his undertaking to re-think the entire philosophical enterprise as such and to recreate philosophy upon what he sought to be at least satisfactorily legitimated basis, Husserl...uncovers perspectives upon the universe of man and projects their new philosophical thematisation that brings together all the attempts made by philosophers...who succeeded him with foundational intentions; it also gives a core of philosophical ideas and insights for the younger generation of philosophers today.<sup>12</sup>

Husserl put himself completely at the disposal in pursuit of such a grand project.<sup>13</sup> The *works* of phenomenological constitution he had achieved in his lifetime are truly enormous.<sup>14</sup> At the end, however, all he hoped to have accomplished was

<sup>8</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. Quentin Lauer (New York: Harper Touchbooks, 1965), 191.

<sup>9</sup> This is the crisis Husserl was determined to overcome, which he discusses in *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970). Cf. David Carr’s essay, “Husserl’s Crisis and the Problem of History,” *Interpreting Husserl: Critical and Comparative Studies* (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), 71-96.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. T. De Boer, xxii.

<sup>11</sup> Husserl, *Ideas II*, 161-162.

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, ed. *Phenomenology in the World Fifty Years after the Death of Edmund Husserl, Book 2: Husserlian Phenomenology in a New Key: Intersubjectivity, Ethos, the Societal Sphere, Human Encounter, Pathos* (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), xiii.

<sup>13</sup> Husserl intimates how he values his works: “I hold fast to my old conviction that in matters of science what counts is work done rather than criticism, work which in the end remains intact, no matter how much it is misunderstood and how often arguments against it miss the point.” Cf. “Epilogue” to *Ideas II*, 407. A-T. Tymieniecka describes Husserl’s efforts in this way: “Indeed, the immense, painstaking, indefatigable and ever-improving effort of Husserl to find ever-deeper and more reliable foundations for the philosophical enterprise (as well as his constant *critical* re-thinking and perfecting of the approach and so-called ‘method’ in order to perform this task and thus cover in this source-excavation an ever more far-reaching groundwork) stands out and maintains itself as an inepuisable reservoir for philosophical reflection in which all the above-mentioned work has either its core or its source.” xiii.

<sup>14</sup> The *Husserl-Archive*, thanks to a Franciscan friar Hermann Leo Van Breda, is a testimony to the enormity of Husserl’s works. J. N. Mohanty describes Husserl’s works (those published in his lifetime)

to open the way for further phenomenological analysis. Theodore De Boer puts it beautifully:

In methodological respects Husserl's thinking definitely reached a certain completion. From then on the transcendental reduction was the gateway to true philosophy. To use Husserl's own metaphor, the 'promised land' had been discovered, but it was still in need of cultivation.<sup>15</sup>

Fifty years after the death of Husserl, his achievement is celebrated in a commemorative compilation of essays, a testimony to the eventual realization of Husserl's grand project. In a 'Foreword' to this monumental work at a particularly significant phase of phenomenology's historical unfolding, A-T. Tymieniecka announces:

We present to the public a four book collection showing in an unprecedented way how Husserl's aspiration to inspire the entire universe of knowledge and scholarship has now been realized. These volumes display for the first time the astounding expansion of phenomenological philosophy throughout the world and the enormous wealth and variety of ideas, insights, and approaches it has inspired. The basic commitment to phenomenological concerns found in all this variety makes this collection a most significant historical document.<sup>16</sup>

Certainly, Husserl had not completed the project, but he paved and led the way as to the manner and direction this project must take. His *works* are concrete examples of doing phenomenology or thinking in the *phenomenological* way.<sup>17</sup> As Bence Marosan offers, "His life-work still remains as the original source of phenomenology."<sup>18</sup>

## The Crucial Step of Constituting Empathy

Empathy is but one of those *works* which preoccupied Husserl and his

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as but "the tips of an iceberg," cf. "The Development of Husserl's thought," *The Cambridge Companion to Husserl*, ed. Barry Smith and David Woodruff Smith (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 45. Steven Spileers' thick volume of bibliographical entries is indisputable evidence to the vast literature on Edmund Husserl; see *Edmund Husserl Bibliography* (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999).

<sup>15</sup> According to T. De Boer, Husserl's transition to transcendental idealism, considered the 'promised land', "must be regarded as the high point of his development," but it is also a "new beginning for Husserl;" xxi.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. A-T. Tymieniecka, 'Foreword', ix. In another instance, she claims that Husserl has fully realized his project: "Husserl's intent that phenomenology should function as a *philosophia prima* with respect to all fields of scholarship, all fields of knowledge, has been **fully realized**," xviii-xix. Emphasis is mine.

<sup>17</sup> K. Held considers Husserl's published works in his lifetime as but programmatic introductory texts, and his unpublished works as concrete phenomenological analyses. 5.

<sup>18</sup> Bence Marosan, "Apodicticity and Transcendental Phenomenology," *Perspectives: International Postgraduate Journal of Philosophy* (2008): p. 98 (78-101).

disciples,<sup>19</sup> most especially Edith Stein who took it as a theme of her dissertation, *On the Problem of Empathy*.<sup>20</sup> Nonetheless, it is crucial to the realization of the grand project of phenomenology,<sup>21</sup> because empathy concerns no less than our experience of others and the world around us.<sup>22</sup> Empathy cuts through the very phenomenological project which Husserl sets himself to achieve, because it explicates not just his project but the whole range of scientific inquiry. It is in this sense that later in his life Husserl writes:

But it soon becomes evident that the range of such a theory is much greater than at first it seems, that it contributes to the founding of a *transcendental theory of the Objective world* and, indeed, to the founding of such a theory in every respect, notably as regards Objective Nature.<sup>23</sup>

In other words, empathy serves as the vehicle for the very possibility of objective knowledge; it is our manner of encountering and knowing the world around us, most especially with our fellow human subjects. Michael Hammond captures Husserl's meaning in this sense: "His original aim was to find firm foundation for one's knowledge of the objective world. But now, experience of such a world presupposes that there are or could be other subjects: one experiences it as inter-subjective world."<sup>24</sup> Empathy, therefore, establishes the intersubjective phenomenon that would warrant the legitimacy of objective knowledge.<sup>25</sup>

More important than obtaining founded objectivities in sciences, however, empathy, in which I encounter psychophysically another fellow human being, paves

<sup>19</sup> In his article, for instance, Curtis Hutt weaves together Husserl, Stein, and Levinas on the issue of intersubjectivity; see "Identity, Alterity, and Ethics in the Work of Husserl and His Religious Students: Stein and Levinas," *Philosophy Today*, vol. 53, no. 1 (Spring 2009), 12-33.

<sup>20</sup> See Edith Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 3<sup>rd</sup> revised edition, trans. Waltraut Stein, from *The Collected Works of Edith Stein*, vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1989).

<sup>21</sup> As one of the "dominant" or "great classic issues of Husserlianism," and considering "the enormous variety of approaches," **empathy** undergoes "an infinite adumbration in nuancement and refinement." Cf. A-T. Tymieniecka, xvi.

<sup>22</sup> Kathleen Haney presents Husserl's phenomenological project and his notion of empathy, cf. "The Role of Intersubjectivity and Empathy in Husserl's Foundational Project," *Phenomenology World-Wide: Foundations-Expanding Dynamics-Life-Engagements: A Guide for Research and Study*, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 147-ff. Similar issues are discussed in *Husserl and Stein*, ed. William Sweet and Richard Feist (USA: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2003), 7.

<sup>23</sup> Edmund Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), sec. 43, 92. Cf. *The Essential Husserl*, ed. Donn Welton (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999), 135-160.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Michael Hammond, "The Recognition of Other Selves," *Understanding Phenomenology* (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 210.

<sup>25</sup> Mette Lebeck mentions how the problem of empathy allows us "to accede to intersubjective experience," thus putting it at the heart of Husserl's phenomenological project. Cf. "Stein's Phenomenology of the Body: The Constitution of the Human Being Between Description of Experience and Social Construction," *Maynooth Philosophical Papers*, Issue 5 (2008), ed. Simon Nolan, 16.

the way towards mutual and reciprocal understanding among peoples, which serves as basis for the establishment of human solidarity and communion – something that our world badly needs today more than ever. This direction, I dare say, manifests the human face and heart of phenomenology.<sup>26</sup> Constituting empathy phenomenologically is therefore a crucial step along the way in satisfying phenomenology's epistemological ends as well as in making phenomenology ethically relevant.<sup>27</sup>

## Meeting Husserl and Stein Via Empathy

An earlier study<sup>28</sup> on *empathy* introduced me to Edmund Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity which is at the heart of his phenomenology.<sup>29</sup> I intended it as a sequel to Edith Stein's account of empathy, introduced to me by my good friend, Rev. Fr. Jose Conrado Estafia, Ph.D., in order to expand and deepen my understanding of Husserl's account of *empathy*.<sup>30</sup>

My initial interest eventually paved the way for me to consider more thoroughly both Husserl and Stein in their phenomenological understanding of

<sup>26</sup> By "human face and heart" I take it to refer especially to the ethical dimension or implications of phenomenology. J.V. Iribarne points out the wrong perception that the scope of Husserl's thought is "exclusively gnoseological" (epistemological). Rather, she contends: "on the contrary, we have the necessary indications to acknowledge that, staying within the transcendental ambit, with the ascending unfolding of the different *strata* of intersubjective constitution, we do reach the level of the **questions of ethics** and of the meaning of historical human existence." Cf. "Intersubjectivity as Starting Point," *Phenomenology in the World Fifty Years after the Death of Edmund Husserl, Book 2: Husserlian Phenomenology in a New Key: Intersubjectivity, Ethos, the Societal Sphere, Human Encounter, Pathos*, ed. A-T. Tymieniecka, 11. Emphasis is mine. In this four-volume work, where we find this article by Iribarne, there are numerous essays directly relevant to the **ethical** dimension of phenomenology, like, for example, Mariannina Failla's "Phenomenology and the Beginnings of the Moral Problem (Dilthey – Brentano – Husserl)" [53-66], John E. Jalbert's "Phenomenology As the Reawakening of the Platonic *Ethos*" [67-78], Alexius J. Bucher's "Phänomene einer Ethik" [93-106], Brunon Holyst's "The Topicality of Husserl's Ethical Anti-relativism" [123-ff.], and Jes Bjarup's "Phenomenology, the Moral Sense, and the Meaning of Life: Some Comments of the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and A-T. Tymieniecka" [169-192].

<sup>27</sup> Initiatives on the **ethical dimension** of phenomenology, like the work of H. Peter Steeves, are also along this direction; see *Founding Community: A Phenomenological-Ethical Inquiry* (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998). C. Hutt explores this **ethical dimension** too in Husserl, Stein, and Levinas; 17-28. Noteworthy is Ullrich Melle's original research in "The Development of Husserl's Ethics," *Etudes Phenomenologiques* 13-14 (1991): 115-35; this is mentioned by C. Hutt, 27, 33. Another relevant article is Michael Gubser's "An Image of a Higher World: Ethical Renewal in Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl," *Santalka, Filosofija*, 2009, 17 (3): 39-46.

<sup>28</sup> See Francis B. Payo, *The Concept of Empathy in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl* (Graduate School, University of Santo Tomas, Manila, 2010).

<sup>29</sup> J.V. Iribarne unhesitatingly takes intersubjectivity as the starting point if we are to consider Husserl's thought thoroughly, stressing the monadologic and systematic character of phenomenology; cf. 3-12. Alessandro Duranti even relocates intersubjectivity at the foundation and center of Husserl's thought; cf. "Husserl, intersubjectivity and anthropology," <http://ant.sagepub.com>, vol. 10 (1): 1-20. 10.1177/1463499610370517; accessed in June 2012.

<sup>30</sup> Cf. Jose Conrado Estafia's masteral and doctoral studies respectively, namely: *Edith Stein on the Problem of Empathy: Towards Being Human* (Graduate School, University of Santo Tomas, Manila, 2004), and *Edith Stein: Her Contribution to the Dialogue Between Faith and Reason* (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Santo Tomas, Manila, 2011).

empathy. How are their accounts similar and/or different considering that they follow strictly the same phenomenological method? This initial question led me to consider a comparative-integrative account which could be more enriching in terms of understanding empathy phenomenologically. *Comparative* here connotes similarities, as well as differences, in both Stein's and Husserl's accounts of empathy, while *integrative* connotes the desired synthesis or integration possible despite divergent points between Husserl and Stein. Thus, this study is an attempt at comparison and integration at the same time, something which is not entirely new as we would see in the course of our investigation.

I find such a comparative-integrative approach appropriate and relevant particularly in response to a controversy concerning the relationship between Stein and Husserl. They worked together for many years when they were preoccupied with the phenomenological constitution of empathy in particular and intersubjectivity in general – issues which are indispensable in phenomenology.<sup>31</sup>

On one hand, a Steinian scholar would insist that Stein, though mentored by Husserl, exhibited independence in her thinking to a large extent as regards the problem of empathy. Mary Catharine Baseheart, for instance, explains how Stein differs from Husserl, in some respects, in formulating her own theory, and that her originality and independence of thought “anticipated later existential developments in phenomenology.”<sup>32</sup>

On the other hand, a Husserlian scholar would be so eager to show Husserl's development of thought, even as regards empathy.<sup>33</sup> Husserl's manuscripts testify to the fact that long before Stein's dissertation, Husserl already had thought about

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<sup>31</sup> Cf. Marianne Sawicki, *Body, Text, and Science: The Literacy of Investigative Practices and the Phenomenology of Edith Stein* (Dordrecht/ Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 49–51.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Mary Catharine Baseheart, in her ‘Foreword to the Third Edition’ of Waltraut Stein's translation of Edith Stein's *On the Problem of Empathy*, x. M. Lebeck, more than simply pointing out Stein's independence of thought from Husserl, claims how superior in some ways are Stein's analyses compared to Husserl's analyses in *Ideas II*; 17. J. Haydn Gurmin categorically says that Husserl, for lack of a precise account of empathy, “followed Stein's characterization of empathy as published in *On the Problem of Empathy*,” see “Edith Stein and Tania Singer: A Comparison of Phenomenological and Neurological Approaches to the ‘Problem of Empathy.’” *Maynooth Philosophical Papers*, Issue 4 (2007), ed. by Simon Nolan (Maynooth: Department of Philosophy, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2008), 99, HKPF@ugc.edu.hk. www.rgc.edu.hk/hkphd, accessed in June 2012.

<sup>33</sup> In this regard, discussions by M. Sawicki and T. De Boer are paramount in relevance and depth. See also Dan Zahavi, *Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity: A Response to the Linguistic-Pragmatic Critique*, trans. Elizabeth a. Behnke (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2001). A. D. Smith in his book, *Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations*, notes in his Preface, for instance, how Husserl's thought “quite simply got more profound as the years passed” (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), viii. A similar perspective is all the more emphasized by Elizabeth A. Behnke in her article, “Edmund Husserl's Contribution to Phenomenology of the Body in *Ideas II*,” *Issues in Husserl's Ideas II*, ed. Thomas Nenon & Lester Embree (Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), 135–136.

empathy, and continued to think about it even years later.<sup>34</sup> Interestingly, due to the constant development of his thinking, Husserl, who was “usually far ahead of his students in diagnosing difficulties and following new paths,” felt it necessary “to distantiate himself from his own students more than once and go his own way,” precisely because “they have tried to arrest and isolate his philosophy at a particular stage of its development.”<sup>35</sup> To a certain extent, this, I suppose, fittingly applies to Stein, considered to be one of Husserl’s most brilliant students.<sup>36</sup>

Such claims, supported by studies on Husserl’s texts, warrant the legitimacy of pursuing a comparative-integrative study – not only pointing out similarities (points of convergence) in Husserl’s and Stein’s understanding of empathy, but also their differences (points of divergence).<sup>37</sup> This attempt may bring out aspects which could enrich mutually both accounts, making them complementary or supplementary to each other. Thus, a kind of integration or synthesis of both accounts could lead towards a richer understanding of empathy.

In trekking this path, we begin by stating in a clear and concise manner our main problem, which concerns the means, the manner, and the direction we can take to find our way: *How do we arrive at a synthesis of Edith Stein’s and Edmund Husserl’s understanding of Empathy?* This question basically behooves us to follow the general path already indicated, that is, to explicate the areas where they converge and diverge, and thus resolve what possible direction can be taken towards an integration or synthesis that would contribute significantly towards a richer understanding of empathy.

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<sup>34</sup> The entirety of Husserl’s manuscripts is solid evidence in the development of his thought, including his account of empathy. See a more thorough treatment of this in my earlier study, *The Concept of Empathy in the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl*, 59-66, adapted largely from an account by Rudolf Bernet, Iso Kern and Eduard Marbach, *An Introduction to Husserlian Phenomenology* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 154-165.

<sup>35</sup> Cf. T. De Boer, xix-xx. Hans-Georg Gadamer dwells on Heidegger’s departure from Husserl in his essay, “Subjectivity and intersubjectivity, subject and person,” trans. Peter Adamson and David Vessey, *Continental Philosophy Review*, vol. 33 (2000), 275-287. Also cf. Soren Overgaard, *Husserl and Heidegger* (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004). Linda Fisher tackles Merleau-Ponty’s departure from Husserl in her essay, “The Shadow of the Other,” *Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity: Central Topics in Phenomenology*, ed. Dan Zahavi (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), 169-192.

<sup>36</sup> Cf. M. C. Baseheart, x. When Stein applied for professorship (upon obtaining her doctorate in 1915 and as Husserl’s assistant in 1916-1918), Husserl wrote the following reference: “Should academic careers be opened up to ladies, then I can recommend her whole-heartedly and as my first choice for admission to a professorship,” cf. [www.vatican.va/news\\_services/liturgy/saint\\_lit\\_doc\\_19981011\\_edith\\_stein\\_en.html](http://www.vatican.va/news_services/liturgy/saint_lit_doc_19981011_edith_stein_en.html), accessed in May 2013. Her being a woman thus prevented her from obtaining a teaching post at a university in Germany. Patricia L. Marks tells of Stein’s remarkable brilliance, thus gaining a “prominent spot” even among her male-dominated peers; *A Retreat with Edith Stein: Trusting God’s Purpose* (Cincinnati, Ohio: St. Anthony Messenger Press, 2001), 5 & 9.

<sup>37</sup> Carmen Balzer, for instance, supports the idea that Husserl’s consideration of empathy differs significantly from that of Stein. Cf. “The Empathy Problem in Edith Stein,” *Phenomenology in the World Fifty Years after the Death of Edmund Husserl, Book 2: Husserlian Phenomenology in a New Key: Intersubjectivity, Ethos, the Societal Sphere, Human Encounter, Pathos*, ed. A-T. Tymieniecka, 271-272.



## Clearing the Ground for a Husserl-Stein Synthesis

Certain motives are at work in the course of this undertaking. A comparative-integrative study of Stein's and Husserl's works shall not only enrich our understanding of empathy, but also highlight empathy's distinct role in the philosophical quest for truth. By focusing on the phenomenological way of understanding empathy, we hope to highlight anew the phenomenological way of seeing the world as well as the non-conceptual emphasis which empathy brings to the fore. Let me elucidate further three salient points which highlight the relevance of the direction being taken. These are the reasons which motivate the course of this intellectual journey. Clarifying them is our way of clearing the ground of our inquiry, thereby establishing the significance of our inquiry.

### *Stein's Independence and Fidelity to Husserl's Phenomenology*

When it comes to a phenomenological understanding of empathy, Edith Stein is apparently better known than Edmund Husserl, her mentor. It was her dissertation, *On the Problem of Empathy*, which first distinguished Stein in the world of phenomenology and philosophy at large. It was Husserl, however, who directed Stein in her studies about empathy. Some authors claim, as already considered earlier, that Stein's work had an influence upon how Husserl developed the notion of empathy. However, Stein herself acknowledges that her consideration of empathy stays within the general framework of Husserl's phenomenology. In a foreword to her work, while admitting that her problem and method "have grown entirely out of intellectual stimuli received from Professor Husserl," she suggests of having been influenced by Husserl's *Ideas II* to the extent that she was willing to make changes in her work.<sup>38</sup> At the same time, Stein underscores her own contribution when she remarks: "Nevertheless, I can say that the results I now submit have been obtained by my own efforts."<sup>39</sup> Thus, while humbly expressing her indebtedness to Husserl, she also takes pride in having produced something out of her "own efforts" – implying her independence of thought and how she differs significantly from Husserl.

Such claims deserve our critical consideration in a serious and sustained manner, since they intimate the significant insights there may be in Husserl's account of empathy as well as in Stein's. One thing is quite clear even this early: while Stein remains faithful to Husserl's phenomenological way, she also exhibits independence of thought in her phenomenological analyses, particularly with regard to the problem of empathy. Here we find a rich ground for inquiry.

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<sup>38</sup> E. Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 2. Jose Conrado Estafia explicitly points out Stein's fidelity to Husserl in terms of phenomenological method while taking a departure from Husserl as shown even as early as in her first philosophical work, *On the Problem of Empathy*; cf. "Edith Stein on the Human Quest: An Analysis of Her Method," *Philippiniana Sacra*, vol. 43, no. 128 (May-August, 2008), 365-370.

<sup>39</sup> E. Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, 2.

### *Stein Introducing Her Ideas Into Husserl's Ideas II*

Despite Stein's comprehensive account of empathy, she continued to wrestle with the issue for a number of years as she prepared the publication of Husserl's *Ideas II*<sup>40</sup> and her own work, *Contributions to the Philosophical Grounding of Psychology and the Cultural Sciences*.<sup>41</sup>

There has been some controversy concerning the publication of Husserl's *Ideas II*.<sup>42</sup> Despite Stein's repeated redactions of *Ideas II* (1916-18), including additional and final redactions by Ludwig Landgrebe (1924-25), Husserl did not publish it.<sup>43</sup> It is supposed that in the long process of redaction Stein must have inserted her ideas into the original text of Husserl's *Ideas II*, perhaps in order to fill in what she might have found lacking in Husserl's constitutional analysis of empathy. Marianne Sawicki points out that it was a common practice for Stein, as redactor, to arrange and elaborate on Husserl's manuscripts.<sup>44</sup> Curtis Hutt, in view of Husserl's resistance to publish *Ideas II*, points out an interweaving of insights by Husserl and Stein in *Ideas II*: Stein interpolated her own theory of empathy into the text which Husserl finds fundamentally different from his own; hence, there are two conflicting theories of intersubjectivity in *Ideas II*.<sup>45</sup>

Without dwelling further on the controversial history of the manuscript, it may suffice to note for now that Husserl has found irreconcilable ideas of intersubjectivity in the text.<sup>46</sup> That is why, perhaps, Husserl did not pursue the actual publication of his long-awaited work (*Ideas II*), but instead published *Cartesian Meditations* (1932), considered to be Husserl's mature work on intersubjectivity,<sup>47</sup> which also discusses the theme of empathy in the oft-cited "Fifth Meditation."

<sup>40</sup> In their introduction to *Ideas II*, R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer describe Stein's major role in the preparation of *Ideas II* for publication; xi-xvi. Also cf. Rudolf A. Makkreel, "How is Empathy Related to Understanding," *Issues in Husserl's Ideas II*, ed. T. Nenon & L. Embree, 200.

<sup>41</sup> Another translation of this work bears the title, *Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities*, trans. Mary Catharine Baseheart & Marianne Sawicki, ed. Marianne Sawicki (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 2000).

<sup>42</sup> Such controversy is brilliantly explicated in *Issues in Husserl's Ideas II*, apparently the most comprehensive treatment of *Ideas II* so far. M. Sawicki also offers relevant comments and detailed analyses in her book, *Body, Text, and Science: The Literacy of Investigative Practices and the Phenomenology of Edith Stein*, 49-51; she discusses in chapters four and six how *Ideas II* was composed and by whom, which is at the heart of the said controversy between Stein and Husserl.

<sup>43</sup> T. Nenon, in his 'Introduction' to *Issues in Husserl's Ideas II*, acknowledges the work of Stein and Landgrebe in preparing *Ideas II*, but directs our attention to the work by Marly Biemel "for details concerning the history of the text and the manuscripts," which was not accessible at the time of this writing; ix. However, an introduction by R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer to Husserl's *Ideas II* may suffice for our present consideration; xi-xv.

<sup>44</sup> M. Sawicki writes: "The overall arrangement and many of the section headings for *Ideen II* are known to be Stein's work. She also composed introductory and transitional paragraphs, fulfilling her responsibilities to produce an 'elaboration' of Husserl's raw manuscripts." 50-51.

<sup>45</sup> Cf. C. Hutt, 16-17.

<sup>46</sup> What I describe as "controversial" or "irreconcilable" M. Sawicki describes as "philosophically incoherent" or "contradictory." Cf. M. Sawicki, 73 and 89.

<sup>47</sup> Cf. M. Sawicki, 51.

### *Emphasis on Empathy in Philosophy*

To arrive at a richer understanding of empathy as phenomenologically understood is one novel contribution this direction could take us. There is, however, another very important novelty and contribution – that is, the mere emphasis on empathy – perhaps not entirely new, but certainly a renewed emphasis. Historically, we usually find empathy in other disciplines – an issue especially in the arts and sciences such as psychology, nursing, and even neurology,<sup>48</sup> but not in philosophy, until it was introduced by Husserl and Stein in phenomenology. And it has something to do with the cognitive or conceptual content of philosophical discourse, considering that empathy brings to the surface the affective or emotional content, that is, the feelings or emotions of a person.<sup>49</sup> Empathy, as we usually understand it, takes place when two people relate with each other, an interpersonal encounter which involves a lot of affect (emotional content).

Empathy was thus an existing challenge to philosophy. Yet Husserl and Stein made it distinctly an indispensable issue in philosophy through their phenomenological constitution.<sup>50</sup> This simply shows that empathy is a very rich idea. Hence, it produces a saint in Edith Stein who is venerated today in the Catholic Church as *St. Teresa Benedicta of the Cross, Virgin and Martyr*,<sup>51</sup> for ultimately empathy is not just an idea, but a presence – an ontological and personal presence, that is,

<sup>48</sup> Here are some recent studies on empathy as applied in the arts and sciences: Roy A. Sorensen's "Self-Strengthening Empathy," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, vol. 58, no. 1 (Mar. 1998), 75-98; Ian Rory Owen's "What the analysis of empathy in the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation* reveals for psychotherapy," a doctoral study in psychotherapy and counseling (London: Regent's College School of Psychotherapy and Counselling, 2003); Leah Rose Laurel Heiss's "Empathy and the Space Between," a masteral thesis in Spatial Information Architecture Laboratory (Melbourne, Australia: School of Architecture and Design, RMIT University, 2006); "Enacting intersubjectivity: empathy as a clinical instrument," *Enacting Intersubjectivity: Paving the Way for a Dialogue Between Cognitive Science, Social Cognition and Neuroscience*, ed. Antonella Carassa et al. (Lugano, Switzerland: Istituto di Psicologia e Sociologia della Comunicazione, 2009), 269-275; C. Jason Throop's "Latitudes of loss: On the vicissitudes of empathy," *American Ethnologist*, vol. 37, no. 4 (2010), 771-782; Patrizia Manganaro's "Phenomenology and Neuroscience: Living Experience, Empathy and Embodied simulation," *Comprendre*, vol. 20 (2010), 153-165.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. M. Sawicki's discussion of Husserl's early treatments of intersubjectivity and empathy in particular, where we can see the transition of Husserl's understanding of empathy from purely logical or cognitive to something with emotional content, and thus eventually ascribing cognitive status to the emotive quality of our feelings; 53-89.

<sup>50</sup> I assume that it is the **phenomenological** consideration of empathy (that is, not just the idea of empathy) that opens a variety of applications in practically all levels of discourse – something which I find implicit in A-T. Tymieniecka's words in referring to phenomenology as the "vast expanse of thought and research which go on in the present day in lines of innumerable diversifications..." xii. That is how foundational any phenomenological constitution can be, as exemplified by empathy being tackled in diverse fields of theoretical and practical sciences. As J. V. Iribarne points out, "Husserl's philosophy is essentially open and is offered as a basis for future research; it is the philosophy of the beginning philosopher," 10.

<sup>51</sup> She and 987 fellow Jews were put to death in a gas chamber probably in August of 1942 in Auschwitz. The late Pope John Paul II (now Blessed) beatified and canonized her on May 1, 1987 and Oct. 11, 1998 respectively. [www.catholic.org/saints/saint.php?saint\\_id=179](http://www.catholic.org/saints/saint.php?saint_id=179), accessed in May 2013.

a living presence of one person to another.<sup>52</sup> Such conviction runs through this narrative by Stein:

In the first section [of *On the Problem of Empathy*], based on some indications from Husserl's lectures, I had examined the act of "**empathy**" as **a particular act of cognition**. After that, however, I went on to something which was personally close to my heart and which continually occupied me anew in all later works: **the constitution of the human person**. In connection with my work, research along this line was necessary to show how the comprehension of mental associations differs from the simple perception of psychic conditions. Max Scheler's lectures and writings, as well as the works of Wilhelm Dilthey, were of the utmost importance to me in connection with these questions. Following up on the voluminous literature on empathy which I had to work through, I added several chapters on empathy in social, **ethical**, and aesthetic areas.<sup>53</sup>

Such an account is but a glimpse of empathy in its broad and profound dimensions, to philosophy and other disciplines. The cognitive as well as affective aspects constitute part of such dimensions of empathy. By highlighting the affective aspect of our living and personal encounter, we see one another better in our interiority and totality. Otherwise we become too rational (or perhaps less rational) like disembodied spirits. That allows us to explore our rationality, cognitive as well as non-cognitive aspects of our being and personhood.<sup>54</sup> In that way, philosophy

<sup>52</sup> Quite interesting is the abovementioned study where L.R.L. Heiss explores our understanding of presence, specifically remote presence, in connection with empathy and intersubjectivity; 10-ff. This is the particular path which Fr. J. C. Estafia trudges in his studies on Edith Stein.

<sup>53</sup> Edith Stein, *Life in a Jewish Family*, trans. Josephine Koeppel, OCD, ed. L. Gelber and Romaeus Leuven, OCD (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1986), 397. Emphases are mine.

<sup>54</sup> J. C. Estafia dwells on this affective aspect as equally important in understanding our human personhood, a significant contribution which he ascribes to Edith Stein. He writes: "But while doing her [referring to E. Stein] study on the problem of empathy, she discovered that the person is not only a mind, but also a heart. A complete person requires both thinking and feeling. Feelings presuppose theoretical acts; a heart requires a mind. Affectivity here is not blind, not a kind of emotionalism. Stein is coming from Husserlian epistemology, from a type of cognition that sees the essence of things. It requires the use of human reason at its best, so to say, precisely because it is rigorous. **This is true rationality.**" Cf. "Edith Stein on the Human Quest: An Analysis of Her Method," 385. Emphasis is mine. Ironically, earlier in this same article, pp. 382-383, Estafia points out that Husserl's phenomenology is "only epistemological" and "not holistic in its approach for it lies only on the level of cognition." He thereby concludes: "*Stein gives heart to Husserl's method, like Marx giving flesh to Hegel's consciousness.* It is not that she abandons the method, but she adds something to it: the human person's affective side." This is further confirmed, on p. 390: "The personalist approach of Stein is evidently already beyond Husserl. The problem of empathy cannot be investigated exclusively through Husserl's transcendental phenomenology." It seems to me therefore that he takes "**true rationality**" to refer only to the cognitive aspect of the human person. Departing from that classic and usual meaning of rationality, however, I here consider rationality as manifesting layers in our human unfolding, the cognitive and affective layers being most dominant. Thus, I find the affective aspect as co-constitutive with the cognitive aspect of our multi-layered human rationality; this is what I would rather call **true rationality**. As a peripheral comment, it seems to me that J. C. Estafia's take on Husserl is that of the 'early Husserl' which may be taken as an inaccurate understanding (to say the least) of Husserl's phenomenology if taken apart from the 'later Husserl'. An integral understanding of Husserl's phenomenology must consider Husserl's corpus at all the stages of his thought, which I do not presume to accomplish in this work.

becomes more humane. Anyway, truth is more than just an idea, otherwise the quest for it becomes irrelevant and futile.<sup>55</sup>

In other words, all our efforts at understanding, clarification and articulation of the phenomenological constitution of empathy may just be what Fr. Frederik Fermin, OP, would call “a juggling with words”<sup>56</sup> – unless of course we consider other equally important aspects of our humanity. As Blaise Pascal, in his famous adage, reminds us, even the heart has reasons which reason cannot understand.<sup>57</sup> Underlying this striking irony<sup>58</sup> is the sense that there is a kind of rationality even in our affective level, which leads us to suppose other kinds of rationality at different levels of our humanity. In a very significant way, empathy plunges us into the immense dimensions of our humanity - where the cognitive as well as the affective and other aspects of our humanity, as rational or otherwise, may come to the surface. Thus, we may have a more integral understanding of who we are, that is, as ourselves in a living personal relation with one another. It is in this sense that I find this renewed emphasis on empathy worth undertaking, contributing anew in ways perhaps even beyond our theoretical considerations.

### Prominent Guides Along the Way

Considering the vast literature on phenomenology, particularly Husserlian and Steinian studies, it is but fitting to dwell on empathy with a clear and specific focus – just enough to penetrate into the work of phenomenological constitution which Husserl and Stein endeavored to achieve in their lifetime. By focusing on empathy, we have defined the scope of our inquiry in the vast contexts of issues pertaining to intersubjectivity and phenomenology. In terms of Husserl’s and Stein’s consideration, empathy is strictly confined within the ambit of phenomenology, that is, strictly as a phenomenological issue. The issue of empathy inevitably brings us within the broader issue of intersubjectivity, which is at the heart of phenomenology.

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<sup>55</sup> In fact, for us Christians, truth is incarnate and personified in our Savior Jesus Christ. In other words, the fullness of truth is manifest in the person of Jesus who reveals Himself as the Way, the **TRUTH** and the Life. Unfortunately, this is almost always dismissed as beyond the realm of philosophical discourse since it properly belongs to the realm of faith or theological discourse.

<sup>56</sup> In a commentary to J. C. Estafia’s study, F. Fermin remarks: “We know ourselves only through experience, and can agree with an analysis to the extent that we recognize our experience in it. Otherwise the explanation remains just words. Some of Stein’s analysis strikes me as that: a juggling with words.” F. Fermin says this in reference to Stein’s philosophical quest as but a preparation for her reception of the gift of faith: “It seems that the whole laborious process of Stein’s philosophizing served to make her receptive to the gift of faith.” Cf. “Edith Stein on the Human Quest: An Analysis of Her Method,” 393.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. Blaise Pascal, *Pensees*, trans. H. F. Stewart (New York: Pantheon Books, 1965), no. 626, p. 343. A similar reference is also made by J. C. Estafia, 383.

<sup>58</sup> Our classical understanding is that reason belongs to the domain of the mind, while emotion belongs to the domain of the heart; yet Pascal ascribes to the heart some kind of “reason” from which we can infer some sort of rationality, something quite beyond the domain of the heart according to our classical understanding; hence, quite an irony.

Thus, by focusing on empathy, we are actually narrowing our consideration while keeping our eyes open at the broader spectrum of phenomenological issues.

Having clarified our thematic focus, and considering also the limitations of this undertaking, a feasible way to approach our task is perhaps limiting our textual focus on Husserl's *Ideas II* and *Cartesian Meditations*, and Stein's *On the Problem of Empathy*. Related studies, which directly tackle the phenomenological constitution of empathy, would be of great help in grasping well and penetrating into the texts of Husserl and Stein. Aside from those mentioned earlier, some recent works are also indispensable as prominent guides along the way.<sup>59</sup>

In his enlightening essay, Dan Zahavi contrasts Theodore Lipps' account from prominent phenomenologists particularly Scheler, Stein and Husserl.<sup>60</sup> He admits that some basic similarities as well as divergences are discernible in them, highlighting "some of the core features of their, at times divergent, alternatives." His insights in this particular account, specifically of Stein's and Husserl's understanding of empathy, would serve well as signposts in approaching a deeper understanding of empathy. Other works by Zahavi, particularly those that are directly relevant to our better understanding of empathy and intersubjectivity, shall be of great help. The extraordinary clarity of his exposition and analysis could facilitate in understanding Husserl's and Stein's rigorous texts which are by no means easy to grasp in their entirety and details.

I find an essay by Mette Lebech, "Stein's Phenomenology of the Body: The Constitution of the Human Being Between Description of Experience and Social Construction," quite significant in bringing out Stein's contribution to phenomenology. Lebech observes how "particularly sensitive" Stein's phenomenology is to intersubjective constitution, and proceeds to present Stein's account of phenomenology of the body. Lebech directly links Stein's analysis of empathy to Husserl, as Stein's immediate response to a challenge of phenomenological constitution presented by Husserl's phenomenological way – that is, Stein's dissertation is a contribution to Husserl's phenomenological project. Lebech considers *On the Problem of Empathy* as an "addition to *Ideas I*: something Stein understood to be missing in this work for the work to be complete."<sup>61</sup> It is interesting to know how Lebech finds the analyses by Stein (particularly of psyche and spirit) as superior to the analyses we find in Husserl's *Ideas II*.

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<sup>59</sup> At the local level (Philippines), aside from J. C. Estafia's works, also worth considering are the works by Emerita Quito, *Phenomenology: Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein* (Manila: De La Salle University Press, 2001), and Michael Hernandez, *The Concept of Intersubjectivity in the Personalism of Edith Stein* (A Dissertation in Philosophy, Graduate School, University of Santo Tomas, Manila, 2008).

<sup>60</sup> Dan Zahavi, "Empathy, Embodiment and Interpersonal Understanding: From Lipps to Schutz," *Inquiry*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (June 2010), 285-306.

<sup>61</sup> M. Lebech, 16.

A thesis for the Master's degree by Fr. Jose Conrado Estafia, *Edith Stein on the Problem of Empathy: Towards Being Human* (defended in 2004 at the Graduate School, University of Sto. Tomas), discourses about empathy and how it opens a way to being and value, that is, how it "unlocks what it means to be human" for Edith Stein. This thesis was followed-up by a dissertation entitled *Edith Stein: Her Contribution to the Dialogue Between Faith and Reason*, which clearly pursued a largely different direction from my present inquiry. However, this latter study still highlights certain insights into Stein's understanding of empathy. My interest in Fr. Estafia's studies concerns mainly in his interpretation of Stein's understanding of empathy. Hence, I shall largely focus on this thesis rather than on his dissertation. I shall nevertheless take into account his discussion of empathy in his dissertation insofar as it enriches his interpretation of empathy in his thesis.

A collection of essays, edited by William Sweet and Richard Feist, supports the approach and direction of our inquiry – that is, taking Husserl and Stein from a comparative point of view.<sup>62</sup> The early issues on empathy and intersubjectivity are discussed in some of the essays which are immediately and directly relevant to our present inquiry, namely: Judy Miles' "Other Bodies and Other Minds in Edith Stein: Or, How to Talk about Empathy," Ernest J. McCollough's "Edith Stein and Intersubjectivity," and Marianne Sawicki's "The Humane Community: Husserl vs. Stein," considered as a crowning essay of the whole collection. They offer insights, either consistent to classical reading of Husserl and Stein or divergent.

H. Peter Steeves, in his book *Founding Community: A Phenomenological-Ethical Inquiry*, engages us in exploring phenomenology's ethical dimension – a dimension which has been under questioning as a sort of weakness in Husserlian phenomenology. But instead of pursuing this direction and without forgetting this crucial ethical dimension, this inquiry would rather consider Steeves' analysis insofar as intersubjectivity and empathy are concerned. Steeves claims how inaccurate it is, from a historical and scholarly point of view, to consider *Cartesian Meditations* as containing Husserl's definitive theory of intersubjectivity. Yet he finds it appropriate, particularly the 'Fifth Meditation', in presenting Husserl's phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity.<sup>63</sup> Steeves' insights, his suggested implications, specifically regarding empathy and intersubjectivity, serve as guide in understanding Husserl's various attempts at constituting phenomenologically our encounter with one another.

Marianne Sawicki's work, *Body, Text, and Science: The Literacy of Investigative Practices and the Phenomenology of Edith Stein*, is particularly penetrating and directly relevant to our inquiry. She explores the interweaving of insights found in Husserl's *Ideas II*, wherein two theories of intersubjectivity – one by Husserl, and the other

<sup>62</sup> See William Sweet and Richard Feist, eds., *Husserl and Stein* (USA: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2003).

<sup>63</sup> Cf. H. P. Steeves, 9-30.

by Stein – are interwoven almost inextricably. C. Hutt makes a similar attempt in his brief essay mentioned earlier. What sets Sawicki's work apart as indispensably important is her detailed and sustained textual investigation, where empathy cuts through the heart of Husserl's and Stein's common yet diverging phenomenological understanding. Without any doubt, Sawicki's account clarifies a number of difficult questions crucial in establishing the common and divergent grounds of Stein's and Husserl's phenomenological understanding of empathy.

Another extraordinary work, *Issues in Husserl's Ideas II*, a compilation of essays edited by Thomas Nenon and Lester Embree, explores the intricacies and complexities one may find in Husserl's *Ideas II*. Three essays have particularly caught my attention, namely: Elizabeth A. Behnke's "Edmund Husserl's Contribution to Phenomenology of the Body in 'Ideas II,'" Rudolf A. Makkreel's "How is Empathy Related to Understanding" and John J. Drummond's "The 'Spiritual' World: The Personal, the Social, and the Communal." In his introduction, T. Nenon brings to fore the difficult textual problems presented in this work by Husserl. One undeniable implication, after wrestling with the text of *Ideas II*, is that it does not present at all a "seamless whole."<sup>64</sup> In other words, one will surely find divergent or apparently irreconcilable (inconsistent to say the least) ideas in the same work by one author. In the midst of such apparent textual inconsistencies or divergent theories, we find the issue of empathy surfacing, apparently not at the periphery but at the core.

The path being taken may be 'long and thorny', yet in trudging it I take consolation for having glimpsed at Edmund Husserl's "promised land," and, like Edith Stein, for having tried to cultivate it – in this case, by dwelling on the problem of empathy. ■



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<sup>64</sup> Cf. T. Nenon and L. Embree, ix.